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The most direct impact of the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese rule on July
1, 1997 will be on the people of Hong Kong. While the arrangement between the
British and the Chinese governments concerning the reversion sought to preserve
the unique nature of Hong Kong society, the people of Hong Kong are likely to
experience a change in the nature of their system of governance after July 1, 1997.
* Professor Daniel D. Bradlow is a Professor of Law and Director of the International
Legal Studies Program at the American University Washington College of Law vhere he
specializes in international economic law. He has been a Senior Special Fellow of the
United Nations Institute on Training and Research and served as an advisor to the Re-
thinking Bretton Woods Project He has edited books and published articles on interna-
tional financial law, international financial institutions, and the World Bank Inspection
Panel.
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The laissez faire and newly democratizing colonial regime that presently governs
Hong Kong will have been replaced by a regime acceptable to the Chinese Com-
munist Party.
This change raises important questions about the sustainability of the recent
democratic changes in Hong Kong and about the likely impact of the new regime
on the human rights and economic futures of the citizens of Hong Kong. The an-
swers to these questions will depend on many factors, including the actions and
decisions of the people of Hong Kong, those who presently represent them in the
Legislative Committee, the new leaders who will take office at the time of the re-
version, and the actions and decisions of both the Chinese government and the
international community. In addition, it will be influenced by the differing legal
traditions that exist in Hong Kong. The way in which the new rulers of Hong
Kong integrate the common law traditions of the "old" colonial Hong Kong with
the Chinese legal tradition that predominates in the People's Republic of China
will influence how the human rights of Hong Kong's citizens evolve, how much
protection workers and other economic actors receive, the predictability and en-
forceability of commercial transactions, and how free speech and the press are re-
spected in the post-reversion society. This attempt to combine two different legal
orders is also an experiment of interest to all who are concerned with how to inte-
grate all the legal traditions of the world into a sustainable and just international
legal order.
The reversion will also create challenges and opportunities for China. The
world is watching to see how it absorbs the free-wheeling and legally distinct
Hong Kong enclave into its own more regimented social order. China's ability to
successfully absorb Hong Kong, while respecting the rights and different tradi-
tions of Hong Kong citizens, will raise confidence in the ultimate success of the
social and economic transformation presently underway in China. A successful
reversion of Hong Kong to China will also raise hopes for the establishment of a
more human rights sensitive social and legal order in China.
The forthcoming changes in Hong Kong are also of importance to the interna-
tional community. First, China is an increasingly important actor in the evolving
global economic order and in geo-political affairs. Consequently, how it meets its
obligations under the "one country, two systems" arrangement that it proposed as
the model for the reversion of Hong Kong to China, will influence other interna-
tional actors' faith in China's credibility as a negotiating partner. Second, the
ability of China to successfully re-integrate Hong Kong, will influence investors
and others' perceptions of the sustainability of China's own social and economic
transformation. This in turn will affect their confidence in the long-term prospects
for Asian development. Based on these factors, the success of the reversion of
Hong Kong to Chinese rule is likely to affect China's influence over the evolving
international order and thus over all of our futures.
Given the international political, economic, and legal significance of the up-
coming events in Hong Kong, the International Legal Studies Program at the
Washington College of Law is proud to have co-sponsored together with Human
Rights Watch/Asia and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the conference
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on "Hong Kong: Preserving Human Rights and the Rule of Law," which took
place on March 18-19 at the Washington College of Law. The mission of the In.
ternational Legal Studies Program of Washington College of Law includes the
promotion of an international legal order that respects the rights of all human
beings and the legal traditions of all societies and that is based on mutual respect
andjustice. As part of this mission, it sponsors conferences, like the conference on
Hong Kong, that are designed to educate law students, lawyers, and the broader
community about important developments in international law. We hope that the
publication of the transcript of this conference will assist the people of Hong Kong
to protect their human rights and their evolving democratic order and vill help
keep international attention focused on ensuring that the reversion of Hong Kong
to Chinese rule becomes an important event in our long march to the establish-
ment of the rule of law in all countries and of ajust international legal order.
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WELCOMVING REMARKS
PROFESSOR BRADLOW: Good morning, everyone. My name is Daniel
Bradlow, and I am the director of the International Legal Studies Program at the
law school, and I would like to welcome you to the law school.
It is my great pleasure to call on the Dean of the law school, Claudio Gross-
man, to officially open this conference. Dean Grossman.
DEAN GROSSMAN: Thank you Professor Bradlow, and I'm very pleased to
be here with you this morning for this inaugural event on the Hong Kong Confer-
ence. I am especially gratified to welcome again into our institution Human
Rights Watch Asia and the Lawyers' Committee, and I would like to express to
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them our appreciation for involving us in this important conference.
As someone who has worked in the human rights field, I cannot say enough
about the work of this ongoing American organization. In my own experience,
with particularly the American Commission of Human Rights, the presence of in-
dependent and powerful observers and activists guarantees the promotion and
protection of human rights. Without their voice, many lives would be sacrificed
and the hope of expanding the freedom and the protection of their witness would
not be possible. So as an academic institution, as I stated before, we are proud to
be associated with this important ongoing American organization.
I'm not much of a flag-waver I want to tell you, but this is a good flag, the flag
I want to mention today in the morning meeting, is the flag of an institution like
ours which is committed to research, teaching, and service, to numerous human
rights activities. And I want to share some of those activities with you.
The law school is now the Legal Research Office for the Prosecutor's Office of
the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. We have a team of faculty members and
students that put their time and effort assisting in that activity whose main aim is
to avoid one of the most important problems of humankind, and that is impunity.
Oar work on impunity--or against impunity-is shown through the type of cur-
riculum we offer and other research projects in which we are currently involved.
The law school is also a place where the Inter-American Human Rights Digest
Project is taking place. The purpose of this project is to systematize the jurispru-
dence under the Inter-American system for the purposes of placing that jurispru-
dence at the process of human rights activists, petitioners, and victims. The law
school is also starting for a second year an Inter-American work core competition
attracting over forty samplings from all over the hemisphere who come here to
acquire the skills, the knowledge, the researchability, and the networks, the possi-
bilities that are offered by the capitol of the United States.
As you probably know, we were the first school in the country and in the world
created by women, and we think that it is very important to offer the possibility of
specializing in gender issues and becoming advocates, law professors, and activ-
ists in that important aid.
For this initiative I want to thank the director of the program, Danny Bradlow,
who has placed a tremendous energy and enthusiasm in these endeavors. I would
like to say, however, that what defines this law school is not the number of things
we're doing here or attempt to do; what defines us is that we feel the need to con-
tinue to interact with scholars, practitioners, and students for the purposes of
promoting values of human dignity. And when I mention the types of things we
are doing in this law school, I mention them for the purpose of seeing whether we
can continue to do things together, whether we can entice you to see us as partners
to continue to develop exciting projects.
It's from that perspective, also, that I'm proud and I'm pleased to be here par-
ticipating in the opening of this conference which is so essential in the moment in
which I'm currently living and I'm going to continue to live. The program, I
think, is excellent and attaches on the issues that have relevance for Hong Kong's
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future. We as an academic institution have an issue that is specific to us that I
would like to see discussed in the debate. It is the issue of academic freedom in
Hong Kong. We know now that before the transfer of power in Hong Kong, Hong
Kong rarely had full academic freedom. I know of an incident in academic Hong
Kong where students painted some slogans concerning the massacre at Tianan-
men Square and the president of the university ordered these removed, but the
students protested, the faculty protested, the press protested, and these slogans
were painted again. That shows the existence of a vibrant intellectual conmunity
which was prepared to participate in the dialogue of their debates and the analysis
of the future of their city and of their country.
We intend to remain vigilant with them in preserving all the human rights
and, specifically, the values of academic freedom. We would seek guidance also in
this conference as to how we can contribute in that endeavor.
I welcome you again to this exciting conference, and I hope that this will be the
continuation of the partnership with ongoing developments that we consider so
important for the expansion of human rights. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR BRADLOW: Thank you, Dean Grossman. With that, let me
hand things over to Professor Peter Jaszi, who moderates the first panel.
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW:
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND PROSPECTS
FOR THE LEGAL REGIME IN HONG KONG AFTER
JULY 1
PROFESSOR JASZI: This first panel, titled "Introduction and Overview: In-
ternational Obligations and Prospects for the Legal Regime in Hong Kong After
July 1" has an important function in today's overall program. Our three distin-
guished speakers will provide the information that will be, in effect, the founda-
tion for the discussions later that will take up the panels of this morning, after-
noon, and evening.
Our first speaker today is Professor Nadine Strossen. She is a Harvard Law
School graduate and since 1988 a professor at the New York Law School. Since
1991, she has been the president of the American Civil Liberties Union. She is a
prolific author and a critical voice for human rights at both the domestic and in-
ternational levels.
Our second speaker today is the Honorable Margaret Ng. She is a barrister, a
member of the Hong Kong Bar Council, a legal journalist, and a member of the
Hong Kong Legislative Council, representing the legal functional constituency.
She is a graduate of Cambridge and Boston University and a frequent lecturer on
political and legal issues both in Hong Kong and throughout the world.
And last we will hear from the Honorable Christine Loh, who has had a distin-
[12:3
HONG KONG CONFERENCE
guished career as a lawyer and business person in Hong Kong and has been a
long-time advocate of governmental transparency and democratic values in Hong
Kong. Since 1992, she has been a member of the Legislative Council representing
the Hong Kong Island Central constituency--with which I will ask Professor
Strossen to begin.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Thank you very much, Professor Jaszi. I am de-
lighted to participate in this important conference. Before I became ACLU Presi-
dent, I was honored to be Vice Chair of Human Rights Watch/Asia, and in that
capacity I had the opportunity to visit Hong Kong on a number of occasions and
to meet with leaders of its legal and human rights communities.
Unfortunately, I've had to reduce my active involvement in international issues
since becoming head of the ACLU, but I have continued to follow developments
in Hong Kong with great interest and, increasingly, with great concern. Very re-
cently, former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh asked me to join with
him as one of the founding members of an organization called the U.S. Commit-
tee for Hong Kong, and I was honored to do so. This is a bipartisan organization
that supports the guarantees to the people of Hong Kong that were originally laid
out in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration: most importantly, for autonomy, a
democratically elected legislature, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and a
free-market capitalist economy.
As indicated by its bipartisan nature, the US. Committee for Hong Kong calls
for holding China to its guarantees of autonomy, democracy, and human rights,
and calls for the United States government to use its influence to that end, have
been coming from across the political spectrum in the United States. In this effort,
I think it is interesting and noteworthy that many liberal organizations, including
human rights groups, have been joined by many conservative organizations, in-
cluding some from the so-called "Religious Right." We are also seeing strange
bedfellows on this issue in Congress, from liberal Democrats to conservative Re-
publicans. I think that this broad ideological consensus underscores the funda-
mental nature of the rights that are at stake--core human rights tenets that are
broadly supported by the international community. In addition to democratic
elections, the rule of law, and an independent judiciary, these fundamental human
rights include an independent civil service and basic civil and political hbrties-
notably, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association.
These basic rights are essential not only for the sake of individual freedom, but
also for the sake of social, political, and economic stability. It's no wonder, then,
that these rights are supported not only by advocates of individual human rights,
but also by business interests. And these rights should be of urgent concern not
only to those who are specifically interested in Hong Kong, important as that is,
but also to those with a more domestic outlook. That is because the future of Hong
Kong will have an enormous impact on the United States for better or for worse.
As Dick Thornburgh stated in recent Congressional testimony: "U.S. interests in
Hong Kong and Asia from trade to law enforcement will be directly affected by
whether the Joint Declaration's broad guarantee of autonomy is respected by
China. The concept of autonomy cannot be separated from the guarantees of an
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elected legislature, an independent judiciary, and a capitalist economy. Any bro-
ken promise by China will make Hong Kong's autonomy more fragile."
Unfortunately, of course, China has already broken many essential promises
and already cast doubt on Hong Kong's autonomy after July 1. Therefore, since
July 1 is rapidly approaching, it is now critical to bring this problem to the atten-
tion of significant affected communities in this country, which could exercise
meaningful support for China's guarantees toward Hong Kong: most importantly,
policymakers, business interests, the legal profession, the press, and the academic
world.
Martin Lee, head of Hong Kong's Democratic Party and a prominent human
rights lawyer, has been traveling around the world and speaking with literally
thousands of journalists in a nonstop effort to plead the causes of autonomy, de-
mocracy, and human rights in Hong Kong. When a U.S. journalist recently asked
him why he was working so hard to try to galvanize international concern, Martin
Lee replied, "I believe the battle for Hong Kong cannot be fought and won if the
world is not behind us. Otherwise we become another Tibet."
As I have already indicated, in the 1984 Joint Declaration, in return for the
transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong, China bound itself to a number of im-
portant guarantees. Most importantly, it agreed that the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region (SAR) "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in for-
eign and defense affairs;" that it will be "vested with executive, legislative and
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication;" that "the laws
currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged;" and finally,
that the following rights and freedoms "will be ensured by law": speech, press,
assembly, association, travel, movement, correspondence, strike, choice of occu-
pation, academic research, and religious beliefs.
Annex I to the Joint Declaration elaborated on its guarantees of "rights and
freedoms." It also contains the following additional guarantees, among others:
that the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights shall remain
in force in Hong Kong; that the legislature "shall be constituted by elections"; and
that a court of final appeal shall be constituted to exercise "the power of final
judgment."
As written, these promises were certainly cause for optimism. On the other
hand, in light of China's historic record, they also provided some cause for skep-
ticism. China had previously made a commitment to "the right of exercising na-
tional regional autonomy" when it assumed sovereignty over another region and
that other region, unfortunately, was Tibet in 1951.
Sadly, China has already shown that its pledges for Hong Kong may well be
worth no more than its pledges for Tibet. That conclusion was supported in last
week's issue of The New Republic in an article by Stan Sesser, a Senior Fellow of
the Human Rights Center at Berkeley. In his words: "Emboldened by the United
States' open embrace of trade concerns over democracy and human rights, and
seeing no particular reason to wait until July, Beijing has already gone a long way
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toward destroying what democracy there was in Hong Kong, and it shows every
intention of finishing the job."
A similar conclusion was reached in Human Rights Watch's last annual report
written at the end of 1996. It stated: "The chances that Hong Kong's autonomy
would be maintained after... July 1, 1997... seems slim. [The Chinese gov-
ernment seem[s] intent on repealing provisions in Hong Kong's Bill of Rights,
dissolving the elected Legislative Council, undercutting the independence of the
judicial system and the executive, and curbing freedoms of expression and assem-
bly."
In my remaining time, I will briefly outline some of the highlights of this anti-
democratic trend-or I should say the lowlights. Throughout the remainder of the
conference, other speakers will amplify on particular developments in more detail.
Ironically, China's departure from the Joint Declaration began in 1990 when its
National People's Congress enacted the Basic Law, which was designed to serve
as the Hong Kong SAR's constitution. That was ironic because the stated purpose
of the Basic Law was to implement the Joint Declaration.
To be fair, to some extent the Basic Law did reiterate and reinforce some of the
essential guarantees of the Joint Declaration. For example, it granted the SAR "a
high degree of autonomy ... and executive, legislative and independent judicial
power, including that of final adjudication." It also reiterates the basic human
rights that are set out in the Joint Declaration, adds several others, and repeats
that the two international human rights covenants shall remain in force.
To an alarming extent, though, the Basic Law departed from and undermined
the Joint Declaration's guarantees. That was the conclusion of a 1992 report by
the International Commission of Jurist (ICJ). Accordingly, the ICJ called on
China to amend the Basic Law to bring it into compliance with the Joint Declara-
tion-something that has never happened.
The Basic Law's serious deviations from the Joint Declaration included sharp
limits on the power and independence of Hong Kong's courts. Also, contrary to
the Joint Declaration's clear guarantee of an elected legislature, the Basic Law
provides for the democratic election of only one-third of the legislative seats. An-
other very troubling provision in the Basic Law is its Article 23, which requires
the SAR's legislature to enact laws prohibiting various crimes, including "subver-
sion" and "theft of state secrets." These are precisely the types of laws that Beijing
has used to suppress dissent in China, thus raising fears that they will be used in
the same way in Hong Kong.
Such fears have recently been fanned by criminal cases in the PRC. First,
Wang Dan, the Tiananmen student leader, received an li-year prison sentence for
subversion, and his allegedly subversive act included publishing articles in foreign
publications, attempting to maintain contact with other dissidents, and taking a
correspondence course from the University of California at Berkeley.
The second recent case in China shows that Beijing's concept of the theft of
state secrets is as expansive and as inconsistent with civil liberties as its concept
of subversion. Specifically, a Beijing-based reporter for a Hong Kong paper was
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convicted of theft of state secrets and received a 12-year sentence after he acquired
information about interest rate changes and other financial data that was about to
be made public anyway.
The next agreement between China and Britain concerning Hong Kong con-
tinued this pattern of eroding the Joint Declaration's guarantees. Under the Joint
Declaration, a new high court for Hong Kong was to be composed of judges se-
lected by an independent commission, and judges were to be appointed from over-
seas common law jurisdictions. But the 1995 Court of Final Appeals Agreement
(CFA Agreement) gives the Chinese-appointed Chief Executive a role in judicial
selection and also limits the overseas common law judges to just one. Moreover,
the CFA Agreement sharply limits the courts' jurisdiction and, worse yet, gives to
the National People's Congress final power over jurisdictional issues. Conse-
quently, Beijing had the last word on the Hong Kong courts' treatment of civil
liberties and challenges to government power. Obviously, that cripples the courts'
ability to enforce human rights guarantees or to remedy human rights violations.
Not surprisingly, therefore, this agreement was strongly opposed by the Hong
Kong Bar Association and Martin Lee. In Lee's words, this agreement meant that
"the rule of law is finished in Hong Kong."
To say the least, then, the Basic Law and the CFA Agreement were terrible
setbacks for Hong Kong's autonomy. Sadly though, they were followed by even
more distressing setbacks. In the 1995 elections for the Legislative Council, Mar-
tin Lee's Democratic Party won a landslide victory, gaining 12 of the 20 directly
elected seats and seven of the indirectly elected seats. That was a wonderful his-
toric show of support for democracy and human rights by the people of Hong
Kong. But the PRC showed no more enthusiasm for this pro-democracy outpour-
ing in Hong Kong than it had shown for a similar outpouring in Tianannen
Square in 1989. Indeed, up to one million Hong Kong residents had demonstrated
against the Tiananmen massacre. Thus, as Stan Sesser wrote in his New Republic
piece last week, perhaps that itself "led Chinese leaders to rethink the guarantees
they had offered in the Joint Declaration."
At least the PRC's backlash and crackdown in Hong Kong has not been as
overtly violent and brutal as its crackdown in Tiananmen, but it may well have
the same stifling impact on democracy and human rights. Specifically, in March
1996, the Beijing- appointed Preparatory Committee, chaired by the PRC's For-
eign Minister, voted to replace Hong Kong's elected Legislative Council
(LEGCO) with an appointed Council. Moreover, last December, China further
violated its promise of an elected legislature by engineering the appointment of a
"Provisional Legislature." This body was chosen by the 400-member Selection
Committee, which had in turn been chosen by Beijing's Preparatory Committee.
In the words of Governor Chris Patten, this Provisional Legislature has "no le-
gitimacy, no credibility, and no authority." Yet it is purporting to act.
The PRC delivered its most recent blow to Hong Kong's autonomy last month,
when the Preparatory Committee recommended that 24 Hong Kong laws not be
adopted as laws of the Hong Kong SAR. That recommendation, of course, violates
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the Joint Declaration's guarantee that Hong Kong's laws should remain essen-
tially unchanged. And the targeted laws, not surprisingly, all promote civil and
political liberties. They include: central provisions in Hong Kong's Bill of Rights
Ordinance; laws protecting freedom of the press, assembly, and association; and
democratic electoral reforms. Instead, the PRC is seeking to revive draconian co-
lonial security laws that severely restrict private associations, demonstrations,
broadcasts, and publications.
Ironically, Britain had adopted these repressive laws in the 1960s to curb ex-
pression supportive of China; now Beijing wants to use these laws to curb expres-
sion critical of China. Even before reviving these repressive laws, China has al-
ready enormously stifled political dissent, artistic expression, and other important
speech in Hong Kong. In a report issued last October, Human Rights WatchlAsia
concluded that free speech in Hong Kong is "at great risk." It cited specific evi-
dence ranging from direct government censorship to intimidation, harassment,
and detention of journalists, and, finally, last but not least, enormous pressures
toward self-censorship.
I'd like to close my overview by quoting from Dick Thomburgh's forceful
Congressional testimony last month on behalf of the U.S. Committee for Hong
Kong, of which we are both founding members. So far I have been mostly nega-
tive, giving you the gloom and doom picture from Hong Kong. As an activist, I
naturally have a more constructive, positive outlook and agree with Dick on his
ending note that we should look constructively to what we here can do to forestall
the trend away from the promises of autonomy, democracy, and human rights,
and I think we can and should and must do a lot. As Dick stressed, Congress has
based U.S. policy toward Hong Kong on support for the Joint Declaration's guar-
antees, but he also criticized the Clinton Administration for not vigorously sup-
porting these guarantees, and he urged Congress to more forcefully exercise its
oversight role. I'll end with his powerful call for renewed vigor, by all American
policymakers, and leaders in monitoring developments in Hong Kong-
It would be a tragedy i1 at a time when democracy and the nile of law are gain-
ing ground around the world, Hong Kong's people, a great many of .,hom are
refugees or descendants of refugees from repression, were to be denied the future
they were promised. The United States simply must stand up for the people of
Hong Kong. As the strongest and most free nation in the world, our leadership is
crucial. It is more than a matter of national interest It is a matter of national
honor.
HONORABLE MS. NG: That was a very musing speech. As someone from
Hong Kong, I'd like to start by expressing my appreciation for the interest that the
American people have shown Hong Kong. It is very easy for one to be totally
submerged in one's own interests and one's own concerns, but to take so much
time to understand in such full detail, as Professor Strossen has done, about an-
other people's problems is something that is to be praised, something that I'm
very grateful to see.
Professor Strossen has outlined to you the predicament that Hong Kong people
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are in. This morning I shall try not to speak with the excitement that we feel at
home, the passion that we feel at home, about defending our autonomy and the
rule of law and our rights. This morning I'll try to use a dispassionate voice, not
to say what problems we are facing, so much as what we can adhere to in order to
protect those rights. And because this morning's conference is going to concen-
trate on preserving human rights and the rule of law, and as I am a lawyer, a
member in Hong Kong's Legislative Council representing lawyers, I shall stick to
the rule of law.
I consider sticking to the legal regime in Hong Kong after the 1st of July a
very, very important matter because, as lawyers, you would appreciate the dictum:
There is no right without remedy. So it is useless for us to talk about rights in very
general principles if we do not have the mechanism with which to protect these
rights, with which to give remedy when these rights are infringed,
In passing, as the Basic Law is imperfect and Professor Strossen has very pow-
erfully highlighted to you some of these imperfections, as I politely put it, we have
to go by what protection there is already in the Basic Law; what is already put in
the Basic Law we intend to keep. We intend to keep China to those promises. So
I'd like to just say one more thing, and that is there is a lot of attention on the
protection of human rights on the ICCPR, on the international mechanism for
looking at these rights, and of pointing them out. But to us in Hong Kong, much,
much more important is the mechanism in place in Hong Kong that would safe-
guard the individual's rights from day to day. We are talking about the laws
which are going to be enacted in Hong Kong, which have already been enacted in
Hong Kong, and the courts which are going to enforce these laws. Without that
system and without the democracy which underpins those laws and makes sure
that the court has those powers, I think to have human rights organisms or or-
ganizations intervene is hardly sufficient because these organizations will only be
able to intervene when things have become truly terrible. And we don't want
things to develop to that extent.
So first of all, I'd like to pick up on the point that our starting point is the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law which provides that Hong Kong's legal system and
laws in force in Hong Kong before 1st of July, 1997, shall remain unchanged.
And just to refresh your memory, I would like to read Article 8 which sets out the
most fundamental point. Article 8 of the Basic Law says: "The law previously in
force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subor-
dinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that
contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region."
Now, what is important to note here is that it is all encompassing. Let nobody
tell you that the laws in force previously in Hong Kong means the ordinances
which were in force in 1984; it said nothing of the sort. It means the common law
which is developing; the rule of equity, itself also a life-developing thing; the or-
dinance says "subordinate legislation and customary law," and it said, "except for
any that contravene this law." That is to say, any law which is in force in Hong
Kong unless it contravenes the Basic Law shall be in force. So any law, unless you
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can show that it contravenes any article of the Basic Law, is in force in Hong
Kong.
And, moreover, it says that "except to any amendment by the legislature of
Hong Kong"--in other words, the only people who can amend the laws of Hong
Kong is the legislature of Hong Kong, and that's very important. The NPC itself
cannot amend any law in Hong Kong, even according to the Basic Law it can just
say that it is not to be adopted or that it contravenes the Basic Law and send it
back to the Hong Kong legislature. It has no authority to amend that law itself
Equally important is Article 18, and I will also read that one to refresh your
memory. Article 18 the first paragraph says: "The laws in force in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall be this Law, the laws previously in force in
Hong Kong as provided for in Article 8 of this Law and the laws enacted by the
legislature of the Region." In other words, the legislature of the region shall be the
only authority which can enact any law for Hong Kong. It goes on to say: "Na-
tional laws shall not be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
except for those listed in Annex II," and even Annex II, which can be changed
from time to time, is limited here, and it says it has to be, "The laws listed therein
shall be applied locally by way of promulgation legislation by the Region." And
then it further says that, "The Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress may add to or delete," but these laws "shall be confined to those relating to
defence and foreign affairs as well as other matters outside the limits of the
autonomy of the Region, as specified by this law."
In other words, even though the list may be changed from time to time and
added to, the scope of Annex Ill of these laws is limited. In other words, it's lim-
ited to those relating to defense, foreign affairs, and things which are outside the
autonomy of the region. So that makes it very, very clear that the laws of Hong
Kong, the legal system, shall remain unchanged.
Now, what does "remaining unchanged" mean to us? It means not only the or-
dinances but the system of law, and I emphasize particularly one point, and that is
the continuity of the common law system with its well-established legal princi-
ples. Now, we are accustomed to talking about the ICCPR in recent years, and yet
the common law in itsell as its fundamental spirit protects the liberty of the indi-
vidual even before the coming into being of the International Conventions. There
is within the Basic Law this, from the mental spirit, which is that the freedom, the
liberty of the individual has to be protected. There is to be no arbitrary detention,
no arbitrary arrest. And that has lasted as long as the common law has existed.
Moreover, equally important, it is inherent in the common law that there are
certain things about the law which the executive must not do. You can change a
law, you can repeal it, you can enact a new law, but everything has to be done ac-
cording to due process. Now, this will be emphasized again and again as I go to
some of the examples.
When you look at the Basic Law, when you look at Chapter I, there is a list of
rights which are protected there, and in Article 39, I think, then it sveeps out by
saying that all the rights you have in the ICCPR are protected. But I think you
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should notice as you read through the articles in Chapter I on your own that al-
most every article begins with those rights are to be protected according to the
law; that they must not be limited except as stipulated by the law, and "the law"
means laws to be enacted by the legislature.
That goes to two points: Firstly, it is important what laws the legislature of
Hong Kong is going to enact, and that takes you to what sort of a legislature the
Hong Kong SAR is going to have. And, secondly, those laws are to be enforced by
the court. So that brings you to the question of what sort of legal system, what sort
of court system you will have after the 1st of July, 1997. It is vital to the rule of
law in Hong Kong after the 1st of July to ensure that the above is scrupulously
maintained; that is to say, what I have read out about the laws and the system of
law remain unchanged. And in the months to come we in Hong Kong shall watch
very carefully what is going to happen.
Now, people have asked me, "Are people in Hong Kong very scared about the
future?" I would say we are equal to anything. Hong Kong is our home. Pessi-
mism or optimism have got nothing to do with what we think about the future.
We look at the Basic Law and we ask what we have been asking throughout the
time when the Basic Law was being drafted: Are there any loopholes there? Pro-
fessor Strossen had pointed out to you some of the loopholes, and no doubt, if we
have time, we could point out others. But that was the first thing we looked at,
and we say even if every article of the Basic Law is obeyed, technically, would our
freedom and our rights be compromised? My topic this morning: "Will our system
remain unchanged and will our laws remain unchanged?" The answer I fear is
that many of us think not.
But more than that our question is: Will China keep to the promises which are
in the Basic Law? And that is not a matter of China saying the Basic Law shall
not apply as from tomorrow. It is something we have to watch from day to day.
The prospect of Hong Kong's legal regime remaining unchanged is threatened
by a number of things China has been doing. Professor Strossen again has very
helpfully given you some of the examples in the past, and I will give you some of
the recent examples. One example is the unjustified position not to adopt 24 of
Hong Kong's ordinances. Now, why are we particularly concerned? Now, it's not
just that-and I have to tell you that many of these 24, I believe, are juxtaposed to
the numbers because many of them would have become defunct anyway; they're
about the British naval force, what would happen to their belongings, things of
that kind-but among them are the very substantive ones about the Societies Or-
dinance, about public order and so on. But the legal profession in Hong Kong is
particularly concerned because it could be done without due process.
In other words, firstly, it has not been shown in law how any of this legislation
contravenes any of the articles of the Basic Law. That, up to this point, has not
been explained to us, and, in fact, some of the explanations are downright wrong.
For example, insofar as they have explained anything, the only thing they have
explained, for example, is what would happen to the Bill of Rights Ordinance in
Hong Kong. The Bill of Rights Ordinance in Hong Kong basically just incorpo-
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rates the ICCPR as applicable to Hong Kong. It has one or two preliminary, over-
all provisions. The one that they say will not be adopted says that ordinances
which passed in Hong Kong before the enactment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance
shall be read in light of this Ordinance. That is to say, insofar as it can be read
consistently with that Ordinance, it will be read that way, insofar as it cannot be
read consistently with that Ordinance, it will be impliedly repealed.
And then, secondly, it says that all future legislation shall be construed in light
of the ICCPR, not in light of the Ordinance, but in light of the ICCPR, which was
incorporated into the Letters Patent which has, as of now, more or less the same
status as the Basic Law after the 1st of July.
Now, the reason we are told that has to be scrapped is because that law, that
provision, has an overriding status over the other legislation in Hong Kong.
Firstly, even ifit does, that does not contravene the Basic Law. But, secondly, as
lawyers, you know that what I have just told you does nothing of the kind; it
merely states a common law principle that later legislation shall be read as im-
pliedly repealed ifit is inconsistent with the most recent legislation.
Now, this sort of thing gives the legal profession a lot of worry. Secondly, the
earlier suggestion was not just that these laws will be not adopted. It goes on fur-
ther to say that the old forms will be revived. For example, the Societies Ordi-
nance was amended in 1992. What was not to be adopted was the 1992 amend-
ment, with the result that the unamended version will be revived. There is no
provision in Hong Kong law to revive an amended legislation save and except the
power of disallowance of the Queen.
So, in other words, we see due process being trampled. Without any explana-
tion, they are recommended not to be adopted. Without telling us how they can
revive the previous version of laws, they say, "Well, it's going to be done any-
way." Then the second example is the more recent one. You must have heard that
the Premier has recently made a working report to the NPC. Now, this is about
the "provisional legislature." In Hong Kong, especially the legal professions,
keeping away from political controversy, had said that they find no legal basis for
the "provisional legislature".
Now, it is said that the "provisional legislature" will have legitimacy because
the NPC has endorsed a report on the work progress of the Preparatory Committee
which includes the establishment of the "provisional legislature". Now, I do not
know how that is supposed to give it legitimacy. All we are going to say is if that
does give it legitimacy, then we are really in trouble, because if something is pre-
viously-what is the polite way of putting it?-if something which has been
clearly shown not to have a legal basis, which is wrong, in other words, for all
sorts of reasons, can be made right just by the NPC endorsing it, where would we
be?
Now, law can only have a forward effect. In other words, you enact that law to-
day and it has effect as of today. What is legal today is legal; what is illegal today
is illegal until you change it. If you could change it just like that, and that is to say
three months down the road you say something which was illegal three weeks or
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three months ago now suddenly becomes legal, do we know any longer what the
law is?
Further, here is something, it seems to us that it is all a matter of whim. It de-
pends on whether the NPC is going to say yes or no. Then next time a client
comes to you and says, "Well, is this lawful or not," you would have to say, "Well,
it depends on what the NPC is going to say tomorrow." And that is utterly unac-
ceptable to people in Hong Kong.
Secondly, if we read the NPC's endorsement of that working report as simply
saying that although the Basic Law is there, the Basic Law could be suspended if
a need arises without going into the circumstances of when it is supposed to be
necessary, and, secondly, what is going to happen when the Basic Law is sus-
pended. Then, we say, "Well, why are we spending our time trying to study this
instrument? Why are we, in spite of the fact that we would prefer Hong Kong to
be much more liberal and more autonomous than provided by the Basic Law, why
are we trying nonetheless to accept it and to abide by this Law if this Law can
simply be set aside when it is inconvenient, when in some undefined circum-
stances it has become necessary to suspend it?"
So that is why the recent development in the NPC gives us further worries.
Further threats are now being posed in the decision of the Preparatory Committee
that the "provisional legislature" which has been established in December and is
now working, is going to enact laws for the SAR, to come into effect after the 1st
of July. This is very worrying to us because at any one time we consider that there
is only one legislature for Hong Kong, and we cannot have two legislatures pur-
porting to be functioning.
Now, a very fundamental thing about whether something comes into effect, is
that when you pass a law, the law has an effective date. Before that date comes,
you can do preparatory work for that law, but you cannot assume power under that
law. It is now explained in such a way that even before the Basic Law comes into
effect a purported legislature has the power, has the legislative power, to enact
laws. Then, it seems to be contradicting one of the very fundamental principles of
the legal system we are familiar with in Hong Kong. It is not a matter of when a
law comes into effect but when you purport to enact it. So that is an additional
problem which we are living with.
Now, before I stop, I shall just briefly point to two things: many people in the
United States, much as they are doubtful about what the Chinese government
does, are very impressed with our Chief Executive-elect, Mr. C.H. Tung, and they
tentatively have a good view of him that he will do the right thing for Hong Kong.
Now, I sincerely hope that this trust is well placed because whether or not the
"provisional legislature" is going to be enacting laws before it has power to do so
depends more on Mr. Tung than on the provisional legislature because the legis-
lature itself does not generate a bill; it is the executive which generates that bill. If
Mr. Tung puts a bill in front of that "provisional legislature", that legislature will
be invited to enact it. If he doesn't, then that "provisional legislature" will have
no authority to do so because the process could not have begun. So let's watch Mr.
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C.H Tung and see whether he is going to do that.
Further on, Ms. Christine Loh will talk about, I think, Article 158 of the Basic
Law, which does things to Hong Kong's jurisdiction in spite of the fact that I
think Article 19 of the Basic Law sets that the courts will have the same jurisdic-
tion as they had before. Nov, whether the jurisdiction of the court will be severely
cut down, will depend on two things. Firstly, it will depend on China's
self-restraint; secondly, it will depend on a strong and independent judiciary in
Hong Kong. And, later on today, the question of the independence of a judiciary
in Hong Kong will be further discussed. Hong Kong is, at this moment, at the
brink of appointing the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal and the judges
of Courts of Final Appeal. And we are watching this process to see how it is done,
to see whether the way it is going to be done will tend to preserve the independ-
ence of the judiciary or whether it will be the other way around. And I'm afraid
that the rule of law again is bound up with Hong Kong autonomy which is again
founded on the elected legislature, because here you see that the legal basis of the
"provisional legislature," particularly the legal basis of its enacting or purporting
to enact laws before the 1st of July, is likely to be challenged in the Hong Kong
courts after the 1st of July.
Now, who is going to be Chief Justice will somehow be linked with that prob-
lem, I think, in our minds. So in a way the politicization of the judiciary seems
inevitable. I leave that problem with you. That is almost an imponderable prob-
lem, but I think I shall stop here. Thank you very much.
HONORABLE MS. LOH: Very often in the Hong Kong Legislative Council I
follow the distinguished Ms. Margaret Ng in making speeches, and I always feel
extremely inadequate following Margaret And today I'm not only following Mar-
garet, I'm also following Nadine. So what I shall try to do is not talk about poli-
tics, the development of the political process and the "provisional legislature" so
much now, because in the afternoon I'll be participating in another session where
we will really talk about the future of politics.
What I will say now is if we look at the Joint Declaration, well, it's really a
political document It's a political document between Britain and China to settle
the transfer of sovereignty, and for such a political document, well, it sounded
quite good and, I guess at the time, back in 1994, myself and many people in
Hong Kong, we certainly expressed cautious optimism about this document. And I
guess in time it was good that China committed itself to the Joint Declaration, and
I guess the question we're asking now is whether it is too good to be true. If we
then look at the Basic Law, the Basic Law has much to commend itself for, but it
also has all the problems that Nadine and Margaret have spoken about I guess we
needed the Joint Declaration and we need the Basic Law precisely because we are
merging two systems within one country where the two systems are fundamentally
different in values and in the way things operate.
Since the two systems are so different, I guess we shouldn't be surprised that
there are going to be very different and difficult problems to resolve. We should
not be surprised that there are conflicts, and we're seeing many conflicts today.
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These two very different systems are coming into clashes. We are already seeing
them now, and it makes us wonder how these clashes will be resolved, whether
they can be resolved after 1997. Let us just take one or two examples to see what
these clashes are.
First of all, the Chinese legal tradition that is currently in place in China is a
Marxist- Leninist-socialist tradition. In that tradition, the law is regarded as an
instrument of the state, so in many ways it makes perfect sense in that system that
the state, the executive, would use the law to serve its political purpose. The
common law tradition, as Margaret has explained and as you well know, has a
fundamental respect for individual liberties, and it places great emphasis on due
process.
Now, if we look at the National People's Congress role in Hong Kong's future,
we immediately see something that makes perfect sense in a Marxist-Leninist tra-
dition but makes no sense in a common law tradition. What the Basic Law re-
quires is for the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to really
be the final adjudicator, the final interpreter of much of the Basic Law. So it is
mandating that a political organ interprets the law. This makes perfect sense in
the Marxist-Leninist tradition because they see that the power of the proletariat
has been vested in the National People's Congress. However, in the common law
tradition, as you well know, this makes no sense because how can a political or-
gan be independent in adjudicating the law?
This is a fundamental clash that Hong Kong and China, in becoming one
country, will have to work through. If we look at the issue of the "provisional leg-
islature" I think that offers another interesting example. By Hong Kong's way of
looking at things, the "provisional legislature" has no legal basis. In China's way
of looking at things, the executive has said it should exist. The law, if used as an
instrument of state can do no wrong. What has happened, as Margaret explained,
is that it wasn't quite acceptable to Hong Kong. Our leading legal minds and even
people who are trusted by China have been bleating all the while to say it isn't
quite right. So what we have now is, I guess, a very interesting example of how
Hong Kong has already caused its first very public act of indigestion on the Chi-
nese system. Because of all this continuous bleating, both in Hong Kong and over-
seas, what the National People's Congress has had to do is to openly endorse what
the Vice Premier Qian Qichen had in his report. Now, it doesn't get rid of the
"provisional legislature," but what it has had to do is to make China, at its highest
political organ, make some additional statement and comments.
So I bring this as an example because we are actually seeing the two systems
coming into conflict and settling to some solution. Now, this solution is not the
solution that Hong Kong would like to see, however, if one looked at how China
traditionally dealt with this problem. Traditionally they would have just said,
"Well, you know, we don't need to deal with these problems at all." But the fact
that they've had to deal with Hong Kong because Hong Kong says, even amongst
people very well trusted by them, that it wasn't good enough is the first jolt that
Hong Kong is causing in the Chinese system.
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How many more of these jolts might there be as these two systems work and
merge into one country? If we look at China today, she is passing more laws than
ever because she wants to modernize. Because she's reforming her economic sys-
tem, she wants to deal with financial services, so she's had to look at new laws,
new ways of doing things. That is certainly an area where Hong Kong has had
quite a lot of input in how China is drafling some of her new commercial and
trade-related laws.
It is very well that China has these laws, and I think we certainly want to en-
courage that legislative process to continue. But we know that one day she will
also need to look at her judicial process and her enforcement process. Those are
going to be very big challenges for the Chinese system. When she will do it, we
don't know, although I think she will have to deal with those problems even
within the Chinese polity itself. Whether Hong Kong and whether China's con-
tinuing engagement with the international community through the WTO and
other organizations, whether those connections and engagements will push China
to look at systemic changes to her system sooner rather than later, I don't know,
but I suspect that these engagements will help to expedite the process somewhat.
Now, for Hong Kong, how do we deal with this problem of a common law
system and a Marxist tradition? The Basic Law has one mechanism that proposes
to deal with this situation: The Basic Law proposes that there should be a Com-
mittee for the Basic Law set up. It should be there by the 1st of July, I guess. It
says that there should be a total of twelve members appointed to this committee,
six from the mainland and six from Hong Kong. In the areas relating to the inter-
pretation and the amendment of the Basic Law, the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress should consult the Basic Law committee before com-
ing to a final view. I wonder whether the drafters of the Basic Law were sort of
thinking of a compromise because it was precisely because they recognize the very
fundamental differences in the values that underpin the two legal systems that
made them think that there should be a committee that would advise the National
People's Congress on how to interpret and think about the Basic Law in general.
Now, of course, this committee could be an interesting committee in the sense
that Hong Kong will be able to have six members on it. I would certainly like to
propose that these six members should be lawyers because, after all, they are
making legal suggestions to the NPC, and I guess if the NPC wants to take politi-
cal positions, they can do it there. So the six members from Hong Kong, I mean,
obviously, if the six appointees are going to be distinguished lawyers from Hong
Kong, well, that would be good: Distinguished lawyers with good international
reputations who stand in high regard within the Hong Kong legal community. I
think that would be good. And in times to come when we dare to propose amend-
ments to the Basic Law, I wonder whether we should not argue that, instead of
having sort of a 50/50 balance between mainland appointees and Hong Kong ap-
pointees, whether we shouldn't have two-thirds of the members from Hong Kong.
These are ideas that we have to work at in the future. But I guess what I'm saying
is we can make perfect sense by arguing what this committee should be doing.
The Basic Law doesn't really tell you exactly how this committee is going to
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work, but I think this committee is potentially important. There's not much talk
about this committee either in Hong Kong or internationally at this moment in
time, but I'm pretty sure that appointments to this body are probably already being
considered by the Chief Executive Designate, and perhaps also by China. There's
only 100 days or so left before this committee will be appointed, and I certainly
hope very much that the legal community in Hong Kong will start whipping into
action and perhaps putting ideas, terms of references and so on, that are missing
in the Basic Law, to the Chief Executive for consideration.
Another point I wish to make is, if we were to imagine that today in America
you had the beginning of lawmaking, procedures, and conventions that will de-
termine the relationship between the federal government and states' governments,
let's say, today is Day One. You have a Constitution that broadly spells out that
relationship, but what you don't have yet are really those details that define that
relationship. Well, if you can imagine that, then I'm sure you can already imagine
what we need to do to define the relationship between the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and the Central People's Government. What is set in the
Basic Law, is only a broad framework; we still have to work out perhaps more
laws, certainly procedure and convention that will define that relationship. I guess
we're going to have to make it up as we go along. In making up that relationship,
much will be determined by how clear-headed and determined Hong Kong will be
in constructing a system that will help to preserve the integrity of the Special
Administrative Region, which will have a high degree of autonomy.
If we are going to look at establishing these relationships and creating the Spe-
cial Administrative Region, we are really talking about an act of creation. It is an
animal the world has never seen, and I'm pretty sure that the rest of the world
would probably, over time, continue to take an interest in Hong Kong precisely
because Hong Kong and China will have to labor through this extraordinary rela-
tionship that straddles two very fundamentally different legal systems.
I think I will just end by saying that this is an exciting process. It is one that
the international community will take an interest in, and it is one where we in
Hong Kong will also have to ensure that we, ourselves, know what we are doing
in entrenching the rule of law more deeply in Hong Kong and in also instilling
broadly in the community the spirit of the rule of law in the common law tradi-
tion. How can we do that?
What I would like to propose, for example, is that our leading legal bodies in
Hong Kong, the Bar Association, the Law Society, and our three law schools in
Hong Kong, that they have a particular role to play in engaging in a range of ac-
tivities every year over the course of many years to help, for example, young law-
yers, young law graduates in Hong Kong to be able to hook into the leading legal
minds and the legal thinking around the world so that they can feel inspired about
what the law should be. We want to invite legal minds, law graduates, and law
professors from the People's Republic of China to participate in this process.
Constructing seminars and exchanges is very easy. This is what universities
and various bodies do all the time. But what I am proposing is that we should
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think in Hong Kong about constructing these projects and these programs with
very specific objectives in mind. This isn't just another academic conference. This
isn't just another exchange program among lawyers. We are doing it because the
aim is to engage Hong Kong, is to engage all of the people, including the judici-
ary, law teachers, law graduates, law students, the profession--engaging every-
body in a process, year after year, in instilling in them the spirit of the rule of law.
PROFESSOR JASZI: Thank you all very much. I can hardly imagine a set of
presentations better calculated to set up the rest of the day's discussions. Techni-
cally, our allotted time is done, but Danny has been nice enough to say that we
could encroach a bit on the rest of the day's program for question time. So if you
would step to the microphone, identify yoursell and if your question is directed to
a particular panelist, so specify.
MR. DOWNS: I'm Chuck Downs, Associate Director of Asian Studies of the
American Enterprise Institute. And since I'm first up at the microphone, I'd like
to express my personal gratitude to the panelists for casting light on a number of
very murky issues today.
But I'd like to take off on a point that Ms. Loh made first about the funda-
mentally different systems between Hong Kong and the PRC and express a con-
cem that I have that in a lot of the discussions of the Hong Kong situation we very
seldom hear the words "private property." And the term "property" is used only
twice in the Basic Law, and both times it is used in a way that says that property
does not entitle you to any special considerations under the law.
How can the international community gain some feeling of assurance that pri-
vate property in Hong Kong will be protected after July 1st? I'd like to know how
the three panelists view this and whether you think there is reason for assurance.
Perhaps it's based on the fact that C.H. Tung must be a man who has a respect for
private property, perhaps it's based on Chinese self-restraint and modernization,
and new approaches to reform; perhaps it's based on the notion of continuity of
laws. But please share with me at least why you think there is reason for assur-
ance on this point
HONORABLE MS. NG: Can I answer very briefly? Firstly, on the broadest ba-
sis, I think that concern was very much present in the minds of people in Hong
Kong in 1982-84 when the whole Joint Declaration was being negotiated, and that
point was well taken by China. It really tries to assure people in Hong Kong that
private property will not be dealt with in a way that it was dealt with in the hey-
days of communism. So by saying that the socialist system will not be applied to
Hong Kong, that is particularly what is targeted; that is, your private property is
not going to be confiscated by the state. It will not become state owned.
But I think much more of the guarantee is in the preservation of the present
system of law and the present law. I have emphasized the protection for personal
liberties in the common law, but you must know, of course, the other strong leg of
the common law is private property. Property and liberty are the two feet of the
common law. Now, provided that spirit continues, not only in the courts in adju-
dication, but also in the process of making law, private property is not to be taken
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away without compensation. And I think that you know that this is one of the
most fundamental presumptions of the law.
I can give you a minute example of what is going on now in the Legislative
Council. We are, at the moment, scrutinizing a bill called the Government Rent
Bill. You would find that it is a dry kind of thing. I was on the committee because
I wanted to make sure that nobody was going to have additional taxation, or rent,
on his property without a clear case that the government is entitled to charge that
sort of rent.
So that spirit persists, and it is in the small particulars, not only in the general
principles. We have the broad general principles, but their protection is in the
particulars, in the routine, in every legislation being scrutinized in every case
which is to be adjudicated before the law. I do not think we are going to look for a
new creature here, as Christine was saying. This is not where we're looking for
this new creature. This is where we are looking for the old creature to be given its
full power, to have its full power and its full spirit assured.
HONORABLE MS. LOH: Yes. I guess all the people that China are
united-fronting at the moment are the biggest property owners, so I guess they're
alerted to this need to respect private property.
I was trying to reflect on the Basic Law-this is a new copy, so I can't find
anything in it-but the leases run out in Hong Kong, the government will be
charging, and it is mandated in the Basic Law, an additional three percent in an-
nual rental to be paid just as a point of information. That means that the Hong
Kong government, from this levying of extra taxation, is going to earn another
three to four billion Hong Kong dollars a year-you know, a large sum of money,
so I guess they want to respect private property.
The last point I want to make is in Hong Kong what we are seeing Chinese
enterprises do is, in fact, buying up, or beginning to buy up, key strategic busi-
nesses in Hong Kong. For example, they have chosen to buy a large share into
Cathay-Pacific. We are likely to see China buying into other major utilities, per-
haps power utilities and other companies in the future. So I think the Chinese way
of doing this seems to be not just to nationalize it but, perhaps, to consider having
to pay for it, which is, of course, much less objectionable.
MR. FELDMAN: My name is Harvey Feldman. I'm Senior Fellow for Asia at
the Heritage Foundation. Before that, I was foreign service officer and had the
good fortune to live in Hong Kong for eight years.
I don't know if this is really a question; this is perhaps a meditation. This is a
conference on rule of law and what we're hearing is that if they violate the Basic
Law in their undertakings, we shall take them to court, and then we will dispose
of it that way. That sounds nice in theory, but what we have is a situation where
what the Basic Law guarantees can easily be amended by whim, as it seems. For
example, when Jiang Zi Chen says, "Well, freedom of press, obviously, does not
include the freedom to criticize the leadership of the People's Republic of China,
or to advocate independence for Tibet, or to discuss the question of Taiwan in
terms other than as a province of the People's Republic of China," what we have
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is, in effect, amendment of the Basic Law by whim. And I'm not quite sure how
you deal with that
PROFESSOR JASZI: Meditation or question, would anyone like to respond?
HONORABLE MS. LOH: Well, again, I think the Qian statement is a very
good example of fundamental conflict. Now, how do you deal with that? Well, in
Hong Kong right now, of course, our laws allow us to criticize anyone we like. As
Margaret reminded us, if we're going to have different laws in the future, it would
require the Chief Executive representing the administration to put new laws for-
ward to the legislature.
Now, in Hong Kong I wonder whether we are going to see amendments soon to
the law where it would say something like this: That the people of Hong Kong
will be prohibited from-from criticizing Chinese leaders of a certain rank up. I
really don't know. That would be absolutely ludicrous. So if what we're going to
end up with is no laws of that sort altogether, that the laws that we have in the
future would be pretty much the laws that we have today, and, after all, we also
have to interpret Article 39 of the Basic Law which allows the ICCPR to continue
as they are, and if they are, well, we can say what we like. Or are we just going to
continue to have this kind of discussion with China where China expresses out-
rage and upset with certain statements and criticisms from people in Hong Kong
from time to time?
Now, if that is the case where it's just talk, and we continue to express the dif-
ferences of the two systems but continue to express some general statement that
we recognize the differences, we need to work it out, but actually the laws don't
change, well, that might be one way to go in the future. But I don't see why that
today we already need to make assumptions that our laws will be changed so fun-
damentally in Hong Kong that these statements would actually be put in laws that
we cannot criticize the Chinese leadership. I find that quite difficult to actually
digest in my own mind-but perhaps I'm being too optimistic.
MR. FELDMAN: My point is this: You're arguing that the law will be
changed and that unless the law is changed nothing happens. I suggest to you that
that's not the way it's going to work at all. I suggest to you the way it shall work
is that someone shall be arrested and brought forward on a charge of subversion
and convicted on a charge of subversion.
HONORABLE MS. LOH: Yes. Well, I can respond to that, too. What it says in
the law here is that the SAR shall pass laws to prohibit subversion. That means
Hong Kong has to write laws and define for itself what subversion means in Hong
Kong. That again requires the Chief Executive to draft laws in some detail to
bring them to the legislature for passage.
Margaret and I right now sit on one bills committee where we're looking at
laws of subversion as the British believe that they are acceptable. It requires, basi-
cally, some physical act, some physical unlawful act. That's why I'm saying in
Hong Kong, if we are going to have to pass some laws prohibiting certain acts, we
still need to define what they are. And what we are suggesting is that Hong Kong
would have the same kind of subversion laws or state security las as they have in
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China; that in Hong Kong what we would do is simply duplicate the laws that are
in existence in China for us today. Well, I also find that quite extraordinary. I'm
not saying it wouldn't happen, but Mr. Tung will have to have tremendous cour-
age to come forward with Chinese legislation for Hong Kong.
HONORABLE MS. NG: I think I'd like to thank this gentleman for his ques-
tion. That is very much in our minds, you know. I think the short answer to this is
not to accept that merely by Jiang Zemin or anybody else saying that this is not
allowed, that the Basic Law is changed. I think that that is why the job is not sim-
ply one of holding to general principle, but standing up each time where that gen-
eral principle is in fear of being violated. So we in Hong Kong, the moment Jiang
Zemin says such a thing, we say: "Under the Basic Law this is not a crime. We
are not restricted from criticizing leaders." When the NPC endorses his working
report, we stand up and say, "This does not appear to us to be right. You cannot
change the law except by due process, and the process is written in the Basic Law.
Unless you are prepared to tear up the Basic Law, and please do so before the
whole world, we are going to hold you to it."
That is why when Lu Peng, in one of his pronouncements, said that if someone
in America were to advocate the independence of Hawaii that would not be al-
lowed by American law. In fact, he would be arrested. That is against the law. We
in Hong Kong stood up and said, "This is not so. Under the common law there is
no crime of advocating anything, because there is no such thing as a law of advo-
cating the wrong things."
So we want not only to point out that due process is provided in the Basic Law,
we also want to say that it is important to emphasize the continuity of the com-
mon law because in the common law we do not just interpret words as the mean-
ing is suggested to us, we interpret them with reference to cases decided. We say
that you can't just say because you want to interpret it this way, the words are as
you want them to mean. We have a whole case law behind us, and it is very im-
portant. And for us in Hong Kong, it goes back to the nitty-gritty of the law which
is to say what is the language of the law going to be. If you are going to have Chi-
nese as the language of the law, how do you interpret it once that law is expressed
in Chinese?
I mean, let me just say that this is the point I tried to emphasize this morning,
and that is that we have to go like the common law; case by case. We have to
speak up each and every time it happens, and I hope that when we do this, when
we interpret the law in the spirit of the common law, that common law jurisdic-
tions will stand up and say that we are right.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: And I'd like to add from the American perspective,
because I was very struck by Christine's, I think, completely apt analogy of the
workings out we had to do. We had a wonderful Constitution, I guess analogous
to imperfect, as your Basic Law is imperfect, but a lot to start working with that
was only worth the paper that it was written on for much of our history.
Specifically, relating to Mr. Feldman's question, as most of the Americans in
the audience know, very shortly after our Constitution even had a specific free
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speech guarantee added to it through the First Amendment, Congress passed a
law that made it a crime to criticize the government It was called the Alien and
Sedition Act and people were convicted under it In fact, it wasn't until, sadly, re-
cently in our history that we took a robust view of freedom to criticize government
officials. It wasn't until this century. So it may be, I hope for Hong Kong it's not,
as long a working out
But I couldn't agree with you more, and this was a point that Margaret made
that what really makes a difference is not only the words they are to work with,
but who is enforcing them, what positions are the lavoyers taking, is there a strong
bar with a commitment to and understanding of human rights, and is there an in-
dependent judiciary.
PROFESSOR JASZI: I can hardly imagine a better transition to the next panel,
and so we will give way. Thank you so much to our speakers.
ISSUES FACING THE JUDICIARY: MAINTAhING
INDEPENDENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
DEAN DINNERSTEIN: I think we can all agree, this has been an excellent
introduction and kick-off to the conference. This particular panel is entitled "Is-
sues Facing the Judiciary: Maintaining Independence and the Role of the Courts."
My name is Robert Dinnerstein. I'm one of the Associate Deans for Academic
Affairs here at The Washington College of Law, and I want to add my welcome to
you as well as that of Peter Jaszi and Danny Bradlow and the deans. How fortu-
nate we are to have you here for this conference.
We have a distinguished panel to address the issues regarding the independ-
ence of the judiciary and, of course, the independence of the judiciary in any sys-
tem is a critical aspect of whether the system will abide by the rule of law and rec-
ognize human rights.
Our first speaker will be Professor Nihal Jayawickrama. He is a Professor at the
School of Law of Hong Kong University and a noted human rights advocate.
Among other things, he is Chairman of the Hong Kong section of the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists.
Our second speaker will be someone you've already met, Margaret Ng, from
the Hong Kong Legislative Council. I might point out, in addition to what you've
already heard about her, that Ms. Ng and Ms. Loh, who you also heard from, have
not joined the "provisional legislature" that is in effect, as have 33 of their col-
leagues of the Legislative Council of 60. So they have not done that
Our third speaker will be Scott Greathead, an attorney with the law firm of
Olwen & Davis, New York City, a founding member of the Lavqyers Committee
for Human Rights in New York, and probably most relevant for our purposes, a
member of a mission that the Association of the New York Bar undertook to Hong
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Kong in late 1995, I believe. You have that report of that mission in your materi-
als at page 88. It's entitled Preserving the Rule of Law in Hong Kong After July 1,
1997: The Report of a Mission of Inquiry.
I will now turn it over to the panelists, and at the end we will again try to pro-
vide some opportunity for questions. Without further adieu, Professor Jayawick-
rama.
PROFESSOR JAYAWICKRAMA: In the normal course of events, the transfer
of sovereignty over Hong Kong would have required the Hong Kong judiciary to
adapt itself not only to a life outside the common law world in which it was cre-
ated and from which it constantly sought nourishment, but also to an environment
dominated by concepts and values which were both alien and sometimes even an-
tagonistic to those upon which it was founded. Reference this morning was made
by Nadine--or I think it was Margaret-to the fact that the Hong Kong courts
will have to seek guidance-not only guidance but even an authoritative pro-
nouncement-from the legislature of China on the interpretation of basic law. It
would have been unthinkable in a common law jurisdiction, certainly in Hong
Kong, for such an event to occur.
That challenge has been made even more formidable by recent decisions of the
Chinese authorities to establish what has already been referred to as, the so-called
"provisional legislature" which has as yet no valid legal existence, and also to re-
move from the Bill of Rights, its operative provisions which do no more than re-
state principles of the common law. How will the Hong Kong judiciary meet these
challenges, considering that in the best of times most Hong Kong judges have not
only been very executive-minded but have also demonstrated an intellectual in-
ability to look beyond the common law world, within which they have imprisoned
themselves, out into the emerging body of international law that now regulates the
treatment of the individual by his government? I am frankly quite skeptical.
Let me identify briefly three issues that are likely to arise: The first is the ques-
tion of institutional independence. One of the consequences of the transfer of sov-
ereignty is that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will cease to be Hong
Kong's Court of Final Appeal. Accordingly, it was agreed in the Joint Declaration
that the power of final adjudication will remain in the territory and be vested in a
new court to be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The
Basic Law therefore provided that-and I think I need to refer to that article in
the Basic Law, Article 82: "The power of final adjudication of the Hong Kong
SAR shall be vested in the Court of Final Appeal of the Region," mark these
words "which means, as required, invites judges from other common law juris-
dictions to sit on the Court of Final Appeal."
In a territory where the legal profession is strong both in quality and in num-
bers, the unusual provision which enables the Court of Final Appeal to invite on
an ad hoc basis judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on it was advis-
edly made. Firstly, since the common law is expected to continue operating in
Hong Kong despite its integration with China, it was believed that the active par-
ticipation in the judicial process of sitting judges from other common law juris-
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dictions will help to maintain its vibrancy and dynamic nature.
Secondly, it was thought that the confidence of the business sector in Hong
Kong's judicial system could be maintained if the courts of the Hong Kong SAR
continue to have an international flavor in the form of'judges who are not likely to
be subject to the pervasive influence of Beijing. What was probably envisaged was
that ajudge of a court of comparable status would be invited by the Court of Final
Appeal to sit and participate in the hearing of an appeal of particular importance
or complexity. However, following a secret agreement between the Chinese and
British governments in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre-hardly anyone
calls it the Tiananmen massacre now, it's the Tiananmen "event," the Tiananmen
"incident," but I still like to call it the Tiananmen massacre because that is what it
was-it was decided to withdraw the power of invitation from the court and to
substitute a power of appointment vested in the chief executive.
That was a fundamental difference because it moved the selection process from
the court to the office of the Chief Executive. Accordingly, the Court of Final Ap-
peal Ordinance now provides for a panel of so-called non-permanent judges from
common law jurisdictions to be appointed by the Chief Executive on the recom-
mendation of the Judicial Officers' Recommendation Commission. Once ap-
pointed, they will rank below the permanent judges of the court, five of them, and
another category of non-permanent Hong Kong judges-a category of retired
Hong Kongjudges, based perhaps on the principle of "jobs for the boys," not pro-
vided for in the Joint Declaration or in the Basic Law. They will hold office, these
non-permanent judges from abroad, for a term of three years with a possibility of
repeated extensions at the discretion of the chief executive. A nonpermanent judge
from abroad will be subject to disciplinary control in Hong Kong and may be sus-
pended or dismissed from office by the Chief Executive on the recommendations
of a judicial tribunal. Therefore, what is now provided for is the office of a non-
permanent judge. Whether on application or by some other process of recruitment,
it is expected that judges from other common law jurisdictions, sitting in the
highest courts of their country, will be appointed to these offices.
Apart from the fact that serving judges in the courts of final appeal in most
common law countries are not permitted by their national constitutions to hold
any other office, it is inconceivable that they would either apply to the Hong Kong
government for appointment as non-permanent judges or would subject them-
selves to a process of selection by an administrative body in the Hong Kong SAR.
Nor is it conceivable that they would agree to submit themselves to disciplinary
control, possibly involving dismissal, by Hong Kong's Chief Executive, thereby
placing in jeopardy the security of tenure guaranteed to them by their own na-
tional constitutions.
What will probably happen is that judges of lesser courts in common law juris-
dictions, state or provincial judges from Canada and Australia, or retired judges
who have ceased playing any active role in the development of the common law
and who do not themselves enjoy any constitutional guarantee of independence,
will begin to vie with each other in seeking employment, even of a non-permanent
nature, under the patronage of the future Hong Kong SAR government.
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The second issue is one of personal independence and impartiality. Let me re-
fer to just two, perhaps three incidents. In October 1995, in a dramatic departure
from the accepted canons ofjudicial conduct, the then Chief Justice decided to be-
come a secret advisor to the Preliminary Working Committee established by the
Chinese authorities, an unofficial advisory body comprising persons from both
China and Hong Kong. I say "secret" advisor because his role was not known for
several weeks until it was broken in a newspaper story. He reportedly urged one of
the members of that committee to repeal the operative provisions of the Bill of
Rights. He was then asked to express his views in writing. He reportedly discussed
the matter with six of his judicial colleagues, who are as yet unidentified, and
drafted a statement that reflected their collective view. That document was circu-
lated to members of the legal sub-group of the Preliminary Working Committee
who then decided that the Bill of Rights should be emasculated and that amend-
ments made to six other laws to bring them into conformity with the Bill of Rights
should be ignored.
I don't wish to refer to the Chief Justice's subsequent conduct, such as his de-
nial that he held any views at all on the Bill of Rights; his denial that he had dis-
cussed the subject with anyone at all; or his subsequent admission that he had, but
that he later had forgotten about it; his meeting with the Chief Secretary, the head
of the executive branch of government in her own office, to explain his conduct;
done on his own his press statements setting out reasons why, in his opinion, the
Bill of Rights would create chaos in the administration ofjustice. It is sufficient to
point out that his conduct raised very serious questions, not only in the matter of
his judgment but also in respect of his independence, his impartiality, and, above
all, his integrity.
At about the same time, and again a few days ago here in the United States,
another Justice of Appeal who is now being mentioned as being likely to be ap-
pointed to the office vacated by the Chief Justice, which is the Office of Chief
Justice of the Court of Final Appeal, has echoed the Chinese government's con-
cerns on the Bill of Rights. According to him, the Bill of Rights had a great ad-
verse impact on criminal law and civil litigation. It weakened the effectiveness of
law enforcement agencies in the maintenance of public order. It increased legal
fees by creating unprecedented obstacles in legal proceedings. He publicly sup-
ported the decision to strip the Bill of Rights of its operative sections.
Yet another Justice of Appeal, who was once mentioned as a likely contender
for the Office of Chief Justice, publicly stated immediately before he joined the
bench that the Bill of Rights-these are interesting comments he made in articles
that he published under his own name-that the Bill of Rights was an "odd
document," with "some bizarre provisions that," according to him, "bums up
much of the fabric of Hong Kong society and tears up much of the fabric of Hong
Kong law." It was, as he called it, "legislation bought off the peg from other
countries," containing "odd concepts and strange prohibitions, sometimes ex-
pressed in bad French which left one," and I quote again, "wholly disoriented."
Finally, he concluded-he is referring to the Bill of Rights which seeks to in-
corporate the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
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Rights-that, in his view, "It was similar to the ravings of Adolf Hitler in his
bunker during the last days of the Third Reich, and if the general public really
sinks its teeth into the text of the Bill and analyzes its impact, there would be a
public outcry." He predicted that it would become a port of first asylum for every
lawyer whenever a client has a grievance to ventilate. These are three judges be-
fore whom matters relating to human rights have come up and at least two of
whom will become members of a court which will be the final arbiter of individ-
ual liberty in the Hong Kong SAR.
The third issue I wish to refer to relates to the appointment process ofjudges;
in particular the appointment process of the Hong Kong SAR's Court of Final
Appeal. I think reference has already been made to the fact that under the Basic
Law the Chief Executive is bound to accept the recommendations of an independ-
ent commission before he makes appointments to the highest court. But the pres-
ent Judicial Service Commission which performs that task now is not on what is
commonly described as the "through train." It will cease to exist on the 30th of
June this year. But since the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance becomes operative
on the next day, the 1st of July, it is expected that the Chief Justice and the other
judges of that highest court will be selected before that date--that is, before the
1st of July.
For that to be done, the members of the future Judicial Service Recommenda-
tion Board will also need to be selected before that date. What may, therefore,
happen is an intermingling of the two exercises, with the Chief Executive choos-
ing not only the members of the advisory body, but the judges themselves. In fact,
the newspapers have already reported discussions which the Chief Executive des-
ignate has had with one prospective chiefjustice.
The second stage of the appointment process is an innovation as far as Hong
Kong is concerned, but is perhaps commonplace to today's audience. The Basic
Law requires the appointments of the Chief Justice and the other judges of the
Court of Final Appeal to be endorsed by the legislature, by the Legislative Coun-
ciL In the absence of a duly constituted Legislative Council, that task may well be
usurped by the so-called "provisional legislature". The endorsement procedure, as
I said, is something very new to Hong Kong where judicial appointments have
always been the exclusive concern of the Executive branch of government. What-
ever merit there might be in involving the legislature in the appointment process,
a serious problem could arise if the judges of the highest court are to derive their
legitimacy from being endorsed by a body whose own legitimacy will almost cer-
tainly be the first serious legal and constitutional issue to be raised before them.
These are, as I said, three issues that relate to judicial independence and the
role of the courts that are likely to arise in the immediate months following the 1st
of July.
HONORABLE MS. NG: Thank you very much. I agreed that my role would be
generally to sweep up the elective issues raised by Nihal, and there seems to be
very little to sweep up. He certainly has put before you very serious problems.
As a continuation of what I said earlier this morning-which is the importance
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of preserving the common law system, the legal system, and the laws in Hong
Kong-in the days to come as in the years just past, we are looking very carefully
at how the common law system may be damaged. We are looking to risks and
dangers and to do something to forestall the destructive effect they may have on
Hong Kong's legal system.
Nihal stated some of the challenges, and you can see that the whole idea of
having the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong is to preserve the legal autonomy
of the SAIL And the main point of having the provision whereby the Court of Fi-
nal Appeal can invite judges of other jurisdictions as required, is for the purpose
of keeping Hong Kong's common law jurisdiction alive because Hong Kong is a
very small place. Although we have all sorts of cases, we cannot expect to develop
the kind of expertise in as many directions as, say, you can find in the privy coun-
cil. So that provision is so that the Hong Kong common law jurisdiction can be
plugged into the common law jurisdiction of the world and, secondly, that the le-
gal system, the court system in Hong Kong, may be transparent, so that it may
remain open and transparent from the inside, because it is when people from an-
other jurisdiction come to work in Hong Kong and participate in that work that
they can see exactly how independent we are and exactly those principles, those
values, that have been traditionally upheld by the common law, that continue to be
upheld in Hong Kong.
So when you limit, restrict the channels through which Hong Kong's common
law can remain plugged into the common law of the world, then you run some
risk of that system, that court system in Hong Kong, becoming diminished in its
importance and its liveliness. But once you have that dried up, once you isolate
the legal system in Hong Kong, then you can expect that system to become with-
ered. If at the same time you have the strongest influence from across the border,
then you stand in some danger of the autonomy of that system being somehow
eroded.
Now, Nihal has pointed out to you the danger facing the Court of Final Appeal,
and what he pointed out is a very strong, a very blunt way, if I may say so, of in-
terfering, namely, by a breach of the Joint Declaration. But there are actually
other ways without reaching the Joint Declaration whereby the system in Hong
Kong can also be eroded. Firstly, there is the presence of Article 158 in the Basic
Law, and just for those of you who are not familiar with the Basic Law, Article
158 is the one which states the power of interpretation.
As you know, the courts in Hong Kong on every level have the jurisdiction to
interpret any part of the law. There is no limitation-it is not that the lower courts
can only interpret small, unimportant pieces of legislation whereas only the
higher court can interpret important things. And certainly, we don't have such a
thing as a constitutional court. Every court can interpret every part of the law. But
in Article 158 it's stated: "The power of interpretation of this law shall be vested
in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress." So as far as the
Chinese are concerned, because it is the NPC which promulgates this Law, the
power of interpretation stays with the NPC, and it is only by delegation from that
body that the Hong Kong courts will be allowed to interpret. But their power of
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interpretation is limited in this way, in that although the courts of the Hong Kong
SAR may also interpret other provisions of this Law in adjudicating cases, under
certain circumstances an opinion has to be sought from the NPC. As explained by
Christine Loh earlier, when you come to a provision which has to do with matters
which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or you come to a
point which has to do with the relationship between the SAR. and the Central
Government, then before you come to a final unappealable adjudication, you have
to seek an interpretation.
Now, as I tried to hint earlier, exactly how to interfere Article 158 depends
upon two things: One is how China is able to refrain from intervening with the
judicial process in Hong Kong. Secondly, it depends on how robust the Hong
Kong courts are going to be, how robust the judges are going to be, because one of
the parties has to make this application to the court at which time it is for the
court to decide whether Article 158 is to be invoked. If the court is prepared to
intervene every time, then you will see 158 being invoked all the time, and the
jurisdiction of the Hong Kong court will diminish to a point that almost all parts
of the Basic Law will be interpreted in that way because, as you can see, this is the
first time Hong Kong has had a document of this kind.
The Basic Law covers, if you like, every aspect of Hong Kong law. And every
aspect can be interpreted loosely in a way having to do with the Central People's
Government, or having to do with the relationship between the SAR and the Hong
Kong government Now, if I were before a court like this, I would argue, that it
does not really have to be a point under Article 158. But if you have a very weak
judiciary, then there are ways of arguing whereby everything will have to do with
158. And that is why the independence, not only the independence, but the ro-
bustness of that judiciary, is extremely important
Now, the other part is that you can see that the Hong Kong court has been a
very professional court in that it tries to disassociate itself from politics in the
sense of policies of the government But with the coming into effect of a constitu-
tional document like the Basic Law, you will find that the courts inevitably will be
interpreting law in light of policies much more frequently than they would have
done before.
Now again, that depends on how self-restrained the judiciary is and how much
they are prepared to separate the government from the judiciary. We are already
faced with two issues which Nihal has touched on. First, the adjudication, the very
likely adjudication, before the court on the legitimacy of the "provisional legisla-
ture" itself The second part, of course, has to do with the rest of the Basic Law.
Now, when you have something like this, how can you have trust in the inde-
pendence of the judiciary when everyone knows that if this comes up for challenge
in the courts, China will not want to hear an answer which says that the "provi-
sional legislature" is illegitimate or without basis in law? Now, before arguments
are heard, we can't prejudge the issue. But how can we ensure that at the end of
the day when that court makes adjudication, whether it has to do with jurisdiction
or whether it has to do with the law, that it is not going to immediately destroy
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our faith in the judiciary? I imagine that the only way of doing it is to ensure that
the appointment of the judiciary itself is not politicized. And the only way of do-
ing this is to ensure that the members of the committee or the commission which
makes these recommendations are completely above question; that their integrity,
their professionalism, their independence are totally beyond questioning. And we
will await Mr. C.H. Tung to make the appointments to assure us that whatever
comes out of that commission will have our trust.
Finally, I want to touch on a point which I assure you is very, very difficult be-
cause it goes into even greater detail on some of the things I touched on this
morning. So I would just introduce a problem without really going into it. As I
was saying this morning, much of the protection we are looking to from the court
system and from the legal system is in our reliance on cases or past authorities de-
cided in the common law system. If that goes, then much of the protection of the
law which we now have will go. So in what way will that be preserved? It can be
preserved only if we stick very closely to the principles already established. But it
can be questioned in a very innocuous sort of way by Article 9.
Article 9 is extremely reasonable. It really talks about a language of the gov-
ernment and of the court. It says, "In addition to the Chinese language, English
may also be used as an official language by the executive authorities, legislature,
and judiciary of the Hong Kong SAR." Now, you would think that if Hong Kong
reverts to China, it is almost natural and perfectly legitimate that Chinese rather
than English would be the official language. So what is English doing there?
English is there because it is recognized, even by China, that the common law is
expressed in English. And the reason why the common law is preserved is in or-
der to preserve the confidence of the international community in the legal system
in Hong Kong. So it has to remain in a system which is familiar to the rest of the
world. So that is why English is there.
Now, if after the 1st of July, the tendency of the court is to use Chinese in ex-
clusion of English, then firstly, we would further lose the link with the rest of the
common law world; and, secondly, we would be left to interpret the law by what
the letter of the law suggests rather than by plugging it into all of the case law
history. Given Article 9, however the only politically correct thing to do is to re-
place English with Chinese in court. We are seeing the beginning of some of that
being pushed, not as required by the Basic Law, but by the change of political
climate in Hong Kong.
Now as I said, I would mention that problem to you because that problem is
just developing. So what I'm trying to say is, if you find the legal profession in
Hong Kong advocating caution in the greater use of Chinese, especially in the
higher courts in Hong Kong, please understand that we are dealing with a very
tricky problem. It will be a great thing if we can develop an expression of the
common law in the Chinese language, but we have to proceed very slowly. If we
go too fast, it will become breathless; then that becomes an instrument for de-
stroying that system. For example, one very immediate effect it will have is to say
that you will not allow judges who are not bilingual to sit in a Hong Kong court.
When you do that, you will be doing away with quite a large proportion of the le-
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gal expertise in Hong Kong.
MR. GREATHEAD: I come at the situation in Hong Kong from a somewhat
different perspective than my colleagues on this panel. I'm a practicing lavyer in
New York. I'm a litigator with a law firm. My entire professional career has been
spent litigating in the state and federal courts in New York and other jurisdictions
in the United States. As a member of a delegation of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, I visited Hong Kong in October of 1995 to examine the is-
sues that relate to the transition to Chinese rule in July of this year. We went be-
cause the New York City Bar Association has a very large presence in Hong
Kong. A large number of New York law firms and a large number of U.S. law
firms maintain offices in Hong Kong, and like New York, Hong Kong is a finan-
cial center and a place of great significance in the world financial community.
We also went because our bar association, like the American Bar Association
and other bar associations in this country, has adopted resolutions committing it-
self to work toward the maintenance of the rule of law in all parts of the world.
Hong Kong's transition to Chinese rule, of course, presents special problems and
special challenges that we wanted to get a basic understanding of
I made this trip after spending some time reading press reports in the United
States about the situation in Hong Kong. I have to say that from that perspective,
things looked pretty bad in Hong Kong. For the past few years, the issue of what's
going to pass after Chinese sovereignty is restored has been the subject of very
bleak reports in the U.S. press.
One that came out just before our trip in 1995 was a cover story in Fortune
magazine that announced "The Death of Hong Kong." A few months later in a
Federal District Court in Massachusetts, in a relatively routine wrongful death
case involving the death of a tourist in the swimming pool of a Hong Kong hotel,
the Hong Kong owners of the hotel, the defendants, moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue. The district judge in an opinion denying the
motion to dismiss made the following observation:
The uncertain future of the Hong Kong legal system, given the island's reversion
to Chinese sovereignty in less than two years, counsels heavily in favor ofjuris-
diction [in Massachusetts] to ensure that the Nowaks [the plaintiffs] have the op-
portunity to obtain redress if any be appropriate for the grievous loss they have
suffered.
Before our trip, I also read the basic instruments that are going to govern the
transfer. You've heard a lot about them this morning. The first one, of course, is
the Joint Declaration, the agreement between Britain and China that was reached
in 1984, that sets out the basic terms of the transfer. The second principal docu-
ment is the Basic Law that was adopted by the National People's Congress in
1991. After reading these documents, my attitude changed somewhat. The Joint
Declaration is a very encouraging document to those who are concerned about the
future of the rule of law in Hong Kong. It expressly provides that the basic rights
and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, assembly, of
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association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of oc-
cupation, academic research, and religious belief will be ensured by law after July
1, 1997.
It also provides that the provisions of the two international human rights cove-
nants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, as applied in Hong
Kong, will remain in force. This was impressive to me as a lawyer because I knew
that China wasn't a signatory of either of those documents, and it seemed to me to
be a significant concession by the Chinese. My spirits were raised further when I
read the Basic Law.
The Basic Law reiterates the basic rights of the Special Administrative Re-
gion's inhabitants that are set out in the Joint Declaration, and it adds more rights
to it. It adds freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or imprisonment and the
prohibition of torture, and arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life. It also reiter-
ates that the two international covenants shall remain in force and shall be im-
plemented by the laws of the Special Administrative Region. This was impressive
to me, but as always, the devil is in the details.
You've heard a lot about some of the more detailed provisions of the Basic Law
that threaten to undercut these basic rights and protections. I'll only briefly men-
tion two of them: Article 19, which limits the jurisdiction of Hong Kong's courts
to the extent that they deal with acts of state, such as defense and foreign affairs;
and Article 158, which vests the ultimate power of interpretation of the Basic Law
in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress rather than the
courts. This, obviously, is a major departure from the notions of an independent
court system that we're used to in the United States, and that British common law
jurisdictions are used to.
Article 158 is somewhat mitigated by a clause that requires the National Peo-
ple's Congress to authorize Hong Kong's courts to interpret the Basic Law on
their own in cases that are within the limits of the Special Administrative Re-
gion's autonomy. But the courts are required to abide by the interpretation of the
People's Congress Standing Committee in cases that concern affairs which are the
responsibility of the Central People's Government or concerning the relationship
between the central authorities and the region. This means that Article 19, when
read with Article 158 basically gives the Standing Committee the non-reviewable
authority to determine what cases fall within the definition of "acts of state," and
thus fall outside the jurisdiction of the SAR's courts.
While we were in Hong Kong, we met with members of the Legislative Coun-
cil, with judges, and with leaders of the bar. Hong Kong has a vigorous and ener-
getic bar, about 5,000 lawyers. Four thousand of them are solicitors who belong to
the Law Society. The Bar Association, which is comprised of roughly 400 or so
barristers, is one of the outstanding bar associations in the world. It is vigorous
and energetic and, I think, in the end will be the institution that is likely to be the
ultimate safeguard of the rule of law in Hong Kong. This provides us with a de-
gree of cautious optimism about Hong Kong's future.
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I think we all have to agree that the People's Republic of China has probably
one of the worst public relations records of any country in the world. Maybe Za-
ire's is a little worse, but it's hard to find a country that has done more to raise
apprehensions about its intentions than China has done in the last year and a half
with respect to Hong Kong.
The first conflict was over the Court of Final Appeals and its composition. I
think that is a conflict that is largely laid to rest. There's not much that can be
done about it. While we were there, a lot of lawyers, leaders of the Bar Associa-
tion and Legislative Council members expressed the concern that the quality of
justice in Hong Kong is going to be diminished significantly if only one member
of the Court of Final Appeal can come from a foreign common law jurisdiction.
We were sufficiently impressed with the quality of judges and lawyers we met
in Hong Kong to feel that probably wasn't as major an issue as some of the other
issues that we heard about Hong Kong has a number of extremely capable judges.
They are not judges whose philosophy we would all agree with, but the Supreme
Court of the United States has a few judges whose philosophies are not universally
accepted by lawyers in the United States, and we survive it. Ultimately, as others
have mentioned, the quality of the justice system in Hong Kong is going to be de-
termined by the independence and willingness of individual judges to carry out
their responsibilities fairly and professionally. There are enough qualified judges
in Hong Kong to do that to make the need for more than one foreign judge from
another common law country to be relatively less urgent.
A bigger problem, of course, is the issue of the Bill of Rights Ordinance. In
October 1995, when we were in Hong Kong, the Chinese government announced
its intention to repeal several provisions of the Bill of Rights Ordinance that af-
fected national security issues: the ability of the government to regulate the press
and freedom of assembly, particularly during times of emergency. They couldn't
have done it in a way that was more calculated to arouse the concerns of those
who doubted the intentions of China to carry out its responsibilities under the Ba-
sic Law and the Joint Declaration. They consulted no one before they did it. Even
their own supporters in Hong Kong were taken back by the announcement of
these intentions. We met with Tsang Yok-sing, who is the leader of the principal
pro-Beijing party in Hong Kong, and he told our delegation that he thought it was
a mistake for the Chinese to be announcing this.
In the end, the future of Hong Kong is going to depend on the willingness of
the Chinese government to tolerate what is a very different kind of system. Oar
delegation's view that the future of Hong Kong is a case for mild optimism is
based on the vigor of its bar, the kind of lawyers that you've heard here today, the
kind of Legislative Council members who are sitting in the present Legco, people
like Christine Loh and Margaret Ng, who may not be sitting in the "provisional
legislature" when it is seated on July 1, but I have no doubt will be seated on the
first elected legislature of the new Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong.
Thank you.
DEAN DINNERSTEIN: We have some time for questions. I would encourage
1997]
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POLY
you to come up to one of the microphones and again, please speak into the micro-
phone and then identify who you are and where you're from.
PROFESSOR JAYAWICKRAMA: May I just make a comment on the ques-
tion of the Court of Final Appeal and what Mr. Scott Greathead said about it not
being of such great significance that there may not be more than one foreign judge
on the bench. I think it's not a question of numbers; it's not a numbers game at
all; it's very much a question of the courts' autonomy.
Of course, it's true that Hong Kong does not need foreign judges. The judicial
expertise is there in Hong Kong's legal profession. There are more than enough
people who could, with great dignity and acceptability, serve on the highest court.
That's not the question. It was decided that there will be foreign participation in
the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal for a completely different reason, and I
mentioned two of them in my presentation.
What is significant is the decision taken to reverse that. It was decided that the
matter of foreign participation shall not be left to the discretion of the court. It
would be decided by the Chief Executive who will appoint these foreign judges.
The whole concept of appointing foreign judges, as I pointed out, meant that
judges of all the highest courts in common law jurisdiction were immediately ex-
cluded because they are not in a position to be appointed to another court. And
that meant, as I said, retired judges being appointed. In fact, one or two retired
judges of other common law jurisdictions have already publicly expressed a will-
ingness to serve on this committee when they were interviewed by the press.
I don't think it was ever expected or anticipated that that kind of judge would
serve. So it's not a numbers issue at all. Rather, it is the concept of having some-
body from outside sitting on that court because the court chose to invite that per-
son. That was important. But that was changed, and the Joint Declaration was
perfunctorily violated in that respect.
MR. GREATHEAD: Well, just to respond, it's highly unusual. I'm not aware
of any other judicial system in the world that provides for, or even permits, for-
eign judges to sit on their highest court. Part of the Hong Kong experience is
based on the fact that appeals always went to the Privy Council, the law Lords in
London. People who practice law in British common law jurisdictions tend to re-
gard the law Lords as somewhere next to God in terms of their judicial compe-
tence, and it is undoubtedly, one of, if not the most outstanding judicial body in
the world. Those of us from less exalted legal systems, like the United States, who
have to deal with more mundane judicial bodies like the Supreme Court of the
United States, which is occasionally a very political body, are more modest in our
expectations. I have to say as a foreign lawyer, a U.S. lawyer looking at Hong
Kong, and having met a number ofjudges in Hong Kong, I came away convinced
that there is a great opportunity for judicial independence just relying on Hong
Kongjudges. Certainly with the opportunity to occasionally invite a foreign judge,
there will be even more protection.
What will really determine the independence of Hong Kong's judicial system is
the selection of the first Court of Final Appeal and the ability and willingness of
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the members of that court to stand by their guns when the first issue involving
their jurisdiction versus the jurisdiction of Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress arises. If they're willing to be expansive and honor the com-
mitments in the Basic Law, then I think Hong Kong's future will be comfortable.
But that's going to be very dependent on the political process by which these peo-
ple are chosen.
HONORABLE MS. NG: Mr. Chairman, I'm sure the audience will forgive me
if, as a Hong Kong person, we are passionate about one thing, and that is we al-
ways think only the best will do for Hong Kong. And we don't often say, "Oh,
that is good enough," because other people are making do with less, less exotic
stuff.
But I think, more realistically, we are now talking about how to preserve the
present system in Hong Kong. It is all very well that we didn't have to do much
before 1997 because the older system is backed up by all the basic systems in
England; whether it is the democratic parliament or whether it is the tradition of
the Privy Council. Once you become entirely on your own, and you are plugged
into the much larger and more powerful systems in China, remaining the same
becomes a unique problem. And that is why you need all the equipment that you
can get, and why you need to become very open.
You want to invite as many outside judges as you possibly can to preserve that
autonomy. That becomes necessary. It's no longer a luxury. All the things which
are luxuries to Americans, because you have a very large country and a very large
jurisdiction, become dire necessities to people in Hong Kong. You see the kind of
process which is beginning to take place in Hong Kong, which was behind why
the panel was trimmed to one foreign judge at most. And that is because the ar-
gument was: Why do we need foreigners? Aren't Chinese people just as good? I
mean, once you have that sort of point in, everything becomes measured on
whether it is Chinese, whether the Chinese are good enough. That political con-
sideration would erode quite a lot of things which we have to keep in place if
Hong Kong is to stay separate from the main systems in China, and that is why
we require that.
But before I stop, I think that one message which I want to put across is that
Hong Kong has been able to stay the way it is because of the communications we
keep having with different parts of the world-with people like you, with people
all over the place.
I hope very much that that communication will remain, because I have been
told that people are thinking that after the 1st of July, they will be less happy;,
people in American firms will be much less happy to litigate in Hong Kong, they
would prefer to litigate in the United States. For example, the case that you have
just cited, the Holiday Inn case. If I remember that case correctly, what the judge
was saying-it was one of these cases deciding on forum-and one of the consid-
erations of Judge Hart was that after the 1st of July, the political situation in Hong
Kong, not the judiciary, but the political situation in Hong Kong, will become so
uncertain that you won't actually know whether the parties and their witnesses
1997]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
will be able to go to Hong Kong as easily as they do now.
But I would say please, please litigate in Hong Kong because it isn't only by
working in Hong Kong, by coming to Hong Kong, by keeping up the communica-
tion that you will keep the Hong Kong system alive. Thank you very much.
MR- FELDMAN: Harvey Feldman once again. This is just an answer to Mr.
Greathead. Yes, there is at least one other constitution which provides for foreign
judges from common law countries, and that is Papua, New Guinea, which com-
monly has judges from Australia and/or New Zealand and/or Canada sitting on its
Supreme Court. Thank you.
MS. ZELDEN: I'm Wendy Zelden from the Library of Congress. First I'd like
to thank the panel for their insights. You've probably touched on this issue al-
ready, but I wondered if you'd elaborate on how the various provisions of the Ba-
sic Law, especially Articles 19, 158, and maybe 23, will impact on the jurisdiction
of the Court of Final Appeal.
MR GREATHEAD: I'd like to add a caveat to that. My view of these provi-
sions is that the Hong Kong courts will be relatively independent and free to act
up to the point that something arguably involves an act of state. My concern in
reading these provisions was what happens when an issue of speech arises. Free-
dom of speech is guaranteed in the Basic Law. But what if an issue of speech
arises that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress rules in-
volves facets of national security or some act of state issue. Will that be a case in
which the courts' ability to interpret the Basic Law is restricted and that the
Standing Committee's interpretation will have to prevail?
HONORABLE MS. NG: Yes. In Hong Kong there are different views about
the effect of Article 19. The view I prefer is that it makes no change to the juris-
diction of the courts. If you look at Article 19, the middle paragraph says that
"The courts of Hong Kong SAP shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the Re-
gion except, that the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system
and principles previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained."
Then, it follows on the "act of state." "Act of state" is a very exalted doctrine in
the common law, but there is such a doctrine in the common law. As to exactly
what doctrine, it's rather more difficult to determine, because after all, there are
not that many cases. But the way we look at it is that one principle is very clear.
There is no act of state as between the sovereign and its subject. This is the rule in
the common law, and we in the legal profession, some of us, prefer to think that
this is the correct view, that this is the correct way to look at Article 19.
I referred to an earlier version of this Article which makes an act of state itself
a means for certification for the Central People's Government or for the govern-
ment of the SAR. As you look at it now, it's different. There are only the facts
which are relevant in claiming an act of state that are satisfiable. Whether some-
thing is an act of state or not is still the business of the court to decide, and that is
why we go back to the same thing, which is the robustness of your judiciary and
your ability to preserve the common law, and all the established principles in the
common law. So that is what we're relying on.
[12:3
HONG KONG CONFEREWCE
PROFESSOR JAYAWICKRAMA: I'm inclined to agree that Article 19
merely restates the legal position as it is today, which is that the courts may de-
termine whether something is an act of state. I don't think it seeks to change the
current legal position. Of course that, as Margaret said, is entirely in the hands of
the judges and depends on how vigorously they are prepared to uphold the present
legal system or whether they are prepared to yield to pressure from outside.
HONORABLE MS. NG: So if you want to infringe on the freedom of the peo-
ple in Hong Kong, they are already opening and you are vulnerable because it is
arguable. The question is which way are you going to argue? That's why we need
much more than just the letter of the law where the Basic Law is concerned. The
Basic Law itself is very encouraging. The question is, how do you interpret it and
whether they are going to be adhered to.
DEAN DINNERSTEIN: I want to thank the panelists for a provocative discus-
sion. Thank you very much.
LUNCHEON SPEAKER
PROFESSOR BRADLOW: We're very fortunate to have as our lunchtime
speaker, Congressman John Porter. Congressman Porter is from Illinois. He's
now in his tenth term as a congressman.
During his time in the House of Representatives, he founded and co-chaired
the Congressional Human Rights Caucus and is the co-chair of the Congressional
Caucus on Hong Kong. He has been actively involved in Hong Kong issues since
the early 1980s, and he's one of the key sponsors of the Hong Kong Reversion
Act, which was recently passed by the House of Representatives. Congressman
Porter.
CONGRESSMAN PORTER. Dan, thank you very much, and thank you for the
opportunity to talk to you while you're having lunch. And I want to begin by
thanking the law school, Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers Committee, and the
International Legal Studies Program for sponsoring this conference on Hong
Kong.
I had hoped to be able to see Christine Loh who is here, and we are, of course,
delighted that she's here, and what I plan to do is simply to attempt to give my
remarks. I have a very bad allergy problem, and my voice may give out. If it does,
I'm going to ask Kelley Currie, of my staff at the Congressional Human Rights
Caucus to continue. And then we'll have, as I understand it, a couple minutes for
questions if you would like to dialogue a little bit.
I. INTRODUCTION
The return of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China and the events
leading up to it present incredible challenges to the way of life that the people of
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Hong Kong currently enjoy, as well as the institutions that support this way of
life. As international attention zooms in to focus on this historic transition, these
challenges will play out against a backdrop of international scrutiny and local po-
litical intrigue. Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, those who harbor a
positive vision of Hong Kong's future have placed their faith in the institutions
and people who have made Hong Kong what it is today. They have done so with
good reason: these institutions are strong, stable, and principled; the people are
well-educated, innovative, worldly, and highly motivated; and both these institu-
tions and people owe their success to a deeply-rooted rule of law that pervades
Hong Kong. For these same reasons I am at once optimistic and concerned about
Hong Kong's future. As long as these people and institutions are functioning
properly, there is no doubt that Hong Kong will continue to thrive. Without them
the future is much darker.
II. REASONS FOR OPTIMISM
Members of the business community-both here and in Hong Kong-have, by
and large, remained optimistic that they will be able to continue to operate in
Hong Kong as they have in the past. This optimism stems from the fact that the
island's legal structure fosters economic growth and opportunity, along with their
anticipation that these structures will remain in place and remain viable in Hong
Kong after the transition. The basis for this belief is that it is in China's best in-
terest not to "kill the goose that lays the golden egg"-a phrase you hear repeat-
edly in discussions of the future of Hong Kong. Given the dramatic opening of the
mainland Chinese economy in recent years and the benefits that have followed
particularly to the ruling elites, I believe that there is reason to believe that the
Chinese value the economic freedom of Hong Kong and will try to preserve it.
Unfortunately, I am afraid that the Chinese government does not fully appreciate
that preserving Hong Kong's market economy requires that they also preserve lib-
erty and the rule of law.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF RULE OF LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
We cannot overlook the importance of the rule of law and the institutions that
support it in underpinning and protecting the economic success of Hong Kong.
The rule of law insures that contracts will be honored, that business secrets can be
kept and that the definition of permitted activity does not change at the whim of a
government official. Without the rule of law, bribery and corruption will flourish,
and those without the necessary "connections" will be left out in the cold. Fre-
quently, the law can be a businessman's only protection when wronged by unfair
dealing in the marketplace. Intellectual property protection is a good example of
this, and China's performance in this arena points out the perils of doing business
without the rule of law to fall back on.
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A. THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
As important as the laws themselves are, who makes and enforces the laws,
and how those people are chosen, is equally significant Laws that are created in
an environment of legitimate participation and accountability, and impartially
enforced by independent institutions are the foundation for economic prosperity in
Hong Kong. This is why the appointment of an non-elected Legislative Council is
so problematic. China's decision to appoint an unrepresentative body-outside the
scope of the Joint Declaration and ostensibly in response to greater democratiza-
tion in Hong Kong-sends the wrong signal to the people of Hong Kong and the
rest of the world.
1. The Provisional Legislature
After June 30th, the legislature of Hong Kong will consist of a group of indi-
viduals who are loyal to, accountable to, and guided by a despotic regime in Bei-
jing, rather than the people of Hong Kong. The importance of this distinction, and
the negative impacts it will have on the rule of law system in Hong Kong, cannot
be underestimated. This legislature's first impulse will be to figure out, by asking
directly if necessary, what China's interests and preferences are when passing
laws dealing with matters where Hong Kong is legally mandated to govern itself.
My friend, Martin Lee, has termed this phenomenon "bending before the north
wind has begun to blow." Unless the goal is to create a Hong Kong that more
closely resembles mainland society, this cannot possibly be desirable. China will
be given the opportunity, through the backdoor, to influence and control those ar-
eas where it is not supposed to have a say. On the other side, the democratic and
free impulses of the people of Hong Kong are thwarted. Their wants, needs, de-
sires and inputs are ignored. China could not easily or gracefully accomplish this
by force, but by employing patronage, they may have already seriously eroded
Hong Kong's autonomy.
The Chinese and their supporters argue that these legislators will listen to the
people of Hong Kong because they will have to stand for election, eventually.
There are a couple of problems with this argument The first, is that this body is
responsible for creating the laws that will govern these elections. As a politician
myself I know how important it is to have your allies involved in areas such as
determining electoral districts and eligibility requirements. If you are able to set
the rules of the game, your opponent starts out at a disadvantage. Martin Lee has
assured me that, in a free and fair election, his Democratic Party and other demo-
crats will win-no problem. But what about an election which is structured to
give certain candidates an inherent advantage? That is quite another story.
2. The Future of Democracy in Hong Kong
The other element that concerns me is the "eventual" return of democracy, on
China's terms. Admittedly, Britain's decision to extend some measure of democ-
racy to Hong Kong in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square was a mistake---they
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were 100 years too late. But by the same token, the people of Hong Kong have
been living under the British system of laws and good government for 150 years,
and it is this tradition that we have the historical and moral authority to fight for.
If the Chinese stick to their part of the Joint Declaration, democracy will return to
Hong Kong. But what if they decide there is nothing to gain and no one to stop
them if they don't stick to this part of the deal? The attitude and actions of the
United States government, up to this point, do not inspire great confidence in me
that we will stand up for democracy in Hong Kong any better than we have in
Burma, Indonesia, Nigeria-the list goes on.
B. OTHER INSTITUTIONS
It is also vital that the institutions of Hong Kong-a clean and efficient civil
service, independent courts, and a vibrant civil society-be maintained, in order
for this promised democracy to be meaningful.
With regard to the civil service, I have great confidence in Anson Chan, as do
most people who know her. She will continue to enforce the highest standards in
the civil service of Hong Kong, and maintain the integrity of this key institution.
C.H. Tung's decision to retain virtually all of the current civil service leadership,
including Anson Chan, also sends a positive message of continuity and credibility
for himself and the future of the Hong Kong government. But there is also bad
news. There are reports that experienced men and women are leaving the civil
service and the police because they are not eager to serve the "future sovereign."
This is something for us to watch.
I am also concerned about the influx of a large number of PRC officials, with-
out clearly defined or identified roles, into the mix of Hong Kong's government.
The Xinhua, or New China News Agency, has served for many years as the major
Chinese government presence in Hong Kong. After June 30th, the number of em-
ployees at NCNA is expected to increase, and they will be joined by approxi-
mately 200 new officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While about 50 of
those have been identified as visa and/or consular officers, the other 150 have no
known role. Without letting the imagination run too wild, it is easy to envision
these individuals attempting to insert themselves into the governance of Hong
Kong -particularly the economic sector as it relates to the mainland. It would be a
great loss if mainland style corruption were to seep into Hong Kong's govern-
mental and economic spheres.
1. Independent Judiciary
The hard-fought concession of having the Court of Final Appeals remain in
Hong Kong is of obvious significance to the future of the rule of law. The Chinese
do not have much experience with the rule of law and the Chinese courts are far
from independent. The mainland judiciary sees itself as an instrument of the
Communist party and acts accordingly. Allowing the final decision on legal mat-
ters to be made in China would be disastrous for Hong Kong. The implications of
preserving the independent judicial review process range from decisions on con-
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tract matters to Emily Lau's demonstration permits, to Martin Lee's ability to
stand for election, to Han Dong Fang's ability to continue publishing. Beijing has
already warned that Hong Kong will no longer be a safe harbor for those fleeing
punishment by China for political activities. We must be especially vigilant in
monitoring how Hong Kong's courts deal with such cases.
2. Society
In Hong Kong today, there is a wide and flourishing public space for political,
cultural, religious, professional and other activities and associations. The people
of Hong Kong are generally free to meet with whomever they please and conduct
a wide range of activities, without government interference. The reach of many
groups in Hong Kong extends far beyond its borders. In addition to being an eco-
nomic center, Hong Kong is also a leading exporter of ideas and its people are in-
timately connected to the global village on a personal level. Such activities and
exchanges are a critical element of the vibrant community that exists in Hong
Kong. In contrast to the present level of openness, senior Chinese officials have
called for a return to the draconian colonial laws that require all private societies
to have government approval. They have also stated their intention to proscribe
organizations from receiving funds from foreign entities. Such changes could ef-
fect not only democracy activists, religious organizations and human rights
groups, but also the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong and similar
organizations.
IV. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Any discussion of Hong Kong's future eventually finds its way to C-. Tung.
There has been a great deal of speculation about the media-shy shipping magnate,
and his plans for leading Hong Kong on this journey. When I met with C.. Tung
in January, I told him that I believed he has the toughest job in the world. He must
oversee the return of a prosperous, free and healthy prodigal child to the nest of a
parent which tends to be unpredictable, irrational, and stifling. This clash of cul-
tures and lifestyles is certain to bring conflict; no one in Hong Kong, even the
most optimistic person, believes that there won't be problems. At some point,
C.H. will have to decide if he is going to be Beijing's man in Hong Kong or Hong
Kong's man in Beijing. I believe that there will be a defining moment in this re-
gard sometime this year or the next, after the transition occurs. How CI. handles
this defining moment will determine much about the future of Hong Kong. There
is a saying that some people seek out greatness, and some people have greatness
thrust upon them. Greatness is bearing down on C.11, and he can either run from
it or embrace it. I hope for his sake, and for Hong Kong's, that he will chose to
embrace it.
V. CONCLUSION
I remain "cautiously optimistic" about the future of Hong Kong. Depending on
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what China does or says on a given day, I am either more cautious or more opti-
mistic. The institutions in Hong Kong have strong roots, and they have good peo-
ple leading them. C.I. is a decent, thoughtful man who cares about the people
and the future of Hong Kong.
Anyone who says they know what is going to happen in Hong Kong in the next
couple of years is either lying or crazy. But I am sure of one thing, the people of
Hong Kong will find a way to survive and thrive. Like America, it is a place of
immigrants, made prosperous by people who came there with nothing but their
sharp minds, strong backs and indomitable spirits. I believe that we must stand
with the people of Hong Kong and fight with them to protect their way of life-
not just because we have strong economic or geo-strategic interests, but because it
is the right thing to do. And in the end, I also believe that Hong Kong will change
China far more than China changes Hong Kong. Thank You.
MR. FELDMAN: Mr. Porter, I'm Harvey Feldman. I'm a retired ambassador
and currently Senior Fellow for Asia at the Heritage Foundation. Sir, you said that
we should stand with the people of Hong Kong, and indeed I do believe we
should. How do we do that? What should we be doing?
CONGRESSMAN PORTER: It's fascinating that no one in the United States
for a long, long time now has paid a great deal of attention to what has been hap-
pening in Hong Kong, or indeed has been focused on the date July 1, 1997. Sud-
denly, the American media has discovered-even though we've been trying to tell
them for years-but they have suddenly discovered that Hong Kong is about to
transition; that this free, open society, a place ruled by law, is about to come under
the domination of a society that is very, very different. And you're seeing today a
great deal of interest arising in the American press that will lead to a crescendo,
and they will all be there on the evening of June 30th and the morning of July 1st
to cover what's going on.
That is also being reflected in the priorities in our administration and in what
members of Congress are reflecting, and so what we're seeing now in both the
administration and the Congress is a much greater interest in Hong Kong. Pre-
sumably, it's been latent all these years and all this time, but now it is beginning
to come forward, and I think the fact of a free society coming under the domina-
tion of an unfree society by agreement, is probably unprecedented in history, I
think it's beginning to capture the imagination of the American people and their
government. What can we do?
We can focus public attention on what happens in Hong Kong. That, more
than anything, may tend to shape the Chinese response in any given situation.
The more the people of the world look on and watch and monitor what is done,
the more likely we are going to have rational decisions rather than irrational
ones-decent decisions rather than bad ones-the more likely C.H. is going to
have a good say-so rather than being dictated as to what should happen from Bei-
jing.
Right now I've introduced legislation, which I had introduced before without
much interest, to attempt to protect the right of free speech in Hong Kong and to
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say to journalists: "If you're in trouble, you'll have a visa to come to the United
States. If you're in trouble because you've written the truth, if you're in trouble
because you've written an article about Tibet or Taiwan or something else that the
Chinese don't like, don't worry. We'll be able to bring you here if you absolutely
have to get out."
Now, this legislation is symbolic. It is simply a message-sending device to say:
We're watching what happens to free speech, which is, after all, the most basic
freedom that must be preserved, in my judgment, in Hong Kong if they're going
to have a viable society and a viable economy continuing in that part of the world.
And so it is something that has been introduced for the purpose of getting mem-
bers of Congress to come together in their concern for Hong Kong. It probably
isn't going to pass into law by June 30th, but it is there on the table; it says
something both to China and to the people of Hong Kong, it says something to the
journalists of Hong Kong, but perhaps more than anything, it says to our people,
the people in Congress, and to the administration, there is concern about the fu-
ture of Hong Kong. We want to focus on what's happening in Hong Kong. We
want to keep the light of public opinion in this country and-hopefully in every
country in the world, on what happens to the people there.
When I say the people there, I'm not talking about the wealthy people who can
go out any time they want-I'm talking about the six million people who fled,
many of them or their parents, from mainland China to find freedom and made a
huge success of their economy and made a stable society ruled by law. Those are
the people I'm concerned with, the ones who can't get out if problems really arise.
HONORABLE MS. NG: Thank you very much, Congressman Porter, for those
rousing words. Do you agree with me that the most important thing is not the 1st
of July, 1997, but possibly the 1st of July, 1998, 1999, and thereafter, if the diffi-
culty lies in keeping up the interest and seeing what China and Mr. C-. Tung
intends to do about Hong Kong? He has retained the officers right now on the 1st
of July, but whether he manages to keep them and keep the civil service func-
tioning in the same mode, in a mode which abides by the rule of law thereafter.
Would you agree with me that that is a much more difficult job, which is to
maintain interest?
CONGRESSMAN PORTER. I very much agree with you. First of all, in the
last three years, I have been urging Time magazine, U.S. News, Newsw,,eek, and
others to put Hong Kong on the cover, not on July 1st or just before July 1st, but
on the cover now so the people will understand what is about to happen and will
be focused on it. Of course, they're not interested. It's got to be topical. And the
difficulty is, when July 1st passes, it's topical; it's over. And the media fades
away.
I have to say that there haven't been many conferences like this one either, and
yet here we are, we're suddenly focused on this thing, and the difficulty is: Will
there be a conference like this on July 1, 1998? Will there be a conference like
this on July 1, 1999? We would hope that we wouldn't need a conference like this,
that everything will have gone smoothly and no problems, and everything is fine.
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You're exactly right though, the focus has to be, not on July 1, 1997-and this
big crescendo of press interest-it's got to be on every day after that. And what
happens on that day and what happens on the next day, and what happens to in-
vestor confidence, and what happens to the people, and what happens when you
apply for a permit to demonstrate, and what happens if you write an editorial in
the local paper that the people in Beijing don't like, and all the rest. And so, it
seems to me, that you're exactly focused correctly: How do we keep the interest
that's going to build to July 1st there after July 1st and watch every move that
goes on in Hong Kong to ensure that the parties live up to the agreement-that
China lives up to the agreement.
MR- DOWNS: I'm Chuck Downs from the American Enterprise Institute. A
few weeks ago I had an opportunity to talk to an advisor of Governor Patten and
ask him: "What could the U.S. Congress do, and what will you be asking the U.S.
Congress to do while you're in town to help facilitate the transition in Hong
Kong?"
And, to my surprise, he said, "I think that it's important that the U.S. maintain
FBI links, Interpol membership, and these kinds of law enforcement connections
to Hong Kong." And I think that you, Congressman, in the past, have been sup-
portive of this. I think in the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, if I'm right, there
are provisions that sort of facilitate the continuation of these law enforcement
programs with Hong Kong. But, is this at all challenged by the current atmos-
phere of concern on Capitol Hill about Chinese alleged influence-buying and es-
pionage? And do you see that as threatening the continuation of ties with Hong
Kong, on these law enforcement agencies, after July lst?
CONGRESSMAN PORTER: Well, you're exactly right. The piece of signifi-
cant legislation that was passed was the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, which
simply follows the British-Sino Accord, and what it leaves to the people of Hong
Kong in terms of their autonomy and says that the United States will deal with
Hong Kong on a whole range of issues that relate to areas carved out by the Ac-
cord for Hong Kong.
The Act that we passed just last week, the Hong Kong Reversion Act, follows
up on that, and focuses exactly on the kinds of issues you're raising now, our con-
tinued maintenance of ties to civil institutions in Hong Kong where we have spe-
cific concerns. And this, to me, is also part of it. If all of our European friends and
the United States-all of the Asian friends together with the United States-if we
all follow a pattern that strictly observes the autonomies left to Hong Kong in the
Accord and keep those ties together, then obviously we have a much greater
chance of forcing China to observe them as well.
I don't know the answer to your factual question about whether there has been
increased activities there that we should be concerned about, but obviously, if we
have the institutions and the ties between them, built to deal with these things,
and we observe them, then I think it's going to help a great deal.
Well, you're very kind to listen to me. I had hoped, originally, to be here this
afternoon and been on one of the panels with Christine. Unfortunately, we have
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votes in the House of Representatives in that time frame, and I cannot miss them,
and so you've been kind to accommodate me and grant me this opportunity to talk
with all ofyou.
You're focusing on one of the most important human rights issues maybe in
the history of human-beings, which will play out before our eyes in the next few
months, and on after. And it is terribly important that all people, who are con-
cerned about human rights, remain engaged in this and keep the pressure on to
make sure that, in the end, the people of Hong Kong continue to Ive as free peo-
ple in a free society. Thanks for listening to me.
ISSUES FACING THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
INDEPENDENT MONITORING: THE BASIC LAW
AND SUBVERSION, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ORDINANCE, PROSPECTS FOR NGOs
PROFESSOR SHALLECK: I'm Ann Shalleck, from the Washington College
of Law where I direct our Women in the Law Program. And we're starting this
next academic year, for the first time, a specialization within that program, gen-
der in the law, in women's rights. And so, we're very excited about many of the
developments in our international program.
We have a very interesting panel and a very important panel, which I think
follows up very nicely on the Congressman's remarks at lunch. Where the Con-
gressman spoke about the importance, not just of the situation at the moment of
transition in Hong Kong, but the importance of the on-going situation year after
year. And one of the important pieces of that is, a monitoring piece. And an im-
portant part of the monitoring piece is the role of NGOs and the legal profession,
as people who can keep track of what's happening in terms of human rights and
then have the various tools at their disposal for addressing issues as they develop.
And our panelists, today, will be able to give us both some background on the
role of NGOs and of the legal profession in Hong Kong and the prospects for the
future within the legal structure that will exist at the point of transition and the
role that those sectors of civil society can play in the protection of human rights.
Our speakers today will be: first, George Edwards, an associate professor at In-
diana University School of Law. Before teaching there, he taught for four years in
Hong Kong. He taught both at the University of Hong Kong, where he was the
associate director of the Center for Comparative and Public Law. He also taught at
the City University of Hong Kong and for the Law Society of Hong Kong.
In addition to his extensive work in Hong Kong, he has worked with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees in their legal protective divisions. When he was
in Hong Kong, he was active in many activities there. Throughout, he's been do-
ing an enormous amount of writing and speaking about the situation in Hong
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Kong.
Following Professor Edwards, Dinah PoKempner will speak. She's the Acting
General Counsel of Human Rights Watch, where she reviews all of the legal posi-
tions and is involved in policy formulation for that very important NGO. In addi-
tion to her role in developing legal and policy provisions, she supervises the advo-
cacy of that organization on all international law issues, including work on legal
tribunals, international standard setting, legislation drafting, and law reform ini-
tiatives.
Obviously, many of those activities are important as we think about the transi-
tion in Hong Kong. Much of her focus, while at Human Rights Watch, has been
on Asia. And she's done field research there and has been involved in writing
numerous reports and articles.
Following Ms. PoKempner, George Black will be our next speaker. He's the
research and editorial director of the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights. He
has published several major books on very important human rights issues: on
genocide in Iraq, on the Democracy movement in China, and on the U.S. role in
Central America and the Caribbean.
In addition to these major works that he has written, he is a frequent contribu-
tor to many magazines and newspapers. In addition to his own writing, he edits
other people's writings, which is perhaps more difficult than writing yourself,
sometimes.
He was the foreign editor of The Nation. And he was an editor at NACLA. His
specialty is in U.S. foreign policy and human rights, and particularly, human
rights in China and Hong Kong.
And finally, we will have Nihal Jayawickrama, who's from the School of Law
at Hong Kong University. I won't introduce him again, since all of you got to hear
him speak this morning. Let's begin with Professor Edwards.
PROFESSOR EDWARDS: Thank you very much Professor. I was asked to ad-
dress the following question today: Will Hong Kong's human rights non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), that play an instrumental role in the quest
for justice and peace in Hong Kong, survive, unencumbered by excessive restric-
tions, after the People's Republic of China (PRC) reclaims sovereignty over Hong
Kong on 1 July 1997?
To answer that question, I will briefly survey the evolution of human rights
NGOs in Hong Kong. I will examine the development of the law, including: the
Societies Ordinance, which since 1949 has governed the establishment and op-
eration of Hong Kong NGOs; the Hong Kong Basic Law (also referred to as the
"mini-constitution"), which will come into force on 1 July 1997, and which in
Article 23 calls for the enactment of certain regulatory legislation post-1997; and
other legislation that may affect NGOs after 1997.
To facilitate discussion about the burdens faced by Hong Kong human rights
NGOs in the light of the transition, I will construct a typology of the NGOs, based
on their membership and focus. To illustrate the challenges, I will highlight a
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particular NGO--the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor-whose work is repre-
sentative of NGOs that engage in both community service work and domestic and
international advocacy. I emphasize freedom of expression and freedom of asso-
ciation, which are both threatened. I will not focus on freedom of assembly, which
is also threatened, but which is beyond the scope of today's presentation.
I. OVERVIEW OF HONG KONG NGO HISTORY: PROBLEMS THAT
HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs WILL LIKELY FACE POST 1 JULY 1997
Hong Kong human rights NGOs have shifted from being scarce, narrow, pro-
vincial, and unfocused in the early days, to being vibrant, abundant, and interna-
tionally astute today. Despite this metamorphosis, a presumption exists within the
Hong Kong NGO community today that human rights NGOs will suffer post-July
1997. One need not have a crystal ball to be reasonably assured of this. A clear
sign of adversity is that NGOs have already begun to feel the heat, even though
more than 100 days remain before the sovereignty change.
The long-standing protection of Hong Kong human rights NGOs-under do-
mestic Ordinances, under international human rights treaties, and under the
common law-is deteriorating. Protection under the Societies Ordinance is jeop-
ardized because of PRC attempts to repeal that legislation, particularly the 1992
Amendments to the Societies Ordinance which had been enacted to bring the
original 1949 Societies Ordinance into compliance with international human
rights norms. Protection under international treaties and the United Nations bod-
ies that monitor them may fail because that protection flows from the United
Kingdom's ratification and extension of the treaties to Hong Kong, and China has
failed to demonstrate her commitments to keeping the treaties in force. Finally,
NGOs stand to lose protection under the common law, which though pledged to
continue in force after 1997, is threatened by the possible erosion of the rule of
law in Hong Kong after Hong Kong becomes a Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) of the PRC on 1 July.
Hong Kong NGOs will lose their "guaranteed" freedoms of expression and as-
sociation. For example, the incoming Administration-which is led by the Chief
Executive Designate, Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, who was appointed by Beijing to be-
come the first HKSAR leader-suggests that some human rights NGOs will be
deemed "political organizations," and must, therefore, sever ties with overseas
NGOs. Hong Kong NGOs would be denied overseas funding, which has been vital
to NGO operations.
The Hong Kong press has been warned that their news reports will be con-
trolled on "sensitive" topics such as Tibet and Taiwan and that they will not be
permitted to publish "personal attacks on the Chinese leaders" or put forward
"rumors or lies." The press has begun to refrain from contacting Hong Kong hu-
man rights NGOs for comment on controversial human rights, governance, or
"political" topics. This self-censorship, which is subtle, would tend to erode the
freedom of expression of human rights NGOs. Their voices are being gradually
ignored.
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The incoming Administration has threatened to require NGOs to seek approval
before they engage in public demonstrations or marches. The Government would
have authority to vet the content of NGO speech and prohibit protests that do not
suit the Government NGOs will be stripped of their rights to expression and as-
sociation (and assembly).
NGOs will likely be required to register, after receiving Government approval,
before being permitted to operate in Hong Kong. NGOs could be de-listed, at the
unbridled discretion of the Government for reasons such as "national security,"
which is an undefined amorphous concept. The restrictions could be used to stifle
the establishment and operation of NGOs. Hong Kong NGOs will not be able to
function effectively because the regulatory environment would be unduly burden-
some, with its vetting and pre-approval processes, which could be easily abused
and are repressive.
The problems and challenges faced by Hong Kong human rights NGOs are
very real, but I posit that the NGOs do not have to continue to be faced with high
hurdles now and do not have to languish post-1997. Political will, internal Hong
Kong pressure and international persuasion may help prevent some of the crip-
pling restrictions upon Hong Kong human rights NGOs.
Human rights NGOs in Hong Kong are vital to the protection of the human
rights of the Hong Kong people, now in the endmost days of British Administra-
tion and post-1997. It is only with the efforts of Hong Kong human rights
NGOs-as independent mechanisms that can help enhance and maintain the ac-
countability of governmental authorities for their actions-that human rights
protection will strengthen in Hong Kong, and not be truncated by the incoming
Administration.
II. HISTORY OF HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs
AND NGO REGULATION
A. 1949 -MID-1970s
Before the mid-1970s, human rights in Hong Kong were protected primarily by
the common law and by ad hoc provisions in Hong Kong Government Ordi-
nances. Hong Kong Ordinances are enacted by the Governor of Hong Kong with
the advice and consent of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, which until re-
cently was fully appointed by the Queen or King of England.
During the 1970s, there was no distinct body of law in Hong Kong known as
"human rights law," and there was a paucity of active human rights NGOs in
Hong Kong to promote within the Colony internationally recognized human
rights. Hong Kong NGOs were mostly community service oriented, rather than
advocacy oriented. The advocacy groups, which at that time confined their efforts
primarily to domestic fora, are a principal focus of today's presentation because
those groups have shifted emphasis to the international arena and stand to be
greater targets of restrictive post-1997 legislation.
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In 1949, the United Kingdom, through the appointed Hong Kong Legislative
Council, enacted in Hong Kong the Societies Ordinance, which was implemented
to control the creation and operation of Hong Kong societies, including NGOs.
Through the Societies Ordinance, the United Kingdom had sought to prevent
communist and nationalist forces from operating in Hong Kong in a manner that
would adversely affect the Colony. There was fear that Hong Kong would become
a base of subversion for pro-Chinese, communist forces, as well as for nationalist
forces.
The Societies Ordinance, which was contained in Ordinance No. 28 of 1949, is
found at Chapter 151 (1950) of the Laws of Hong Kong. Since 1949, the Societies
Ordinance has been amended numerous times, with the more significant modifi-
cations occurring in 1957, 1961, and 1992: Societies (Amendment) Ordinances
No. 31 of 1957, No. 28 of 1961, and No. 75 of 1992. Before the Societies Ordi-
nance was enacted, Hong Kong people were free to associate with whomever they
chose, without restriction, as the case was (and still is) in the United Kingdom.
I refer to the Societies Ordinance and its multiple iterations between 1949 and
1991 as the "pre-1992 legislation" because it represents the widening and tight-
ening of social control imposed on Hong Kong NGOs during the period com-
mencing in 1949 and ending in 1992 with the adoption of liberalized Amend-
ments to the Societies Ordinance.
The pre-1992 legislation required any organization that wished to operate as a
society in Hong Kong to apply to the Registrar of Societies (who was the Commis-
sioner of Police) for registration (or for exemption from registration) upon estab-
lishment or upon being deemed to be established (Section 5(1)). Pursuant to Sec-
tion 5(2), the Registrar had the discretion to register the society if he was satisfied
that it was established solely for religious, charitable, social, or recreational pur-
poses, or as a rural committee or as a federation or other association of a rural
committee (as amended by Ordinance No. 28 of 1961).
The Registrar could refuse to register or to exempt from registration any soci-
ety on any of the following grounds:
(1) The society was a branch of or was affiliated to or was connected with any
organization or group of a political nature established outside of Hong Kong (as
amended by Ordinance No. 33 of 1952);
(2) The society was likely to be used for any purpose prejudicial to or incom-
patible with peace, welfare, or good order in Hong Kong (as amended by Ordi-
nance No. 33 of 1952); or
(3) The constitution or rules of the society did not contain matters as prescribed
by the Ordinance or required by the Registrar (as amended by Ordinance No. 28
of 1961).
Furthermore, the Registrar had discretion to cancel the registration or exemp-
tion of a society on specified grounds (similar to those in respect of the approval
of registration or exemption) and upon failure to otherwise comply with the Ordi-
nance, but the Registrar was required to afford the society an opportunity to be
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heard before cancellation (Section 10). Finally, any person aggrieved by a deci-
sion of the Registrar could have appealed to the Governor in Council, who had the
power to revoke or confirm the decision. The Governor in Council could, at his
discretion, order that any exempted or registered society be dissolved where he
was satisfied that such society was being used for purposes "prejudicial to or in-
compatible with peace, welfare or good order in the Colony" (Ordinance No. 28 of
1949, § 16). Appeal was once allowed to the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, but
such appeals were later disallowed.
Under the pre-1992 legislation, the Registrar could: enter, with or without
force, premises believed to be used as a meeting place for a society; enter any
meeting of any society at any time; search the premises and persons present
therein or leaving therefrom; demand information about the number and places of
all meetings of any society in the six months preceding the request for such in-
formation; demand that the society provide the Registrar with a membership list
of the society; and demand "such other information as may be prescribed" (Ordi-
nance No. 28 of 1949), § 7(1)(d)). There was no requirement that any action of
the Registrar be reasonable.
NGOs fought for many years for the amendment or repeal of this Draconian,
colonial legislation, that they deemed burdensome, unnecessary, and contrary to
domestic and international human rights law. It was not until many years later-
1992-that the pre-1992 oppressive provisions of the legislation were superseded
by Ordinance No. 75 of 1992.
B. LATE 1970s- EARLY 1980s
The pre-1992 Societies Ordinance was still in place during this period.
On the whole, the 1970s in Hong Kong were times of general political quies-
cence on human rights promotion and protection issues. However, discourse on
human rights issues grew in Hong Kong during the late 1970s, following the
United Kingdom's 1976 ratification of the two human rights Covenants-the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)-.and the concur-
rent extension of both Covenants to Hong Kong.
The limited domestic human rights protections in Hong Kong were converted,
through application of the Covenants, to internationally recognized protections.
Human rights in Hong Kong became subject to scrutiny and monitoring by the
international community, notably by the United Nations Treaty Bodies. As indi-
viduals in Hong Kong became more aware of these new international protections,
human rights NGOs in Hong Kong began to blossom, particularly in the interna-
tional advocacy arena.
In 1978, the United Kingdom submitted to the Human Rights Committee its
First Periodic Report on implementation of the ICCPR in Hong Kong. Neither the
1978 report nor the hearings held by the Committee in 1979 on the report at-
tracted much attention from the Hong Kong NGO community. Though the re-
porting process went virtually unnoticed among NGOs, it marked the beginning
[12:3
HONG KONG CONFERENCE
of the robust, ongoing practice of Hong Kong NGO involvement in the United
Nations Treaty Body reporting and monitoring process. For example, NGOs be-
came involved with other Treaty Body reports during this period, such as the First
Report on Hong Kong under the ICESCR, which was submitted to the UN Eco-
nomic and Social Council (the predecessor to the Economic Committee) on 13
April 1981. Commentaries by academics involved in the early reporting process
include Nihal Jayawickrama, Hong Kong and the International Protection of Hu-
man Rights, in HUMAN RiGHTS IN HONG KONG 120, 134-135 (Raymond Wafks
ed., Oxford University Press 1992) and ANDREW BYRiNEs & JOHANNES CHAN,
PUBLIC LAW AND THE HUMAN RiGHTS: A HONG KONG SOURCEBOOK 419 (Butter-
worths Asia 1993).
By the early 1980s, the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China
had begun to negotiate the blueprint for the change of sovereignty--the Joint
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong. Hong Kong people became increas-
ingly aware that "1997" was not just an Orwellian fiction that would never arrive,
but was real and was rapidly approaching. Consciousness within the community
of human rights waxed.
C. LATE 1980s
A milestone for NGOs in Hong Kong, particularly for international advocacy
NGOs, was the submission to the Human Rights Committee of the Second Peri-
odic Report on Hong Kong in May 1988 and the November 1988 hearings on that
report. The report and hearings attracted more attention than the ones ten years
earlier. Several Hong Kong NGOs submitted comprehensive briefing papers
and/or delivered oral briefings to the Human Rights Committee and attended the
hearings. Among those groups was the Hong Kong Journalists Association,
JUSTICE, and the Professional Lobby Group.
The next milestone, which was unfortunate and tragic, resulted in a surge of
human rights activism in Hong Kong, and the epiphany of the vibrant interna-
tional and domestic advocacy human rights movement in Hong Kong today. On 4
June 1989, in what has become known as the "Tiananmen Square Massacre," the
People's Republic of China ordered armed troops in Beijing to quell peaceful
demonstrations by students who favored democracy in China. The troops opened
fire on the masses of students and killed untold thousands of innocent, unarmed
civilians. In direct and immediate response to the Tiananmen Square Massacre,
Hong Kong human rights NGOs exploded in energy and vibrancy that %ras un-
precedented in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong human rights NGOs began to become more heavily immersed in
international advocacy, campaigning furiously before United Nations bodies. Per-
haps the first major triumph was before one of the United Nations Charter-based
bodies in which many human rights abuse complaints against nations are first of-
ficially lodged within the UN system. In the summer of 1989, months after the
Tiananmen Square Massacre, advocacy and international political will resulted in
the People's Republic of China becoming the target of a denunciatory resolution
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regarding her human rights practices. Though the resolution was not directly re-
lated to Hong Kong, Hong Kong people participated instrumentally in the NGO
team that lobbied for the resolution.
D. EARLY 1990s
Hong Kong human rights NGOs had become familiar to the international ad-
vocacy process and actively prepared critiques of Government reports and regu-
larly attended UN hearings. In 1990, the Third Periodic Report on Hong Kong to
the Human Rights Committee was submitted, followed by hearings in New York
in April 1991. Among the human rights NGOs that either submitted comprehen-
sive briefing papers to the Human Rights Committee, attended the hearings, or
both, were: JUSTICE, the United Democrats of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Hu-
man Rights Commission (which is in fact an NGO and not a governmental body),
the Hong Kong Bar Association, the Hong Kong Journalists Association, the
Hong Kong Council of Women, Amnesty International, and the International
League for Human Rights.
Other reports that were submitted to UN Treaty Bodies, and for which hearings
were held in the early 1990s and in which NGOs became involved, included the
United Kingdom's Tenth Periodic Report to the Race Committee, which was
heard at the Race Committee's March 1991 Session.
In the period between the June 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and June
1991-two years later-not only were NGOs inspired by the Human Rights
Committee's consideration of the Third Periodic Report under the ICCPR, but
also Hong Kong NGOs were motivated by public debates and discussions about a
British-backed Bill of Rights Bill that, as a direct result of the Massacre, had been
tabled in the Hong Kong Legislative Council. NGOs were absorbed in the debates
and discussions for what became the Bill of Rights Ordinance, which was enacted
on 6 June 1991 (and came into effect on 8 June 1991) to "provide for the incorpo-
ration into the law of Hong Kong of provisions of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights as applied to Hong Kong." Among the NGOs involved
in Bill of Rights discussions and debates were the Bar Association of Hong Kong,
JUSTICE, the Law Society of Hong Kong, the Civic Association of Hong Kong,
and the Human Rights Commission.
E. 1992 AMENDMENTS TO THE SOCIETIES ORDINANCE
In 1992, the Draconian, colonial provisions of the pre-1992 Societies Ordi-
nance were superseded in an attempt to bring that Ordinance in line with the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance and with the ICCPR. The 1992 Amend-
ments are in place today but will not survive the 1 July 1997 handover because the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) of the PRC voted
not to adopt the 1992 Amendments as part of the law of the Hong Kong SAR.
Under the 1992 Amendments, the NGO registration requirement was aban-
doned and replaced by an NGO notification requirement. Organizations are re-
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quired to inform the Societies Officer-who, under the pre-1992 legislation, was
known as a Registrar, but in both instances is the Commissioner of Police-in
writing, of specified particulars, within one month of the date of establishment of
an organization or the date that the organization is deemed to ba established
(Section 5). The notification calls for the name of the organization, its objects, the
names of its office bearers, and the address of its principal place of business and
every place or premises owned by the society. After notification, the organization
is listed on a "list of all societies." The only restrictions attached to the notifica-
tion process are that an organization cannot be listed under a particular name if
another organization is already listed under that or a similar, confusing or mis-
leading name (Section 9), and notification has to be given within one month of
changes in a society's name, objects, office-bearers, or principal place of business.
(Section 10(1)). No requirement exisas that a detailed set of objectives be spelled
out in the notification. Less opportunity exists for abuse in vetting than there as
under the pre-1992 legislation.
Under the 1992 Amendments, the Societies Officer has limited powers to make
inquiries of a society, or to take action against an organization. For example, the
Societies Officer can ask a society for information about itself or its operations
only if the request is reasonably related to the carrying out of the functions of the
Societies Officer (Section 15(1)). Though the Societies Officer can still enter a
meeting, he may do so only if his entry is reasonably necessary (Sections 31 &
33). If the Societies Officer reasonably believes that the operation or continued
operation of a society would be prejudicial to the security of Hong Kong or to
public safety or public order, the Societies Officer must notify the Secretary for
Security, and may recommend that a prohibition order be published in the Gazette
(Section 8). After the prohibition order is gazetted, the society will have an op-
portunity to be heard before any action is taken against it. It is only after these
procedural safeguards have been effected that a society can be de-listed.
Under the 1992 Amendments, any person aggrieved by a decision of the Sec-
retary for Security may appeal to the Governor in Council who may revoke, vary,
or confirm the decision (Section 8(7)). Under the 1992 Amendments, the Gover-
nor no longer has the power to dissolve societies.
F. POST-1992 AMAENDMENTS-INCREASED INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY
During the period following the 1992 Amendments, the depth and breadth of
NGO activity was reinforced. International scrutiny of human rights in Hong
Kong heightened, as evidenced, for example by United Nations Treaty Bodies
calls for extraordinary hearings on human rights in Hong Kong in light of human
rights concerns generated by the impending transfer of sovereignty. These ex-
traordinary reports and hearings primarily focused on issues related to how the
Treaty Bodies would be able to monitor treaty implementation in Hong Kong
post-1997, after China (a non-party to the UN treaties) resumes sovereignty over
Hong Kong.
Between 1992 and March 1997, nearly one dozen reports-including regular
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periodic reports and extraordinary reports-have been submitted on behalf of
Hong Kong to five United Nations Treaty Bodies, and corresponding hearings
have been held on the reports. Among the respective Committees, reports and cor-
responding hearings are: the Economic, Social and Cultural Committee (two peri-
odic reports, hearings November 1994 and 1996); the Human Rights Committee
(one periodic report and one supplementary report, hearings October 1995 and
1996); the Committee Against Torture (one report, hearing November 1995); the
Race Committee (one report, hearing March 1996); and the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (one report, hearing September 1996).
Hong Kong NGOs were indispensable to the efficacy of the monitoring proc-
ess, by attending meetings, lobbying, and briefing the Committees with insightfiul
information, for these reports. For example, Hong Kong NGOs worked with the
Economic Committee in 1994 when hearings were held on a Periodic Report un-
der the ICESCR As Professor Andrew Byrnes has pointed out, NGOs began pre-
paring for the hearings months in advance, by establishing an information and
action network within the NGO community for the gathering and dissemination
of information. NGOs sought to brief the Committee on human rights issues that
were of priority to the NGOs and to provide the Committee with information to
supplement or complete the information provided in the Government Report.
(Will the Government Put its Money Where its Mouth Is? The Verdict of the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on Hong Kong's Human
Rights Record, 25 HONGKoNGL. J. 156, 158-160 (1995)).
Hong Kong NGOs traveled to Geneva and made oral presentations and/or
written submissions to the Economic Committee on implementation of the Cove-
nant in Hong Kong. NGO participants in Geneva included: the Society for Com-
munity Organisation, the Hong Kong Human Rights Commission, JUSTICE, the
Hong Kong Committee on Children's Rights, the Constitutional Development
Panel of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and the International League for
Human Rights. Written submissions were made by Hong Kong NGOs who did not
travel to Geneva, including: the Hong Kong Women's Coalition, Hong Kong
Committee on Children's Rights, Refugee Concern, the Hong Kong Christian In-
stitute, the Hong Kong Youth Concern Group, Amnesty International, a group of
31 NGOs that submitted a joint statement on one issue, and migrant organizations
which wrote about foreign domestic helpers.
Furthermore, regarding various other Hong Kong appearances before UN
Treaty Bodies, the Centre for Comparative and Public Law (of the Faculty of Law,
University of Hong Kong) has traditionally invited Hong Kong members of vari-
ous Treaty Bodies following publication of particular Hong Kong periodic reports
and before hearings on them. The Centre sponsors public seminars on issues re-
lated to human rights and respective treaties. NGOs actively participate as semi-
nar panelists, engage Committee members in discussions, and accompany Com-
mittee members into the field-to prisons, refugee detention centers, cage homes,
the courts, etc.-to talk to victims of human rights abuses, to listen to concerned
members of the public, and to talk to government officials.
Professor Peter Bums, who is a member of the United Nations Committee
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Against Torture and who in October 1995 visited Hong Kong at the invitation of
the Centre, stressed, in his presentation, the importance of such visits by Com-
mittee members and further explained that the Torture Committee "finds the ma-
terials supplied to it by NGOs to be of the most vital significance. "...
[SIpecifically directed NGO material related to the particular country that we are
dealing with has provided us with the most useful check against the information
contained in the government report. Without that, I suspect we just could not
function effectively at all."
In October 1995, the Human Rights Committee held hearings in Geneva on the
United Kingdom's Fourth Periodic Report on Hong Kong. The following NGOs
attended the hearings: the United Ants, the Hong Kong Human Rights Commis-
sion, the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, the Hong Kong Bar Association, the
Hong Kong Journalist Association, JUSTICE, and the Democratic Party of Hong
Kong. Representatives of the Centre for Comparative and Public Law of the Uni-
versity of Hong Kong Faculty of Law attended the hearings, and presented to the
Committee submissions made by several Hong Kong human rights NGOs who
were unable to travel to Geneva for the hearings. In October 1996, the Human
Rights Committee held hearings on a United Kingdom Supplemental (Extraordi-
nary) Report to the Fourth Periodic Report on Hong Kong. The same NGOs at-
tended those hearings, and the Centre played a role similar to its role in the previ-
ous Human Rights Committee monitoring proceedings.
Domestic NGO service work and domestic advocacy had increased dramati-
cally by this time, along with international advocacy. NGOs grew. Receipts of
contributions from overseas sources grew. NGO lobbying and briefing of foreign
governments grew, as did lobbying and briefing of inter-governmental organiza-
tions, such as the United Nations.
Domestic advocacy constituted an important element of the efforts of NGOs.
Many NGOs became more heavily involved in lobbying the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches of the Hong Kong Government (meetings with Government De-
partments and Branches, meetings with the Governor, testifying before Legisla-
tive Council panels, etc.). Some groups became more involved with the Judiciary
(by, for example, working on judicial proceedings involving human rights issues,
such as immigration claims). Service work also increased.
Generally, among NGOs there was an immensely heightened political aware-
ness, which coincided with increased enfranchisement within the Hong Kong
community. Enfranchisement had been slow in coming to Hong Kong. Until
1991, all Hong Kong Legislative Council members were appointed by the Gover-
nor of Hong Kong, who in turn was appointed by the British monarch. Demo-
cratic elections were held for a portion of the 60 seats in the Hong Kong Legisla-
tive Council then and by 1995, all 60 members were elected.
There was a boost in organized training in international human rights law
within the NGO community. For example, in April 1994, a three day human
rights advocacy training workshop was conducted at the Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Hong Kong. Trainers were academics and NGO workers from the United
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Kingdom, Hong Kong, India, and Australia. Participants in the session hailed
primarily from Macau and Hong Kong. A similar large-scale workshop is sched-
uled for June 1997 in Hong Kong. This training helps inform Hong Kong people
of their rights, and inform them of the role they can play in ensuring the contin-
ued protection of those rights, particularly through international advocacy.
Finally, motivation was spurred by a lack of trust in China. What would pre-
vent the Tiananmen Square Massacre from being re-enacted at Statue Square in
downtown Hong Kong, after 1 July 1997?
There was a shift in culture and tradition among Hong Kong people. Quies-
cence turned to activism in magnitudes theretofore unheard of in Hong Kong. The
threat of retrenched civil and political liberties in Hong Kong was sufficient to
start ablaze a new human rights NGO campaign.
I. THE VIBRANCY OF NGOs IN HONG KONG TODAY
Today, a wealth of Hong Kong-based NGOs focuses its efforts on the promo-
tion and protection of human rights in Hong Kong. I categorize the NGOs into
several discrete yet overlapping groups, based loosely on the composition of the
NGOs, their mandates, their activities, and their general nature. It is difficult to
formulate a coherent structure that will sustain rigorous scrutiny, in which to pi-
geonhole the NGOs. I intend for the typology merely to serve as a general map
that can be referred to for convenience by persons who wish to gain general fa-
miliarity with Hong Kong human rights NGOs. The grouping may offer insights
into, and facilitate discussion about, the sorts of difficulties that NGOs have expe-
rienced in the lead up to 1997, and the encumbrances that they will likely face
post-1997. All NGOs are at risk post-1997, whether they are groups that engage
primarily in community service, groups that engage primarily in domestic or in-
ternational advocacy, or, as in the case of most NGOs, groups that engage in both
service and advocacy.
My list is not exhaustive. It reflects only some of the NGOs and NGO types
that operate in Hong Kong. My failure to mention any NGO or NGO type is either
an oversight, for which I assume full responsibility, or is purposeful because of my
view that the absent organization or type of organization is subsumed, and there-
fore represented within one of the listed categories. Likewise, my inclusion of a
group or groups in this categorizing does not suggest that those groups would
categorize themselves in the same manner, or that they would even consider
themselves to be "Hong Kong human rights NGOs."
I draw the following categories of groups:
(A) Grassroots NGOs;
(B) Multi-ethnic Advocacy Groups;
(C) Non-Local (Expatriate) Special Interest Groups;




(F) Other Law-Oriented Groups;
(G) Globally Focused Overseas NGOs with a Physical Presence in Hong Kong;
Globally Focused Overseas NGOs without a Physical Presence in Hong Kong
that Focus on Hong Kong Issues;
(I) Other Hong Kong Special Interest Groups;
(J) Other Local Groups;
(K) Gay and Lesbian Groups;
(L) Refugee Groups;
(M) Cultural and Social Rights Groups;
(N) Religious groups;
(0) Alliances of NGOs on Specific Issues; and
(P) Women's Groups.
These groups, some of which are registered under the Societies Ordinances and
others of which are registered under other Ordinances, such as the Companies
Ordinance, tend to overlap in the areas of their work, their mode of operations,
their mandates/remits, their scope, their membership, and even their facilities.
A. GRASSROOTS NGOs
There exists a host of "grassroots" organizations based in Hong Kong that
primarily provide services to the Hong Kong community. Some of these groups
perform social work services for the homeless and the aged and in the area of
health. Though some of their work may be advocacy-oriented (both domestically
and internationally focused), most of it is service.
The Society for Community Organisation was established in 1976 to help the
poor and disadvantaged, particularly in the area of housing. SOCO combines
community organizing with human rights monitoring and education, and pub-
lishes occasional reports.
The July 1st Link is an umbrella group that was created in 1995 by eight
Christian NGOs to monitor issues related to the transfer of sovereignty on 1 July
1997. July 1st Link publishes a bi-monthly newsletter and organizes workshops
and conferences.
The Hong Kong Welfare Society is a charitable organization that provides a
wide range of services for families, including family counseling, clinical psycho-
logical services, family life education, home help service, family aide service,
foster care service, school social work, services for single parent families, and
services for people suffering mild mental health problems.
A distinguishing characteristic of these groups is that they are comprised al-
most exclusively of Hong Kong Chinese, who do not hold overseas passports and
who do not have the right of abode in any country or territory outside of Hong
Kong. Persons who fall into this category are destined to remain in Hong Kong
after the change of sovereignty, for they have no place else to go.
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This is significant because, though they may not be at risk because of their ad-
vocacy, they may be at risk because they, as groups, are subject to the regulatory
whim of the incoming Administration. The members of the groups, as individuals
with no right to leave Hong Kong, are themselves subject to the whim of the in-
coming Administration, more so than individuals who have the right to leave
Hong Kong if the political climate becomes unbearable.
On the one hand, grassroots groups have more obstacles to advocacy, particu-
larly of a controversial nature, and may need to pay a higher price, because of
possible personal or group repercussions. Such self-censorship is often a goal of
repressive regimes. On the other hand, the grassroots organizations may be more
formidable because, for example, of a commitment born out of attachment to their
culture or their way of life.
B. MULTI-ETHmC ADVOCACY GROUPS
These groups, which I label "Multi-Ethnic, Advocacy Groups," are comprised
partially of local ethnic Chinese, but mostly of a mix of foreign nationals, includ-
ing American, Filipino, Australian, Canadian, Indian, European, etc. These
groups, which include the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor (which I discuss in
more detail later), are few, and tend to focus on a wide range of Hong Kong hu-
man rights issues that they raise in the advocacy context in domestic and interna-
tional arenas. On a lesser front, they also engage in community service work.
Domestically, they raise issues within the Legislative Branch, the Executive
Branch, and the Judicial Branch. Internationally, these groups engage in exten-
sive overseas lobbying and briefing. For example, they lobby/brief and receive fi-
nancial assistance from intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations
(both the Treaty and the Charter-based bodies) and the European Union. Fur-
thermore, they lobby/brief individual foreign governments, such as the United
States of America, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and, of course, they have
launched intensive advocacy efforts in the United Kingdom.
Members of the multi-ethnic groups tend to have acquired more years of for-
mal higher education than members of other groups, with more members in the
professions such as solicitors and barristers (lawyers) and law-makers (Legislative
Council members). Again, membership in multi-ethnic groups overlaps with the
grassroots groups. Often, for example, local Chinese members of the multi-ethnic
groups will also be members of one or more grassroots groups.
C. NON-LOCAL (EXPATRIATE) SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS
These groups tend to be comprised of expatriates, who campaign for specific
rights, applicable to them in Hong Kong, that are common to the group. These
groups include supporters of rights for foreign domestic helpers in Hong Kong,
such as: the Mission for Migrant Workers; Friends of Thai in Hong Kong; Help-
ers for Domestic Helpers; Kaibigan (Friends of Filipino Migrant Workers); and
the multitudinous other Foreign Domestic Helper NGOs comprised mostly of Fili-
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pinos. Among these groups is the United Filipinos in Hong Kong, which is an
umbrella group for more than 20 Filipino groups with different missions related to
social welfare and social services, fellowship, socialization, charity, and religion.
These groups stand threatened because they are primarily comprised of expatriates
who have no right of abode rendering their immigration/visa status precarious,
and because their issues sometimes include sensitive points of Hong Kong law
and policy.
D. REGIONALHUMAN RIGHTS GRoups THAT Focus ON ASIAN ISSUES
There are many NGOs based in Hong Kong that are comprised of mainly
multi-ethnic persons but that focus primarily on Regional/Asian issues, rather
than on Hong Kong issues. These NGOs include the Asian Monitor Resources
Centre (AMRC), the Asian Migrant Workers Centre (AMWC), the Asian Do-
mestic Workers Union (ADWU), the Asian Center for the Progress of Peoples, the
Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives (ARENA), the Asian Pacific Mis-
sion for Migrant Filipinos (APMMF), and Documentation for Action Groups in
Asia (DAGA).
Also within this group is the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC),
which is an independent NGO that promotes awareness and realization of human
rights within Asia and mobilizes Asian and international public opinion to obtain
relief and redress for victims of human rights violations. The AHRC focuses on
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, and the right to development
Its Regional scope covers Cambodia, India, Burma, South Korea, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Hong Kong, and Thailand.
These groups are jeopardized, but perhaps not as much as some of the other
groups. There is a concern because most of their members are expatriates whose
immigration status could be compromised. However, this concern is tempered be-
cause the issues these groups tend to concentrate on are not Hong Kong human
rights issues, making them less threatening to the incoming Administration.
E. LABOR GROUPS
Approximately 20% of the Hong Kong workforce belongs to a trade union or
organization. There are three principal factions of such groups: (1) the pro-Beijing
affiliated unions in the Federation of Trade Unions, (2) the pro-Taiwan Hong
Kong and Kowloon Trade Union Council, and (3) the Hong Kong Confederation
of Trade Unions, which is not aligned with China or Taiwan. Thirty-six percent
of labor organizations are unaffiliated to any of the three.
Labor groups have been heavily involved in advocacy, and they are at risk post-
1997. They will be adversely affected by the Societies Ordinance and Article 23 of
the Basic Law even though a separate legislative regime is in place to govern
trade unions. The Trade Union Ordinance imposes upon unions a compulsory
registration process. The Registrar of Trade Unions has the power to monitor un-
ion activities through supervision of union rulebooks, accounts, and related pa-
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pers. The Registrar even has the authority to monitor the administration of trade
unions. Furthermore, the right of workers to organize is restricted by the Trade
Union Ordinance, which is deemed by some labor groups to be so burdensome
that they opt to register under the Societies Ordinance or other Ordinances rather
than the Trade Union Ordinance.
F. OTHER LAW-ORIENTED GROUPS
These groups, some of which are multi-ethnic in mix, others of which are pre-
dominantly ethnic Chinese, are comprised primarily of members of the legal pro-
fession. Their advocacy tends to be both local and international in focus. Among
these groups are JUSTICE, which is the local branch of the International Com-
mission of Jurists (which is an international organization based in Geneva with
local affiliate chapters around the globe), the Hong Kong Bar Association (com-
prised of Hong Kong barristers), and the Law Society of Hong Kong (comprised
of Hong Kong solicitors). All of these groups have been actively involved in
community human rights service, as well as in lobbying/briefing the three
Branches of the Hong Kong Government and, to a degree, in lobbying/briefing
United Nations Treaty Bodies and other international bodies.
G. GLOBALLY FOCUSED NGOs WITH A PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN HONG KONG
Several globally focused NGOs have a physical presence in Hong Kong-much
like a branch office-that focus on China and/or Hong Kong human rights con-
cerns. These organizations include Amnesty International (Hong Kong Branch)
and Human Rights Watch/Asia. Each has a physical office with staff in Hong
Kong.
Amnesty International (United Kingdom), which is the parent organization of
Amnesty International (Hong Kong Branch), works on behalf of prisoners of con-
science, irrespective of belief, and for the human rights of political prisoners, in-
cluding their right to a fair trial. Furthermore, it advocates the right to be free
from torture and ill treatment and for abolition of the death penalty for all prison-
ers. Amnesty International (Hong Kong Branch) does not focus on individual
human rights cases in Hong Kong but focuses to a larger extent on institutional
framework Hong Kong human rights issues and on human rights in China and
elsewhere.
Human Rights Watch/New York, which is the parent of Human Rights
Watch/Asia, was established in 1978 to monitor and to promote internationally
recognized human rights globally. In Hong Kong, Human Rights Watch/Asia
tends to concentrate on human rights in Hong Kong and in China.
Thus, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch strive to focus
international attention on the human rights scene in Hong Kong and China. They
provide information on existing human rights situations, and they center their
work on abuses, legislation, and practices. Both organizations issue press releases,
and they advocate before domestic and international tribunals in Hong Kong and
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China. These organizations are in jeopardy because they will more likely be
deemed "political" organizations and because they will likely be considered thorns
in the side of the incoming Administration.
IR GLOBALLY FOCUSED NGOs VrrHOUT A PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN HONG KONG
THAT FOCUS ON HONG KONo ISSUES
These groups, such as the New York-based LaiV ers Committee for Human
Rights, have headquarters overseas but engage in significant advocacy and other
human rights work related to Hong Kong and China. The Lavoyers Committee,
which since 1978 has focused its programs on building the legal institutions and
structures that guarantee rights long-term, sends missions to Hong Kong and
China to collect human rights data and to participate in the advocacy process.
Groups such as these are at risk because of the nature of their work, but their ex-
posure is less because they do not have a permanent physical presence in Hong
Kong.
I. OTHERHONGKONG SPECIAL INTEREST NGOs
Many other special interest NGOs operate in Hong Kong. Among those are
international advocacy groups such as Article 19, which is a United Kingdom-
based NGO that focuses on freedom of expression. This NGO takes its name and
mandate from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which
proclaims the fundamental right to freedom of expression. Also included is the
Hong Kong Journalist Association (HKJA), that focuses on freedom of expression.
The HKJA, which was established in 1968, monitors freedom of the press and
works on cases of individual journalists in trouble because of their work. It pub-
lishes two quarterly newsletters-ournalist and On the Record-and publishes
annual reports on freedom of expression issues. The HKMA is registered as a trade
union for journalists in Hong Kong and has been active in human rights advocacy
in the international arena for many years. It works closely with the NGO Article
19, with whom it publishes joint Annual Reports.
Also included in these groups is the Asian Resources Group, comprised mostly
of Indians and other South Asians who were longtime residents of Hong Kong
who would have become stateless after 1997 because they did not qualify for Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region or British passports. Early in 1997, follow-
ing heavy NGO campaigning, the United Kingdom government confirmed that
Asians who would otherwise have become stateless would be granted full United
Kingdom citizenship.
Also included among these groups is the People's Council on Public Housing
Policy.
3. OTHER LOCAL GROUPS
A multitude of other local Hong Kong NGOs exist Most of these groups are
comprised primarily of ethnic Chinese. Among these groups are the Hong Kong
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Human Rights Commission, the United Ants, MAD (Movement Against Dis-
crimination), Against Child Abuse, the Friends of the Earth, the Council on
Smoking and Health, the Hong Kong Development and Strategic Research Cen-
tre, the Joint Council for the Physically and Mentally Handicapped, the Humanist
Association of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Temporary Housing Area Joint Dis-
trict Residents Committee, the University of Democracy, and the Professional
Teachers Union.
The Hong Kong Human Rights Commission was founded in 1988 as a consor-
tium of 10 NGOs that represent interests of labor, women, religion, the poor,
communities, and students. The Commission focuses on rights monitoring and
human rights education, and it publishes occasional reports and educational mate-
rials. The Commission has been heavily involved in the monitoring and reporting
processes of the United Nations Treaty Bodies that oversee implementation in
Hong Kong of UN human rights treaties.
The United Ants advocates for the abolishment of functional constituencies in
the electoral process in Hong Kong. MAD struggles against discrimination.
Against Child Abuse campaigns for children's rights. Friends of the Earth is con-
cerned with the environment. The Council on Smoking and Health focuses on to-
bacco-related issues. The Hong Kong Development and Strategic Research Centre
aims to enhance public participation in public policy deliberations. The Joint
Council for the Physically and Mentally Handicapped is concerned with rights of
the disabled. The Humanist Society, which was founded in 1984, seeks to hu-
manize the social and political situation of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Tempo-
rary Housing Area Joint District Residents Committee, which is set up by resi-
dents of Temporary Housing Areas in Hong Kong, is concerned with government
policies affecting THAs, and the right to adequate housing. The University of
Democracy is an educational organization established after the Tiananmen Square
Massacre to explore, in a public manner, China's way of democratization. Its
goals include dissemination of democratic ideas via various means to promote
democratic education and practices.
One local group, the Professional Teachers Union (PTU), is particularly influ-
ential and effective. It is the wealthiest of the pro-democracy NGOs in Hong
Kong, and through revenues from the operation of two supermarkets, provides
support to many smaller NGOs. The PTU provides venues for press conferences
and loans chairs, tables, and loudhailers to other groups. The PTU makes its staff
available to facilitate NGO alliance activities.
K. GAY AN LESBIAN GROUPS
There is an increasing number of Gay and Lesbian Groups in Hong Kong that
have been struggling in recent years for, inter alia, legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. Some of the groups are comprised of
predominantly local Chinese, others are predominantly expatriate, and others are
of mixed local and overseas membership. However, their missions converge-
equality for all, and non-discrimination based on sexuality. Among these organiza-
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tions are the Hong Kong 10% Club, Freemen, Isvara, the Long Yang Club, the
Satsanga, Horizons, and the Hong Kong Gay Coalition.
L. REFUGEE GROUPS
These groups include those that campaign for internationally recognized hu-
man rights of refugees, primarily the Vietnamese asylum seekers who reside in
Hong Kong. These groups often provide legal representation to the asylum seekers
in domestic and other tribunals and provide other assistance. These groups in-
clude Refugee Concern and Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers.
M. CULTURAL AND SOCIALRIGHTS GROUPS
These groups include Zuni Icosahedron, which struggles for rights in the area
of culture, and other groups that campaign for language rights and other similar
rights.
N. RELiGIOUS GROUPS
Religious groups include the Justice & Peace Commission of the Hong Kong
Catholic Diocese, the Christian Conference on Asia/Urban Rural Mission (CCC-
URM), the Diocesan Pastoral Centre for Filipinos, and the Hong Kong Christian
Institute.
Furthermore, there is the Hong Kong's Women Christian Council, which was
founded in 1988. It seeks equality for women within the established church and in
society. It publishes a newsletter and other publications. Of course, this group
might be categorized under "Women's Groups," which I mention later.
0. ALLIANCES OF NGOs ON SPECIFC ISSUES
Alliances of NGOs on specific issues typically form in response to controver-
sial issues, as they arise. The alliances tend to wane when they achieve their goals
regarding the specific issues of concern, when the alliances are no longer able to
command sustained media attention, or when it is deemed that there are other
mechanisms available to achieve their goals. Alliances have included the Joint
Alliance of People's Organizations Striving for Democracy (JAPOD), Full De-
mocracy in '95, Joint Action for the Release of Xi Yang (a Hong Kong journalist
who was convicted in a PRC for publishing PRC government "state secrets"), and
the Hong Kong Alliance for Human Rights. One of the alliances-the Hong Kong
Alliance in Support of Patriotic and Democratic Movement in China---is one of
the most targeted groups and is at great risk.
P. WOMEN'S GROUPS
Women's groups include the Hong Kong Women's Christian Council, Hong
Kong Women's Coalition for Equal Opportunities, and the Hong Kong Associa-
tion of Business and Professional Women. These and other women's groups ac-
1997]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tively campaign for equal opportunities legislation, freedom from discrimination,
and other human rights concerns in a wide range of areas.
IV. HOW THESE NGOs MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE OF
SOVEREIGNTY: THE HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR
To illustrate the need for human rights NGOs to continue to operate in Hong
Kong, and to demonstrate the manner in which human rights NGOs in Hong
Kong might become stifled, I highlight the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor,
which is but one of the many NGOs active on human rights issues in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor (the "Monitor") is a local NGO that
promotes better human rights protection in Hong Kong, both in terms of law and
of practical daily life, and encourages greater human rights awareness. The
Monitor is particularly concerned that human rights should be protected in the
light of the transfer of administration from the United Kingdom to the People's
Republic of China. The Monitor focuses on human rights law, as contained in in-
ternational human rights instruments that apply to Hong Kong, and on domestic
Hong Kong law that incorporates international human rights norms.
The Monitor engages in community service. It assists in resolving community
and individual problems and promotes education and awareness of human rights
issues in Hong Kong. The Monitor also engages in domestic and international ad-
vocacy-before governmental and inter-governmental bodies--on Hong Kong
human rights concerns.
The Monitor was founded in 1995 by individuals drawn from the legal profes-
sion (law academics, solicitors and barristers, and the Legislative Council), com-
munity human rights leaders and advocates, and others. The Founding Chairper-
son of the Monitor is Paul Harris, an English Barrister who was the first
Chairman of the English Bar Human Rights Committee. The Founding Members
of the Monitor are: Professors Andrew Byrnes and Johannes Chan, (Faculty of
Law, University of Hong Kong and noted human rights academics); Philip Dykes,
QC (the chief architect of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights); Ho Hei Wah (known for
his grassroots human rights work with groups such as the Society for Community
Organisation and the Hong Kong Human Rights Commission); Stephen Ng and
Charles Mok (former Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Associa-
tion of Hong Kong Chinese in the United States); John Kamm (who has long ex-
perience in working for human rights in China); P. Y. Lo (member of the Hong
Kong Bar Council and an expert in international human rights treaties); Christine
Loh (Legislative Councilor); and Phillip Ross (a noted Barrister and human rights
worker). Staff of the Monitor include Mr. Law Yuk Kai (Director), Ms. Patricia
Ignarski (secretary), and Mr. Lai Wing Yiu. The Monitor has had the assistance
of Ms Maryanne Joyce, an intern from Columbia Law School, New York. The
Monitor will have two interns from Yale University beginning June 1997.
The non-founder members of the Monitor who are also members of the Hong
Kong Legislative Council (raising the total of Legislative Council Monitor Mem-
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bers to 11) include Elizabeth Wong, Lau Chin Shek, Andrew Cheng, Bruce Liu,
Leung Yin-Chung, Zachary Wong, Albert Ho, Emily Lau, Lee Cheuk Yan, and
James To.
The remaining approximately 120 members of the Monitor come from all
walks of life including, in addition to the founding members, students, blue and
white collar workers, and members of other NGOs. Many members have long ex-
perience in human rights work There are no formal requirements for Monitor
membership, which is open to anyone with a commitment to the rule of law and to
human rights.
There are no geographic restrictions for membership in the Monitor. Approxi-
mately 90% of Monitor members live in Hong Kong. The remaining 10% live in a
variety of countries including the United Kingdom, Malaysia, the United States of
America, Australia, the Philippines, and Canada. The Monitor has representatives
living in or handling Hong Kong human rights matters from bases in Washing-
ton, DC, New York, and Canada. Some of the overseas members act as liaisons
between the Monitor and overseas governments and NGOs and other concerned
entities. There are no ethnicity restrictions for membership in the Monitor. Ap-
proximately 70% of Monitor members are Hong Kong Chinese. The rem g
30% are of numerous ethnic backgrounds.
The Monitor is funded primarily by overseas contributions, from concerns such
as the National Endowment for Democracy (United States), the John Merck
Foundation (United States), and the European Union. An example of funding is in
March 1996, the Monitor received U.S. $50,000 from the European Union to pro-
duce a series of booklets explaining human rights in simple language. So far, six
of these have been published: "The Rule of Law and You," "The ABCs of Proces-
sions and Demonstrations," "The ABCs of Press Freedom," "Hong Kong Bill of
Rights: Clarification of Misconceptions and Misunderstandings," "Human Rights
Made Simple," and "Taking Your Rights Seriously".
In addition to membership fees ($12.50 U.S. joining fee, with no annual dues),
the Monitor has received funding from the Hong Kong Committee on the Promo-
tion of Civic Education (funding for a human rights educational video). Finally,
the Monitor occasionally receives modest local donations from non-members.
The principal activities of the Monitor since its inception have consisted of:
monitoring the actions of the Hong Kong government on human rights matters
and speaking out on those issues, conducting human rights research, investigating
allegations of human rights abuses, publishing and distributing human rights in-
formation in English and Chinese, and participating in the United Nations system
for the protection of human rights by lobbying, briefing, and appearing before UN
Committees.
Since its creation in 1995, the Monitor has accomplished the following-
(1) Drafted and submitted Briefing Reports to United Nations committees re-
sponsible for monitoring human rights in Hong Kong pursuant to UN treaties.
The Monitor has sent representatives to Geneva and New York to UN hearings at
which these reports were considered, including hearings before the following UN
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Committees: Committee on the Rights of the Child; the Human Rights Commit-
tee; the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee; the Race Committee;
and the Committee Against Torture;
(2) Sent missions to the United States, to brief the U.S. Government regarding
human rights in Hong Kong. The missions included meetings with officials from
the U.S. Department of State, the White House, and Congress, and with NGOs,
academics, and the press;
(3) Sent briefing missions to the European Parliament, the Australian Parlia-
ment, and the United Kingdom Parliament, and organized a visit to Hong Kong of
a party of European Parliament Members who met with Mr. Tung Chee Hwa (the
Hong Kong Chief Executive Designate) and Mrs. Rita Fan (the Speaker of the
Provisional Legislature);
(4) Met with the Hong Kong Governor Christopher Pattern on topics relating
to police interrogation practices and complaint procedures, the prison system, and
Vietnamese Boat People;
(5) Testified at Legislative Council hearings on various human rights issues,
including equal opportunities legislation;
(6) Published a report on Hong Kong's immigration law and practice from a
human rights standpoint and handled immigration cases referred by other NGOs;
(7) Campaigned for an improved police complaint system, and for an inde-
pendent inquiry into the case of Mr. Lee Shing Tat, who had been arrested after
an argument over production of his Hong Kong identity card, and who died
shortly after he made a complaint that he had been beaten up by police officers;
(8) Helped the People's Council on Public Housing Policy and social workers'
groups to promote housing rights;
(9) Reviewed Hong Kong's legal aid system and practice;
(10) Spoke out, in the English and Chinese press, on important issues such as
the dangers to the rule of law from the "new" arrangements for the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal and the emasculation of the Bill of Rights;
(11) Submitted suggestions to amend the draft code of practice under the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance;
(12) Researched the continuity of Hong Kong's habeas corpus and lobbied for
legislation for its preservation;
(13) Investigated individual cases with possible human rights implications;
(14) Delivered public speeches and organized evening classes on human rights;
and
(15) Published and distributed English and Chinese booklets and newsletters,
produced by the Monitor, informing members of various groups (including mi-
grant workers) of their rights.




V. CHALLENGES THAT THE MONITOR AND OTHER SIMILAR
HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS WILL LIKELY FACE POST-1997
Hong Kong NGOs, particularly those such as the Monitor that strongly focus
on domestic and international advocacy, face many risks post-1997. Paramount
among those risks is erosion of their association and expression rights guaranteed
by the ICCPR, the Bill of Rights Ordinance, and the Basic Law. Again, even
though freedom of assembly is implicated, I will not discuss that freedom today.
Before I explore the specific harms that may befall these NGOs, it is necessary
to canvass: (a) the law currently in place that protects human rights NGOs; and
(b) the law that will likely govern NGOs after the change of sovereignty on 1 July
1997.
A. THE EXTANT LAW THAT GOVERNS NGO CREATION
AND OPERATION IN HONG KONG
As discussed above, the 1992 Amendments to the Societies Ordinance are in
effect in Hong Kong today and are scheduled to remain in effect until 1 July 1997.
Those Amendments liberalized the repressive pre-1992 Societies Ordinance and
were enacted to render the pre-1992 legislation in compliance with the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance and with the ICCPR. Specifically, the 1992
Amendments protect NGOs' freedom of expression pursuant to Article 19 of the
ICCPR and Article 16 of the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, the 1992 Amendments
protect NGOs' freedom of association, in conformance with Article 22 of the
ICCPR and Article 18 of the Bill of Rights.
Though the 1992 Amendments provide for more freedoms than the pre-1992
legislation, it is arguable that even the 1992 Amendments are burdensome, and
should be abolished, whether or not they fully comply with the ICCPR and the
Bill of Rights. Proponents of this theory would argue that there is no need what-
soever to control Hong Kong societies through registration, notification, or other-
wise.
B. POST-1997 LAWTO GOVERNTHE CREATION
AND OPERATION OF NGOs IN HONG KONG
It is unclear precisely what the scope of the post-1997 law will be that will
govern the creation and operation of Hong Kong human rights NGOs, but there
are some general guidelines that the new Administration is obliged to follow in
determining the reach of the new IKSAR law. The Basic Law, which will be the
PRC promulgated "mini-constitution" of the newly created Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region after 1 July 1997, provides, in Article 160, that the laws
previously in force in Hong Kong shall be adopted, except for those which the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Re-
public of China declare to be in contravention of the Basic Law. There are no cri-
teria set out in the Basic Law for determining what constitutes a pre-1997 Hong
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Kong law that contravenes the Basic Law post-1997.
On 23 February 1997, the NPC resolved that the 1992 Amendments to the So-
cieties Ordinance would not be adopted as the laws of the HKSAR because the
Amendments contravene the Basic Law. The NPC did not indicate in the resolu-
tion how it was that the Amendments were deficient. After 1 July 1997, in light of
the non-adoption of the 1992 Amendments, the HKSAR will have two choices
regarding legislation governing the creation and operations of NGOs in Hong
Kong: (1) the HKSAR can refrain from enacting legislation governing NGOs; or
(2) it can enact new legislation governing NGOs. If the HKSAR enacts new leg-
islation, it could be more restrictive, or less restrictive, than the 1992 Amend-
ments. Non-adoption of the 1992 Amendments will not automatically result in
reinstatement of the pre-1992 Legislation, but will result in a vacuum, in that
there will be no legislation applicable in Hong Kong that expressly addresses the
creation and operation of Hong Kong human rights NGOs.
If the HKSAR chooses to enact legislation, which it will likely do, that new
legislation must comply with international human rights protections embodied in
Article 27 and Article 39 of the Basic Law.
Article 27 of the Basic Law provides: "Hong Kong residents shall have free-
dom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assem-
bly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and
join trade unions and to strike."
Thus, under Article 27, no HKSAR legislation may infringe the rights of free-
dom of expression or freedom of association in Hong Kong. Article 39 sets the
standard for defining the scope of freedom of expression and freedom of associa-
tion protection.
Article 39 provides:
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and interna-
tional labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and
shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.
The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted
unless as prescribed by law. Such restrictions shall not contravene the provisions
of the preceding paragraph of this Article.
Thus, Article 39 sets a floor, a minimal standard, beneath which the laws of
the HKSAR cannot fall in providing protections in Hong Kong for fundamental
fireedoms, such as freedom of expression and fieedom of association. First, free-
dom of expression and freedom of association in the HKSAR must be protected at
least at the level they are protected under the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong,
and no HKSAR Law may contravene the ICCPR. Second, if the rights and free-
doms enjoyed by Hong Kong people are to be restricted-and there is nothing in
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the Basic Law that suggests that there is any need to restrict expression or asso-
ciation or that such restrictions are mandatory-such restriction must be as pre-
scribed by law. Again, this is not a general call for restrictions, but only a guide-
line to be used to outline the manner and the means by which any restriction,
should itbe warranted, would be imposed.
The proper approach in interpreting Article 23 would be a restrictive approach.
All HKSAR laws must incorporate principles of international human rights law,
as contained in the ICCPR, and as interpreted in the common law. The Privy
Council recently reiterated such international human rights law principles, as em-
bodied in the ICCPR. These principles, because of the continuation of the com-
mon law in the HKSAR, should guide the HKSAR Legislative Council as it enacts
new laws that might restrict freedoms and that should guide HIKAR courts as
they interpret such laws. In Ming Pao Newspapers Ltd. v. Attorney General 6
HKPLR 103 at 110 (1996), Lord Jauncey recapitulated those principles:
(1) A generous and purposive interpretation must be given to any constitution
that entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms to which all persons in a state
are to be entitled;
(2) Three of the essential foundations of a democratic society are freedom of
expression, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly. When a restriction
is imposed on those guaranteed rights, those restrictions must be narrowly inter-
preted; and
(3) Any restriction on freedom of association, expression or assembly must be
proportionate to the legitimate governmental aims sought to be achieved by the
restriction.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights--to which Hong Kong courts
have looked for guidance to the jurisprudence of the European Human Rights
Commission, see R v. Sin Yau-ming 1 IkPLR 38, 107-103 (1991)-has reiterated
that not only must any restriction of a fundamental right be narrowly defined and
construed, but also the restriction must be necessary to the achievement of the le-
gitimate objectives that are pursued. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 EHRR 737
(1976). There must be a rational connection between the restriction and the goal.
Furthermore, the restriction must be proportional to important governmental ob-
jectives. Thus, if a right is to be restricted, that restriction must impair the enjoy-
ment of the right to a minimal extent and then, only as much as is necessary to
achieve the important goal.
Many common law courts, in other jurisdictions that have constitutionally en-
trenched bills of rights and to which Hong Kong courts look for guidance in in-
terpreting constitutional documents that protect rights (1 IKPLR at 88 (1991)),
have adopted similar tests for outlining the scope of permissible restrictions of
fundamental rights. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court, in interpreting
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 (Canadian Bill of Rights,
Section 1), requires that if a law restricts a fundamental right, that restriction
must be "demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society." Furthermore,
as the Canadian Supreme Court ruled in R v. Oakes 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th)
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200, 24 CCC (3d) 321 [1986], the restriction must satisfy the tests of rationality,
proportionality and minimal impairment. In the United States, expression may be
restricted only if there is a "clear and present danger" to justify a "compelling
state interest." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1965); Boos v
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 99 L. Ed 2d. 333 (1988). Thus, the HKSAR should be
guided by the principles that if restrictions are to be imposed on the fundamental
freedom of expression or association, the burden upon the government will be ex-
tremely high to show that the interest in expression or association is somehow
outweighed by whatever interests are sought to be protected by the restriction.
C. FURTHER PROSPECTIVE LEGIsLATIoN: ARTICLE 23 OF THE BASIC LAW
As a means of restraining any dissent within Hong Kong and as a means to
quell any subversive activity in the HKSAR, in particular threats from outside
forces that might tend "to destabilize" the HKSAR and "threaten" China, Article
23 of the Basic Law requires the new HKSAR to enact legislation that will pro-
hibit treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Beijing Central gov-
ernment. Furthermore, it requires the HKSAR to enact legislation that will pro-
hibit theft of state secrets and that will proibit ties between "local" "political
organizations" and overseas "political organizations." Article 23 has far-reaching
implications for and creates pressing problems for Hong Kong human rights
NGOs.
Article 23 of the Basic Law provides:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to
prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central
People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political or-
ganizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to
prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties
with foreign political organizations or bodies.
It is important to note that Article 23 of the Basic Law mandates that the
HKSAR shall pass these restrictive laws; Article 23 does not prohibit, or restrict.
It provides merely that the HKSAR must prohibit certain things.
The HKSAR itself must decide which laws to pass. Generally, Hong Kong hu-
man rights NGOs will have no major problem with the application and interpre-
tation of Article 23 so long as the rule of law is in place in Hong Kong. The new
government is bound by Article 39 of the Basic Law not to impose new legislation
in Hong Kong that is more restrictive of rights than laws currently in place, but if
the rule of law goes sour, Hong Kong NGOs stand to face grave problems, in-
cluding imposition of prospective broad definitions, interpretations, and applica-
tions of the terms of Article 23.
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D. BROAD DEFNiTIONS, INTERPRETATION AD APPuCATION
OF ARTICLE 23 TERMS
1. "Treason:' "Secession," "Sedition," "Subversion," and "Theft of
State Secrets"
It is unclear how the terms "teason," "secession," "sedition," "subversion,"
and "theft of state secrets" will be defined. The broader the definitions, the greater
the chances for abuse. There is the great likelihood of unfettered abuse because
ultimate interpretation over the definitions lies with the NPC, which is not part of
or even within the HKSAR. We can look to interpretation and application of these
terms in China in recent years in instances in which individual freedoms were at
stake.
For example, on 30 October 1996, the Beijing No 1 Intermediate People's
Court found human rights activist Mr. Wang Dan guilty of "conspiring to subvert
the government" and sentenced him to 11 years in prison and two year's depriva-
tion of political rights. The 7 October 1996 indictment of Mr. Wang alleged that
his criminal acts of subversion included accepting funds from organizations "hos-
tile" to China and "publishing anti-government articles abroad." He was further
charged with "colluding" with other dissidents (including Mr. Wei Jmgsheng) to
form discussion groups and to appeal for the rule of law, criticizing the govern-
ment in articles published abroad, accepting a scholarship at the University of
California for self-study in Beijing, and forming a mutual aid group with other
dissidents.
In 1994, Mr. Xi Yang, a Hong Kong journalist who wrote for the Hong Kong
Chinese-language newspaper Ming Pao, was in the PRC working on a story. He
was charged with "stealing state financial secrets." His crime was that he acquired
and published information related to the PRC gold reserve. He received a sentence
of 12 years in prison (Mr. Xi was released from prison in early 1997, and per-
mitted to return to Hong Kong.) Those interpretations and applications of the
amorphous terms do not engender confidence in the new HKSAk legal system.
2. "Local" versus "Foreign" Organizations
Article 23 calls for a distinction to be drawn between local and foreign organi-
zations. It is unclear which human rights NGOs operating in Hong Kong will be
deemed "local" or "of the Region" and which will be deemed "foreign." Unfortu-
nately, there are no definitions of these terms in Article 23, but the Societies Or-
dinance might offer some guidance on those definitions, even though it is unclear
that the incoming Administration will look to the Societies Ordinance for such
definitional assistance.
Section 2 of the Societies Ordinance (both the pre-1992 and the 1992 amend-
ment versions), provides the following definitions:
"Society" means any club, company, partnership or association of persons,
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whatever the nature or objects, to which the provisions of this Ordinance apply.
"Local society" means any society organized and established in Hong Kong or
having its headquarters or chief place of business in Hong Kong and it includes
any society deemed to be established in Hong Kong by virtue of section 4.
Section 4 of the Societies Ordinance provides:
A society shall be deemed to be established in Hong Kong, although it is organ-
ized and has its headquarters or chief place of business outside Hong Kong, if
any of its office bearers [president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer of the so-
ciety or branch, or member of the governing body/branch], or members resides in
Hong Kong or is present therein, or if any persons in Hong Kong manages or as-
sists in the management of such society or solicits or collects money or subscrip-
tions in its behalf.
Furthermore, Section 4 provides that a society is not a "local society" if and so
long as:
(A) It is organized and is operating wholly outside Hong Kong;
(B) No office, place of business, or place of meeting is maintained or used in
Hong Kong by such society or by any person in its behalf and
(C) No register of members is kept in Hong Kong; and
(D) No subscriptions are collected or solicited in Hong Kong by the society or by
any person in its behalf.
Under the Societies Ordinance, most of the human rights NGOs contained in
my typology are "local." They all have the requisite contacts. For example, most
of them, excluding the Lawyers Committee which does not maintain a physical
presence in Hong Kong, are organized and established in Hong Kong or have
Hong Kong as their headquarters or chief place of business.
Again, it is not clear whether these definitions will be used when the HKSAR
government legislates under Article 23, but these definitions provide a sense of
the regime that has been in place in Hong Kong since 1949.
3. "Political" Versus "Non-political" Organizations
There is no definition of "political" in Article 23, and there is no other Hong
Kong ordinance that defines the term. To help determine which NGOs will likely
be deemed local and which will be deemed foreign, it is instructive to look at case
law as precedent. Furthermore, it is helpful to examine comments by the Chief
Executive Designate, as evidence of the intentions of the incoming Administra-
tion.
The clearest guidance is that of the English Court of Appeal in a case decided
17 December 1996. In R v. Radio Authority, exparte Bull and Another, 2 All ER
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561 (C.A. 1997), Lord Woolf MR ruled that Amnesty International is a "political
organization" that engages in political activities. Specifically, Amnesty Interna-
tional is political because it urges countries to change their laws or policies to
conform to the United Nations Charter's human rights standards. Lord Woolf
ruled that "To campaign to change those laws and policies so that they do comply
with the Charter is political even though it is also commendable."
The definition of "political" contained in this English case is relevant because
pursuant to Article 8 of the Basic Law, the common law as exists in Hong Kong,
which includes the common law of England, will continue to apply in Hong
Kong. Thus, under the common law system of precedents, Radio Authority will
apply, and the definition of "political" in the context of organizations and as re-
gards Amnesty International will apply.
a. Local "Political Organizations"
Now that I have defined "local," and I have defined "political organisation," I
can determine that the following organizations will likely be deemed "local politi-
cal organisations" for purposes of Article 23.
(1) The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor
Following the case of Radio Authority, the Monitor will be deemed a political
organization. Aside from the definition provided in Radio Authority, the Chief
Executive Designate, Mr. Tung, has stated that the Monitor would be considered
"political." Mr. Tung stated this during a visit to Hong Kong of a delegation of
European Parliament members in March 1997. Though Mr. Tung's word in
March 1997 is not the law, it is an indication of the thinking of the incoming
Administration.
(2) Amnesty International (Hong Kong Branch)
It follows that if Amnesty International (United Kingdom) is a political organi-
zation, then Amnesty International (Hong Kong Branch) is also a political or-
ganization.
(3) The United Ants
"This Hong Kong NGO that is listed pursuant to the 1992 amendments to the
Societies Ordinance advocates" for abolishment of the functional constituency
electoral system in Hong Kong. Following the Radio Authority definition of po-
litical, the United Ants is political.
(4) The Democratic Party of Hong Kong
By any reasonable definition of "political organisation," the Democratic Party
will be deemed political.
(5) Human Rights Watch/Asia
Human Rights Watch/Asia, which is based in Hong Kong, monitors and pro-
motes the observance of internationally recognized human rights and advocates
for governmental conformance to the human rights norms contained in the United
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Nations Charter and other international human rights instruments. Thus, Human
Rights Watch/Asia would fall within the definition of "political" as outlined in
Radio Authority.
(6) Bar Association of Hong Kong
The Bar Association, which is comprised of Hong Kong Barristers, engages in
domestic and international advocacy to foster change in Hong Kong laws. Thus,
the Bar Association would fall within the definition of "political" organization.
(7) Law Society of Hong Kong
The Law Society of Hong Kong is comprised of Hong Kong solicitors. Like
the Bar Association of Hong Kong, the Law Society engages in advocacy for the
change in laws. Thus, it too would be deemed a "political organization."
(8) Tibet/Taiwan Groups
Without question, these groups will be deemed political. And, they stand to be
banned irrespective of the Societies Ordinance definitions.
b. Foreign Political Groups
(1) Amnesty International (United Kingdom)
As I mention above, Lord Woolf in Radio Authority has ruled that Amnesty
International is a political organization.
(2) The Bar Association of the City of New York
This group can be considered a political organization because it fosters the
change of law.
(3) Human Rights Watch (New York)
Since, as I conclude above, Human Rights Watch/Asia in Hong Kong is a po-
litical organization, it follows that Human Rights Watch (New York) is also a po-
litical organization, because they are both engaged in the same types of activities.
(4) The United Nations
The United Nations and all of its instrumentalities that have competence over
human rights matters are political bodies because the function of these bodies in-
cludes advocating the change of law and practice by governments to conform with
internationally recognized human rights norms.
(5) The European Union.
The European Union is a political body by almost any definition and, certainly,
because its primary functions include modifying law.
(6) The United States Congress, the Australian Parliament the Canadian Par-
liament, and the Legislative Branch of any other Foreign Government
All of these organizations, by function and otherwise, are political by any defi-
nition.




These organizations are political because they strive for change in laws and
because they are directly involved in the electoral processes for government offi-
cials.
(8) Overseas Trade Unions
Most of these organizations, by even the most conservative and narrow defini-
tions, are political because of their involvement in advocacy and their involve-
ment in elections around the world.
(9) National Endowment for Democracy
This organization, which is a bipartisan creation of the United States Govern-
ment, is political because among its purposes is the encouragement of govern-
ments to democratize.
4. 4Ties"
There is no definition of "ties" in Article 23, which bans certain "ties" between
certain types of organizations. The plain meaning definition of "ties"--"Lian (2)
Xi (4)" as taken from the Chinese version of the Basic Law-is "contacts," which
is general and broad. If I take a conservative definition of "ties," and construe it
narrowly, it can still have a wide range of meanings from direct or indirect com-
munication, receipt or solicitation of financial assistance, influence, formalized
contractual relationships, or memberships.
The incoming Administration, when and if it enacts legislation that restricts
"ties" between Hong Kong human rights NGOs and overseas entities, has an op-
portunity to enact legislation narrowly, to conform with Article 27 and Article 39
of the Basic Law and to comply with internationally recognized human rights
standards. Such legislation would be narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate
government objective, it would be proportional to the aim sought, and it would
impair freedom of association and freedom of expression minimally.
5. "Ties Between Local Political Organizations and Foreign
Organizations"
Article 23 calls for legislation banning ties between local political organiza-
tions and foreign political organizations. I have identified above some organiza-
tions as local political organizations, and I have identified some organizations as
overseas political organizations. It is, however, unclear which "ties" between
these two types of organizations will be banned. Even ffI presume that "ties" will
be narrowly construed, so as to maximize the expression and association freedoms
of Hong Kong NGOs, the proscribed ties will likely have a crippling impact upon
Hong Kong NGOs. This adverse impact will contravene NGOs freedom of expres-
sion and freedom of association.
It is fruitful to explore the range of prospective proscriptions, in the context of
"ties" of the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, by examining some of the con-
1997]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
strictions the Monitor may face after 1997, depending on how "ties" is defined.
VI. HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR: PROSPECTIVE
DIFFICULTIES IN THE LIGHT OF ARTICLE 23 OF THE BASIC LAW
AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF OTHER POST-1997 LEGISLATION
Under Article 23, the Monitor (along with most of the NGOs I described) will
likely be deemed a "political organization," and it will be deemed a "local organi-
zation" (as will most of the NGOs I have described). Thus, the Monitor (and the
other Hong Kong NGOs) will be required to sever "ties" with overseas political
organizations. The following are the types of "ties" that the Monitor may be com-
pelled to sever with overseas political organizations, if the definition of "ties" is
broad.
A. TIES wrrH INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE UNITED
NATIONS, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
The inter-governmental organizations that will likely be deemed "foreign po-
litical organizations" include the United Nations, the European Union, and the
British Commonwealth. Any Monitor "ties" (which could include lobbying,
briefing, solicitation of funds, etc.) with these groups would be illegal.
B. TIES wrrH THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECuTIVE BRANCHES OF ALL OVERSEAS
GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, AND THE
PARLIAMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
All overseas governmental legislative branch and executive branch bodies are
by their very nature "political organizations." Thus, "ties" between the Monitor
and any of those bodies would be prohibited. Since ties could include lobbying,
briefing, solicitation of support, and other contacts, the Monitor and other Hong
Kong "political organizations" would be banned from establishing or maintaining
such relationships. The Monitor has engaged in briefing missions to the United
States Congress and the Parliaments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom. Furthermore, the Monitor has engaged in briefing missions to
the United States Department of State and the White House. Those are activities
that could possibly fall within the proscriptions of Article 23.
C. TIES WITH MONITOR MEMBERS (WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE HONG KONG
RESIDENTS) WHO LIVE OVERSEAS
Though Article 23 bans ties between local political organizations and overseas
political organizations, it could be read to include overseas individuals who are
"political," in particular because the purpose of the overseas ties proscriptions of
Article 23 are to protect China from outside destabilizing forces, irrespective of
whether the subversive or other untoward threat issues from an overseas individ-
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ual or a group. Thus, Article 23 could be extended to ban "ties" between the
Monitor and its members who reside overseas, particularly if those overseas mem-
bers are "political" and can be seen to pose a threat to the stability of China or of
Hong Kong.
D. TIES WrrH rrs OvERsEAs FUNDERS
The Monitor has received substantial grants from overseas funders. These in-
clude the National Endowment of Democracy, the John Merck Foundation, and
the European Union. Without this finding, it will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for the Monitor to continue its domestic service and domestic and
overseas advocacy work. The National Endowment for Democracy and the Euro-
pean Union would be considered overseas political organizations. Thus, the
Monitor would not be permitted to solicit those groups for funding or receive
funding from them. Though it is less clear whether the John Merck Foundation
would be deemed an overseas political organization, funding from Merck to the
Monitor stands to be cut off because of the incoming Administration's underlying
fears of undue overseas influence in Hong Kong.
E. TIES vHTH OVERSEAS NGOs, INCLUDING GROUPS THAT FOCUS ON HONG KONG
ISSUES, SucH AS FRIENDS OF HONG KONG AND MACAU (WASHINGTON DC-BASED),
AND FRIENDS OF HONG KONG (WASHINGTON, DC-BASED)
Numerous overseas groups focus on Hong Kong issues. For example, in the
United States, these groups include: the Friends of Hong Kong and Macau,
Friends of Hong Kong, and the Association of Hong Kong Chinese in the United
States. Though there may not be formal, institutionalized "ties" between these or-
ganizations and the Monitor (or other Hong Kong NGOs), no such "ties," of any
sort, will be permitted if these overseas groups are deemed to be political organi-
zations.
F. TIES vTHTHE UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES, AND WITH THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER-BASED BODIES, SUCH AS THE HUMAN RIGHTS COmmSSION
The United Nations Charter-based bodies, such as the UN Human Rights
Commission, are political bodies, within the meaning of Article 23. The member
States of the Commission of Human Rights carry to the Commission their own
national agendas, which either favor the furtherance of change in the human
rights law and practices of other member States or defend the maintenance of the
human rights status quo in their own or other States.
The Monitor would not be permitted to create or maintain any ties with the
Commission or with any other United Nations body, such as the Economic and
Social Council, that was deemed a political organization. This prohibition could
extend to United Nations Treaty Bodies, even though their members work on
those committees in their personal capacities, rather than as mouthpieces for their
States.
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G. THE MONITOR WILL BE COMPELLED TO SEVER ITS INTERNET Lmims wrTH
OVERSEAS ORGANIZATIONS
The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor maintains a Web Page on the Internet
<www.freeway.org.hk or members.hknet.com/-hkhrm>. The Web Page is
"linked" to the Web Pages of several organizations, and can potentially be
"linked" to Internet sites of overseas organizations. Given any reading of Article
23, any "links" or electronic "ties" between the Monitor Home Page and any over-
seas political organization's site would be forbidden. Furthermore, Article 23
would likely draw within its scope any links between the Monitor's Internet con-
nection and any local organization that has "links" or "ties" (Internet or other-
wise) with an overseas political organization.
VII. OTHER RESULTS OF INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 23
Examples of some other absurd results from imposition of legislation enacted
under Article 23, even if that legislation is narrowly tailored, follow:
(1) Amnesty International (Hong Kong Branch) would not be allowed to re-
ceive funding from Amnesty International (United Kingdom), because both or-
ganizations would be deemed political, and the former organization is local and
the latter is foreign. In this case, the tie is an institutional tie and could be banned
under any reading of Article 23. The same restrictions on ties would apply in the
case of Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch/Asia would be prohibited
from maintaining "ties" with its parent organization, Human Rights Watch/New
York. The former group is local, and the latter is overseas. They both would be
deemed political.
(2) The Bar Association and Law Society of Hong Kong would be prohibited
from maintaining ties with the Bar Association of the City of New York (New
York Bar). From 24-31 October 1995, the Committee on International Human
Rights of the New York Bar sent a mission of lawyers to Hong Kong to inquire
into the future of the justice system and the rule of law post 1 July 1997. The mis-
sion was led by Senior United States District Judge Leonard B. Sand of the South-
ern District of New York and included three members of the Committee: R. Scott
Greathead, Monica McCabe, and Maurice Nessen. The team issued a report, Pre-
serving the Rule of Law in Hong Kong After July 1, 1997: A Report of a Mission
of Inquiry, 51 The Rec. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 357 (1996), which con-
tained the Committee's conclusions. The Report, after acknowledging that "the
rule of law in Hong Kong will require careful world-wide monitoring", proposed
an "on-going relationship" that would take the form of a "special committee" that
would, among other things, "hold joint-conferences, perhaps bi-annually alter-
nately in Hong Kong and New York" to discuss matters such as those raised in
the Report. Though the "leaders of both the Hong Kong Bar Association and the
Law Society of Hong Kong expressed great enthusiasm when this proposal was
tentatively advanced," that enthusiasm may be misplaced should Article 23 be
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broadly defined to proscribe this relationship.
(3) Democrats Abroad and Republicans Abroad, both of which are active in
Hong Kong-particularly during U.S. Presidential campaign years-would be
forced to sever ties with their parent groups, the United States Democratic Party
and the United States Republican Party, respectively, because all of the groups are
political and the parents are foreign. The Hong Kong-based U.S. political groups
would be forced to cease operation in Hong Kong in any event, because Article 23
of the Basic Laws calls upon the HKSAR to enact legislation "to prohibit foreign
political organization or bodies from conducting political activities in the Re-
gOILo "
VIII. OTHER POTENTIALLY RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE BASIC LAW
The Basic Law contains several articles that address the issue of "ties" between
local NGOs and foreign NGOs post-1997. Unfortunately, these articles do not ex-
plicitly include Hong Kong human rights NGOs. Thus, it is unclear whether the
human rights groups will be included within the limited protections contained
therein. However, it is likely that Hong Kong human rights NGOs will be ex-
cluded from protection, because they will be deemed political, and thus restricted,
under Article 23.
The following Basic Law Articles explicitly mention NGOs:
Article 144:
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall main-
tain the policy previously practised in Hong Kong in respect of subventions for
non-governmental organizations in fields such as education, medicine and health,
culture, art, recreation, sports, social welfare and social wrk. Staff members
previously serving in subvented organizations in Hong Kong may remain in their
employment in accordance with the previous system.
Article 145:
On the basis of the previous social welfare system, the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on the
development and improvement of this system in the light of the economic condi-
tions and social needs.
Article 148:
The relationship between non-governmental organizations in fields such as edu-
cation, science, technology, culture, art, sports, the professions, medicine and
health, labour, social welfare and social work as well as religious organizations
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and their counterparts on the
mainland shall be based on the principles of non-subordination, non-interference
and mutual respect
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Article 149:
Non-governmental organizations in fields such as education, science, technology,
culture, art, sports, the professions, medicine and health, labour, social welfare
and social work as well as religious organizations in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may maintain and develop relations with their counter-
parts in foreign countries and regions and with relevant international organiza-
tions. They may, as required, use the name 'Hong Kong, China' in the relevant
activities.
Again, it is unlikely that these articles will apply to Hong Kong human rights
NGOs.
IX. CONCLUSION
Hong Kong human rights NGOs will likely not be permitted to operate freely
and unencumbered after the People's Republic of China resumes sovereignty over
Hong Kong on 1 July 1997. The freedom of association and freedom of expression
that Hong Kong NGOs have enjoyed is waning now and will likely continue to
constrict after 1 July. Human rights NGOs, such as the Hong Kong Human Rights
Monitor and others that are actively involved in domestic and international advo-
cacy, are particularly at risk because of the prospective enactment of restrictive
control legislation and because of the potential for discretionary abuse of those
laws.
This deterioration does not have to continue. Hong Kong NGOs can persevere
in their struggle for their expression and association rights. The international
community can pressure China to ensure that she fulfills her commitment to the
continued enjoyment of rights in Hong Kong. Now is not the time for the world to
turn a blind eye to Hong Kong. Now is the time to speak out against restrictive
legislation, before it is imposed on 1 July 1997. The enactment of Draconian, op-
pressive legislation would not only be a retrogression, but also, it would violate
the internationally recognized human rights of the people of Hong Kong, who
have enjoyed human rights and fundamental freedoms and should not be swept
into the dungeon of repression.
XI. ADDENDUM-CONSULTATION PAPER ISSUED ON
SOCIETIES ORDINANCE
On 9 April 1997, the Office of the Chief Executive Designate (Mr. Tung Chee
Hwa) issued a "Consultation Document" on "Civil Liberties and Social Order"
that purports to serve as a basis upon which the people of Hong Kong will be con-
sulted on Hong Kong legislation that would control the creation and operation of
human rights and other NGOs. This Document outlines proposed legislative sub-
stitutes for the Societies Ordinance Amendments of 1992. The proposed legisla-
tion would swing the pendulum further retrograde than even the earlier oppressive
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pre-1992 Legislation. The changes put forth in the Document have been severely
criticized and condemned in written submissions by human rights NGOs includ-
ing the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch/Asia, the
Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, the Law Society, the Society for Community
Organisation, and the Bar Association Council of Hong Kong.
The proposed changes toll the death knoll for organizations such as the Hong
Kong Human Rights Monitor, and other human rights NGOs in Hong Kong that
engage in international advocacy and that rely upon support from overseas enti-
ties.
The Document, which proposes that the Chief Executive will be the ultimate
civil liberties arbiter, proposes that all NGOs register with the police, who are
given panoramic powers. The police would have the authority to deny an applica-
tion in the interests of national security, public safety, or public order. Further-
more, the police would be able to deny registration if the NGO engages in "politi-
cal activities" and has "ties" to foreign organizations, such as accepting financial
contributions from foreign organizations or allowing foreign groups to influence
its activities. Thus, all "political organizations" will be prohibited from soliciting
or accepting financial assistance from overseas.
The Document defines "political organization," sweepingly, as: "those societies
which directly participate in political activities relating to government institutions
and comment on public affairs as their main objectives." Domestically, this en-
compassing pronouncement captures the Monitor within its wings, as well as
groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the United Ants, as
expected. Internationally, the broad proposed legislation captures many organiza-
tions and institutions, also as expected, such as Amnesty International (United
Kingdom), Human Rights Watch (New York), the United Nations, the European
Union, and foreign governmental bodies.
Thus, all of the "ties" between local and overseas "political organizations" that
I feared would have to be severed would be required to be severed pursuant to the
Document proposals.
The incoming Administration attempts to justify the repressive proposals by
asserting that the new legislation would serve to strike the "balance between civil
liberties and social stability" that the new laws are needed for "national security,"
and, that "We must take steps to prevent Hong Kong from being used for political
activities against China." These claims are not supported by facts or arguments
sufficient to overcome the high hurdle of necessity, rationality and proportionality
that must be shown in order to justify, under international human rights law, leg-
islation that would restrict fundamental freedoms, such as expression and asso-
ciation.
The Document also proposed legislation that would replace the 1995 Amend-
ments to the Public Order Ordinance and that would further restrict freedom of
assembly for Hong Kong human rights NGOs. The 1995 Amendments, which are
in force today and will remain in force until 1 July 1997, require that the police be
notified if more than thirty people are to gather, not less than 24 hours in ad-
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vance. The police can deny permission for the gathering in the interests of public
order or public safety. Under the proposed law as outlined in the Document, the
police must issue a "Notice of Objection" before a peaceful protest or demonstra-
tion can take place. The police can refuse to issue a Notice of Objection on the
grounds of national security, public safety, public order, protection of health or
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
If these proposals of the Chief Executive Designate are enacted and become the
law of Hong Kong after 1 July 1997, Hong Kong human rights NGOs will become
imperiled. Hong Kong human rights NGOs will be shifted further away from full
realization of expression, association and assembly rights, rather than closer to-
wards full suppression of those rights.
MS. POKEMPNER:
A FRAGILE MACHINERY: OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS AND
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN HONG KONG
The greatest danger to human rights in Hong Kong is low expectations. Should
the transition date pass without the arrest of a democrat, the dispersal of a protest,
or the expulsion of a human rights activist, there is a risk that observers world-
wide will heave a sigh of relief and conclude that the territory has managed to
stay above the level of the rest of China with regard to civil rights. This, however,
would be exactly the wrong benchmark to use. The risk is not so much that Hong
Kong will undergo some swift and dramatic human rights disaster as that civic
engagement in governmental accountability will atrophy and Hong Kong will re-
turn to an undemocratic style of governance that typified colonial rule. Such a
return, indeed, might set the stage for later human rights disasters, of both the
dramatic type-suppression-and of the quieter type-inhibition.
Popular interest in governmental accountability represents a sea change in the
civic culture of Hong Kong that has gone largely unnoticed abroad. Concern with
human rights and the growth of democratic participation and politics in the terri-
tory, both of which bloomed in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989,
have driven the development or refinement of oversight mechanisms in numerous
areas of government. By oversight mechanisms, I refer to institutional means by
which individuals can compel review of governmental action in a wide range of
situations. This paper will briefly sketch some of these mechanisms and the
situations to which they apply, including access to the courts, complaints against
law enforcement agencies, prison monitoring, government record-keeping, and
anti-discrimination enforcement. The last British government of Hong Kong, I
will argue, did much to install oversight measures but preferred weak ones to
strong ones and, in several instances, overrode legislative support for stronger ac-
countability. The administrative measures in place at the point of transition con-
stitute a fragile machinery dependant on executive goodwill for their effectiveness
and popular engagement for their fuel.
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Left to its own trajectory, there is little doubt that popular demand in Hong
Kong would be for continued refinement of this machinery, and greater govern-
mental transparency. But China has already let it be known that it intends to rein
in some of the most powerful checks on the executive branch of government: an
elected legislature, a Bill of Rights, a free press, and popular politics and protests.
These institutions are the substratum in which oversight mechanisms have their
roots. This paper concludes by examining what implications China's intentions
hold for government accountability and the tradition of administrative oversight
The survival of these mechanisms will be a critical indicator for the condition of
Hong Kong's democracy, and the vindication of basic human rights.
THE LEGAL AID SERVICES COUNCIL
The enactment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance made it possible for the first
time in Hong Kong law for litigants to use the provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to state a cause of action, or to
challenge the validity of a domestic law for inconsistency with that treaty. The
scope of the law was swiftly curtailed by the courts at the government's motion to
preclude challenges to human rights violations committed by private hands, even
where the act was possible only in the context of government tolerance or facilita-
tion. Thus, the first and most frequent application of the ordinance %as in crimi-
nal law to challenge statutory presumptions. Even so, the ordinance was wielded
with enthusiasm by the Hong Kong bar in just under 200 cases in the first four
years after its introduction in June 1991.
For the most part the poorest in Hong Kong were unable to exploit the Bill of
Rights in a civil context. It soon became apparent that the Legal Aid Department
was approving exceedingly few cases based on the new statute. For example, in
1991 it came to light that the Legal Aid Department and opposing government
authorities had reached an informal agreement that Vietnamese asylum seekers
who sought Legal Aid to appeal denial of refugee status would be put through an
administrative procedure, rather than allowed to demand judicial review of their
cases. Another case was the application of Lee Miu-ling, a member of a demo-
cratic pressure group known as the United Ants which supported direct elections,
who requested Legal Aid to challenge the legitimacy of Hong Kong's electoral
laws. She was denied assistance on the rationale that the relief sought-a decla-
ration that functional constituencies are inconsistent with the principle of one per-
son, one vote under the ICCPR-would bring only "trivial advantage." In this
case, a rumor circulated that a member of the Attorney General's chamber had
sought to discourage Legal Aid from taking the case, a practice suspected in other
politically sensitive cases before. Lee Miu-ling's case also brought to light the
plight that unsuccessful applicants face: it is possible to appeal an adverse deci-
sion on Legal Aid, but one cannot get legal aid funding for the appeal.
The Legal Aid Department is not an entity independent of the government in
Hong Kong, although it is supposed to operate free of influence from other gov-
ernment departments. It places an annual bid to the government for its budget,
which is allocated from general treasury funds. The Legislative Council passes on
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the budget as a whole, rather than approving any specific allocation for Legal Aid.
Until 1996, such meager oversight as existed was provided by a Standing Com-
mittee on Legal Aid, chaired by the Registrar, and answerable to the judiciary.
The director of Legal Aid is a government appointee, and its lawyers are civil ser-
vants.
The agency's vulnerability to executive pressure and lack of any meaningful
independent oversight were widely criticized. In July 1993, Hong Kong's Legis-
lative Council (LegCo) urged the establishment of an independent legal aid
authority, a move supported by both branches of the legal profession and numer-
ous human rights groups. The government countered by proposing the creation of
a Legal Aid Services Council to replace the Standing Committee, a move that was
adopted. Both oversight bodies have very limited mandates: both may formulate
policy directives, but neither has oversight of day to day operations, the power to
intervene in cases, review individual applications, or hire or fire. The new coun-
cil consists of the Director of Legal Aid and nine unofficial members appointed by
the Governor and is serviced by six staff and a HK$4 million budget. Its principle
distinction is that it has been specifically charged with considering the feasibility
of establishing an independent legal aid authority and reporting back to the gov-
ernment. So far, it has not made recommendations.
In 1995, an amendment to the law allowed the Director of Legal Aid to waive
the means test for all civil suits where an applicant has a meritorious Bill of
Rights claim. The Department's practice is to refer such cases to independent ex-
perts outside the government for their recommendation. Both measures are
helpful, though hardly foolproof, for avoiding undue government influence. After
July 1, 1997, however, the utility of the Bill of Rights in challenging the validity
of new legislation may be nil. The Standing Committee of the National Peoples
Congress has announced that it will strike down the provision in the Bill of Rights
giving it precedence over subsequent inconsistent law in the territory. In theory,
the provisions of the ICCPR will still be the law of Hong Kong and, as interna-
tional treaty obligations, superior to subsequent inconsistent domestic laws. It re-
mains to be seen, however, whether Hong Kong courts will entertain claims based
on the treaty once its application depends on its incorporation through reference
in the bilateral treaty between the United Kingdom and China and Hong Kong's
Basic Law, both of which specify that the provisions of the ICCPR as applied to
Hong Kong shall remain in force. Cases brought under the Basic Law, which also
has fairly detailed rights provisions, should be subject to waiver of the means test
as well.
POLICE OVERSIGHT
Hong Kong enjoys one of the most professional and disciplined police forces in
Asia, yet concern over police abuse has been rising steadily. Over the last five
years, the number of complaints against the police for abuses such as assault or
fabrication of evidence has run between 4,000 and 5,000, but only two to three
and a half percent of these complaints has been verified. The high ratio of com-
plaints to cases where allegations have been substantiated through investigation
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has called into question the effectiveness of police oversight, particularly in view
of evidence that police abuse is a real problem. Janice Bmbyrn, who conducted
empirical research over two months on lower court treatment of evidence where
coercion was alleged, has documented that in approximately twenty percent of
cases, magistrates excluded from evidence confessions that defendants claimed
were forgeries or the product of physical abuse. Comparable figures in England
ran at about two percent Some of the particular allegations documented by
NGOs and the press are shocking accounts of brutality amounting to torture, and
there have been several cases of deaths that allegedly resulted from abuse in cus-
tody. Loh's bill also had proposed that individuals be given access to personal
information that the government held on them and be provided means to chal-
lenge its accuracy. This aspect was not incorporated into the government's code,
but the government introduced an ordinance on personal data and privacy with
similar effect that became law.
Should individuals be dissatisfied with the government's compliance under the
Code on Access to Information, the mechanism for investigating police abuse is
the Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO), a branch of the police, which re-
ports to the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC), an administrative
committee that until recently lacked any investigatory powers. CAPO has come
under fire for bias and egregious delays during investigation that seriously com-
promise the ability of witnesses and complainants to present credible evidence. In
1993, the IPCC itself recommended that some non-police should be appointed to
CAPO to participate in the investigation of serious complaints and that a civilian
should be appointed the head of CAPO. The government rejected these recom-
mendations, but the IPCC reiterated them again in 1995. Once again, the ad-
ministration rejected the recommendations on the rationale that police were the
only ones with requisite expertise to investigate complaints of police abuse. The
police, for their part, strenuously argued it would injure police morale to have out-
siders investigate the force. Hong Kong has a unitary police force, so it is not fea-
sible to have one branch investigate another, as is done in some countries.
In response to this pressure from NGOs and the IPCC itself; the mandate of the
IPCC was expanded to give it powers to interview, but not compel, witnesses and
observe, but not participate in, CAPO investigations. There is still considerable
doubt whether these measures are sufficient to enable the IPCC to perform a
genuine supervisory function to CAPO inquiries and correct bias. The govern-
ment tabled a bill in July 1996 that is still pending to change the IPCC from an
administrative to a statutory body. The bill will not, however, widen the IPCCs
powers. Moreover, the IPCC, like most oversight bodies, continues to have at its
head a Governor appointee. It has been suggested by human rights organizations
that the IPCC be allowed to recruit its own head to better enhance its independ-
ence and allow at least a portion of its regular meetings to be open to the public.
THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPON
Corruption has bedeviled Hong Kong's past, and in the last three years there
has been a resurgence that may in part be a cyclical phenomenon and in part a
1997]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
reflection of the growing influence of China in the territory's economy and busi-
ness practices. The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is a po-
lice body in Hong Kong vested with extraordinary powers of search, seizure, and
arrest in cases involving corrupt practices. It has been notably effective in sup-
pressing corruption, but its powers and secrecy have generated considerable un-
ease, particularly in the light of China's impending political control.
The ICAC came under public scrutiny in 1993 when Alex Tsui Ka-kdt, the
Deputy Chief of Operations (the number three post in the organization) and the
ethnic Chinese most likely to have assumed leadership after the transition, was
abruptly fired without explanation. He claimed it was a racist decision; subse-
quent information that came out in a LegCo hearing linked Tsui to triads (Hong
Kong criminal societies). In the course of the scandal, Tsui protested the wiretap-
ping of his telephone by the agency, and alleged that it had similarly monitored a
political target list of prominent local figures. The ICAC maintained it was
privileged to withhold explanation for the dismissal. In the end, a Review Com-
mission was appointed by the governor to examine the agency's powers and ac-
countability.
Given six months to complete its inquiry, the Review Commission issued its
report in December 1994 after deliberations behind closed doors, It declined to
look into Tsui's allegations of wiretapping. Some recommendations involved
long-overdue checks on the ICAC's powers, such as requiring court authorization
to conduct searches of premises. But few of the seventy-five listed recommenda-
tions challenged the broad powers of the agency, and some, such as urging a
greater role for the Governor in high-level appointments, seem of dubious utility
in promoting the agency's future political neutrality and independence. The recent
statement of the Chief Executive-designate, C.H. Tung, that the term "independ-
ent" would be dropped from the agency's name after the transition has reawoken
concerns for its future integrity.
One result of the Review Commission's recommendations was broadening the
scope of review of the most important of several oversight bodies for the ICAC, its
Operations Committee. The Operations Committee advises and monitors all spe-
cific investigations completed by the ICAC and is empowered to demand expla-
nations in cases where investigations have been pending for too long without
prosecution. It gained the mandate to monitor investigations in progress, cases
where suspects faced prolonged bail periods and search requests. All these pow-
ers, however, are exercised in strict confidentiality, giving little scope for public
accountability or pressure. Beyond calling the head of the ICAC to account in
situations of concern, the Operations Committee may also bring its concerns di-
rectly to the Governor. But as a member of the committee explained, the com-
mittee members are Governor-appointees, and if they are dissatisfied with the re-





Independent prison monitoring is not routinely permitted in Hong Kong, de-
spite the recent growth in human rights NGOs and the presence of an inquisitive
press corps. A joint visit in 1997 by Human Rights Watch and the Hong Kong
Human Rights Monitor is the first non-governmental exercise with regard to the
prison system as a whole. Family members and laVers may visit under condi-
tions prescribed by the Correctional Services Department Official oversight is
provided through Justices of the Peace, who by statute must visit prisons once a
fortnight and record their impressions in a book. The Commissioner of the Cor-
rectional Services Department must allow access at all reasonable times to the
Justices of the Peace. In practice, these visits consist of little more than guided
tours by prison authorities, with little initiative shown by these Governor appoint-
ees for interviewing prisoners privately or independent exploration of the facilities
and their operation.
The lack of oversight is particularly apparent in the management of detention
centers for Vietnamese asylum-seekers. The government has in the past barred
the press and certain non-governmental groups from these camps, which are
squalid and rife with abuse, in contrast to the more orderly conditions in prisons
for criminal offenders. Although Justices of the Peace have been charged with in-
specting these facilities as well, they have proven ineffectual in bringing abusive
conditions to light In 1995, the government employed massive amounts of tear
gas against protesting Vietnamese in the Whitehead Detention Centre, causing
large numbers of injuries. A public outcry and legislative hearings ensued, and
the government initiated a joint monitoring scheme involving Justices of the
Peace and representatives of non-governmental organizations. The monitors were
to be summoned whenever there was a camp transfer or repatriation exercise, and
their presence was to reassure asylum seekers and act as a deterrent to police ex-
cess. To some extent, they succeeded, and the inclusion of non-governmental
monitors resulted in more thoughtful and critical reports of these operations.
Monitoring, however, was highly variable, depending on the degree of govern-
ment cooperation in summoning the observers to the scene. An area of immigra-
tion detention that continued to lack effective oversight was the practice of sepa-
rating individuals from their families and incarcerating them in separate units for
being "troublemakers" in the eyes of correctional service personnel, without re-
course to judicial review or legal services.
AccEss TO GOVERNiENT-HED INFORMATiON
In 1994, LegCo member Christine Loh Kung-wai proposed a bill to mandate
public access to government-held information, along with the establishment of an
administrative office to enforce public requests. In its response to the U.N. Com-
mittee's Concluding Observations, it justified this conclusion by reference to ex-
isting Hong Kong institutions, such as the "Bill of Rights Ordinance to provide
remedies against infringement of human rights, a truly independent judiciay, a
sound and comprehensive legal aid system, an effective ombusdman, a fairly
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elected legislature and an active advisory committee in civic education including
human rights." The Code on Access to Information sets out an expansive range
of grounds on which the government may refuse to disclose information, such as
information concerning defense and security, or deliberations of any government
advisory body, to information that might damage the environment, harm eco-
nomic policy, prejudice commercial transactions, or even prejudice efficient de-
partmental operations. The government has broadened the number of government
departments to which the Code applies from the initial nine departments named at
its implementation in early 1995.
Should individuals be dissatisfied with the government's compliance under the
code, they may appeal to the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints, Hong
Kong's general administrative ombudsman. The Commissioner has powers to
investigate and report on complaints of governmental maladministration, but does
not have the power to enforce a judgment or compel government action to remedy
a complaint. In the first appeal under the Code on Access to Information, the
Commissioner upheld the government's refusal to disclose to the South China
Morning Post records on Carrian Investments Limited and Carrian Holdings Ltd,
two companies at the center of recent financial scandals. In the most recent ap-
peal, the ombudsman also upheld the government's refusal to release two consul-
tancy studies on electricity supply and demand, on the grounds that it concerned
pending commercial negotiations with two major utility companies.
Despite the limitations on the ombudsman's powers and the numerous loop-
holes of the administrative code on access to information, in other areas the
Commissioner has focused public attention and pressure through his reports, more
effectively in some instances than other oversight bodies. For example, in 1995
he put a spotlight on the Legal Aid Department's laggard performance in taking
twelve years to decide whether to give assistance to an applicant in a land dispute
case that involved both Qing dynasty and modern property law. Since the public
was allowed to submit complaints directly to the office of the Commissioner for
Administrative Complaints, the number of complaints has grown dramatically,
and the ombudsman has sought to increase his mandate's scope, another sugges-
tion that this mechanism is taking on increasing importance in Hong Kong.
THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION
In July 1994, legislator Anna Wu Hung-yuk proposed an equal opportunities
bill to LegCo, which would have outlawed both private and public discrimination
on the grounds of sex, marital status, pregnancy, family responsibility, sexual ori-
entation, race, political or religions conviction, trade union membership or activi-
ties, or prior conviction. This law was to be accompanied by another bill propos-
ing a Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission which would be
charged with implementing the law, receiving human rights complaints, and con-
ducting research, promulgating standards, and promoting human rights educa-
tion.
The Governor refused to allow the bill's introduction on the basis that it would
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have financial implications-if not the proposed commission, then in increased
applications for Legal Aid assistance under the law. Instead, the administration
introduced two far narrower bills on discrimination on the basis of sex and dis-
ability, with significant exemptions, lack of reinstatement as a remedy, and a limit
on the damages available to victims of discrimination so low it is unlikely to have
strong deterrent effect. The government also created an Equal Opportunities
Commission with a more limited scope than the commission proposed by Wu; the
government's commission is, however, empowered to suggest amendments to the
law should it not be working effectively. Other grounds of discrimination that
Hong Kong is obligated to address under international law, including age dis-
crimination, family status, race, and sexual orientation, were put off on the dubi-
ous excuse of a need for'Turther study," such as surveys polling the community to
discem whether discriminatory attitudes actually exist.
The Commission, established in May of 1996, is another Governor-appointed
body but with more powers than most oversight mechanisms. It may investigate
complaints of discrimination, encourage conciliation between disputing parties,
and where conciliation is inadequate to resolve a dispute, it may provide legal as-
sistance in bringing a case to court under the anti-discrimination laws. As of
January 1997, the Commission had received nine complaints, roughly split be-
tween disability and sex discrimination, and was in the process of investigating
them. The Commission has also drawn up codes of practice on employment that
were approved by LegCo and went into force at the end of the year and has taken
a proactive stance on discriminatory newspaper advertisements, warning publish-
ers, with the result that such advertisements are on the decline. It remains to be
seen, however, to what degree it will be willing to use the courts to enforce the
law, rather than rely on compromise and conciliation.
OVERSIGHT IN THE CONTE'T OF CIVIL SOcIETY
While the willingness of the government to establish oversight committees is
commendable, its preference for weak, executive-dependent committees over in-
dependent authorities is not. The mechanisms described above share several fea-
tures that make them vulnerable to manipulation. One is that most are bodies
whose members are appointed by the head of the executive branch. Given that
Hong Kong's top executive position is not chosen by direct election, this feature is
unhelpful in insulating them from political pressure. Although some bodies have
included a fairly wide scope of appointees, including known critics of the gov-
ernment, others have been staffed with members who are deferential to the bu-
reaucracies they monitor, making oversight more decorative than functional. An-
other is that not all oversight mechanisms are transparent. Few hold their
meetings publicly, and many do not report the specifics of their findings (the
ICAC oversight committees and CAPO are notable examples).
Another problem has been the government's reluctance to vest oversight bodies
with the power to intervene in individual cases. The Equal Opportunities Com-
mission and the ombudsman are the notable exceptions, with the Legal Aid Serv-
ices Committee at the opposite end of the spectrum, and the Independent Police
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Complaints Commission mid-way, empowered to observe but not to participate in
fact-finding. Under pressure, the government has supported grounding adminis-
trative oversight mechanisms in statute, ensuring their continued existence from
administration to administration.
The government has also preferred administrative solutions to legislation that
would allow individuals recourse to the courts. The administration refused to en-
tertain legislation on access to information and strenuously resisted equal oppor-
tunity legislation, in the end substituting a much weaker version of the law and
scrapping the plan for an expansive human rights commission. Conversely,
where human rights law was already in place, the government resisted supple-
menting enforcement through administrative recourse. Hong Kong shares the
British rule that unsuccessful civil litigants must bear their opponents' legal costs;
where a challenge to the government is involved, the prospect of confronting an
opponent with very deep pockets is inhibiting. The United Nations Human Rights
Committee, in its concluding observations to the United Kingdom's fourth report
under the ICCPR on Hong Kong, criticized the government's decision not to es-
tablish a Human Rights Commission to facilitate enforcement of the Bill of Rights
and afford individuals a means of redress or conciliation in situations where liti-
gation was unnecessary or prohibitive. The government rebuffed the U.N. recom-
mendation as "not the best way forward in the particular circumstances of Hong
Kong." It justified this conclusion by reference to Hong Kong's "Bill of Rights
Ordinance to provide remedies against infringement of human rights, a truly in-
dependent judiciary, a sound and comprehensive legal aid system, an effective
ombudsman, a fairly elected legislature and an active advisory committee on civic
education including human rights."
Many of these elements are in question today: the continued applicability of the
Bill of Rights; the existence of an elected legislature; the availability of Legal Aid
to challenge government laws and even the independence of the judiciary. The
compromise between the United Kingdom and China that limited to one the num-
ber of foreign judges on Hong Kong's highest court has caused some anxiety over
the continued independence of the judiciary, particularly after Hong Kong's chief
justice was discovered to have taken a position against the legality of the Bill of
Rights in private to Mainland officials. The provisional legislature has announced
it intends to review candidates for the highest court, a political move that has
raised doubts about the viability of the rule of law. Normally a nine-member
board, the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission, is responsible for rec-
ommending candidates for judicial office in Hong Kong. In April 1997, Chief
Executive-designate, C.H. Tung, reappointed seven of the current nine members,
but replaced two known for their support of democratic politics with two pro-
China businessmen who are also members of China's appointed Preparatory
Committee and Selection Committee. Along with the Secretary of Justice that
Tung will appoint, these constitute the three votes necessary to block judicial
nominations under the procedures for deliberations, effectively giving the Chief
Executive control over all judicial appointments.
It is not accidental that many of the bodies and practices described above re-
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sulted from legislative pressure, a novel phenomenon in Hong Kong that is a di-
rect result of the electoral reforms that broadened the franchise in the territory.
The abolition of an elected legislature may have severely detrimental conse-
quences for mobilizing popular pressure for reform. Even should the provisional
legislature or future elected legislatures continue the tradition of questioning the
government on the transparency of administration, the ability of members to press
for reform by proposing laws will be even more constrained than under the colo-
nial regime. Currently, private members cannot introduce bills with "charging
effecf-i.e. financial implications-without the consent of the Governor. Article
74 of the Basic Law stipulates that for the future Legislative Councils, private
members may only introduce bills "which do not relate to public expenditure or
political structure or the operation of the government" and that bills "relating to
government policies" must have the written consent of the Chief Executive before
their introduction. As virtually all matters of oversight involve government poli-
cies or the operation of government, it is likely that the incentive to draft such
legislative proposals will be dampened.
Still other developments throw into question the viability of oversight bodies
in the new Special Administrative Region of China. The press is coming under
increased pressure for self-censorship, and China has not hesitated to blacklist
certain publications it considers overly critical, either by denying correspondents
access to the Mainland or attempting to otherwise influence the financial viability
of critical media. Public protests and non-governmental organizations are likely
to come under tighter regulation in the territory as well. In the wake of the deci-
sion of the Standing Committee of the Chinese legislature to scrap laws that had
been amended to conform to the Bill of Rights, the Chief Executive-in-waiting
has proposed revisions to the Public Order Ordinance and the Societies Ordi-
nance. The revisions, which have drawn heavy protest, in essence would give
enormous discretion to police authorities to suppress public demonstrations or de-
clare political parties and other noncommercial organizations illegal by invoking
"national security" concerns. The press, non-governmental activists, and political
parties each act as a channel for the expression of popular opinion and all are
critical to channeling demand for government oversight. If their demands for
oversight trigger retaliatory acts of government regulation, they are less likely to
express such popular demands. This, in turn, may provoke a synergy where public
expectations for government responsiveness and accountability diminish as
popular demands vanish from view. Once public expectations are lowered and
voiced opprobrium muzzled, there will be less inhibition of government abuse and
less pressure for oversight bodies to perform their functions with integrity.
The colonial wisdom on Hong Kong was that it was a place to where people
had fled to make money, not to make politics or tangle with government This
view of an apathetic polity is patently untrue in the 1990s, as the growth of public
oversight bodies shows. The question is whether the perception of a disengaged
public revives after the transition to a less democratic system. Will the demands
for independent oversight mechanisms and transparent government persist? Or
will the momentum be lost, with compromised oversight committees serving as
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window-dressing on unchecked executive powers? A subtle change in attitudes
towards governmental accountability is much to be feared, because it threatens
Hong Kong's character as an open society in a far more invidious way than blun-
dering acts of repression ever could.
GEORGE BLACK: Let me speak very briefly, in part because George Edwards
has made such a magisterial presentation that it leaves one very little to say, espe-
cially in describing the details of the statutory framework within which Hong
Kong NGOs operate. I'll allude to that briefly, but I won't repeat what George has
done so excellently. I also very much appreciated Dinah PoKempner's emphasis
on the need to be attuned to the subtleties of developments in Hong Kong and not
to have apocalyptic fears or to be delighted when those fears fail to materialize.
I think that is in many ways the key to understanding the human rights situa-
tion in Hong Kong, both today and in the future, and I approach these questions
with a somewhat different perspective than both the previous speakers on this
panel and those on the panel this morning. I'm delighted that the Lawyers Com-
mittee for Human Rights, together with Human Rights Watch/Asia, has been able
to cosponsor this event, and the perspective that I want to bring is not that of the
expert immersed in the details of the situation in Hong Kong. Instead, what I'd
like to try to contribute to this discussion is to pick up on the last thing that
George said, which was the invitation to meditate on what it is that can be done
by outsiders.
What are the levers that one should use in seeking to influence events in Hong
Kong? What are the antennae that one needs to develop to understand what is
going on there? These questions are very consonant, I think, with Dinah's earlier
comments about oversight mechanisms.
I think this is a situation which calls for very particular antennae to be devel-
oped in the human rights community and, perhaps, antennae which are not the
same as those we have not historically used.
This is quite an unusual situation. In a way, it's almost the reverse of the char-
acteristic situation that confronts an international human rights NGO when it
seeks to be useful and helpful to the interests of its counterparts in a particular
country.
The classic model of human rights advocacy by internationally based groups is
of course to document abuses as they occur and then to hold governments ac-
countable and to hold them up to public stigmatization for the abuses of which
they are guilty.
The second thing that we have increasingly tried to do--and I think all of the
principal international human rights NGOs have adopted this focus in different
ways-is either to compensate for, or preferably to help develop, a local human
rights community by placing the skills they have acquired at the disposal of local
NGOs.
Within that context, there is a third thing that we have been able to do with the
understanding that we now operate in an international human rights community
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which has changed quite radically in character over the last ten or fifteen years as
the result of the tremendous proliferation throughout the world of the kind of
groups that George has so ably characterized in Hong Kong. We have tried to
provide access to local NGOs, primarily access to international institutions as well
as to foreign governments who were capable of influencing the situations in the
particular country in question.
Hong Kong, as I say, confronts us almost with the reverse of the standard pic-
ture. Here, we have a situation where, at least currently, there are very few obvi-
ous classic abuses. There are many problems of the sort that Dinah has pointed
out, but this is not, or at least not yet, a situation which is characterized by large
scale or gross violations of human rights.
As reversion approaches, I think we increasingly feel that this may continue to
be the case, at least for some considerable time. The threat to human rights re-
mains a latent one. It remains a matter of what is expressed in the intentions-or
the feared intentions or the half suggested intentions-of the Chinese government
and the future SAR authorities.
Perhaps it is because we are dealing with a nebulous, looming set of threats
that much of the discussion of the prospects for human rights in Hong Kong is so
alarmist and, franikly, apocalyptic in tone. I think the challenge that ve now face
is knowing how to define the threats clearly and how to strike an appropriate tone
in our response.
The indigenous, locally based human rights community in Hong Kong is al-
most unique in my experience. In addition to its work at the grassroots level, in
constituency building and representation, it is extraordinarily well versed in those
areas in which the international human rights NGOs have traditionally tried to
supply access and guidance. It is certainly the equal of any other national NGO
community that I have encountered. My co-panelists have made presentations to
the Human Rights Committee and to other UN treaty bodies, to which, frankly,
we have nothing greatly to contribute or to add. If the job is being exceedingly
well done locally, why duplicate it?
The local advocacy skills that allow NGOs to confront their own government
and to achieve modifications in the behavior of that government-modifications
in the legislative framework and influence on particular pieces of legislation-all
those skills exist, too, and we have heard them described.
The existence of this vital human rights advocacy community is, I think, one of
the prime indicators or barometers of the survival of the rule of law in Hong
Kong. Now, I don't want to romanticize this concept of the rule of law in Hong
Kong. What we've heard, particularly in Dinah's presentation, is a very necessary
reminder that for all the general virtues there is a great deal wrong with the Hong
Kong polity, and a great deal of what is positive about that polity was added very
late in the day by the colonial authorities.
For reasons that we all know, the more positive aspects of the rule of law and
rights protection manifestly arose as a response to events in China in 1989. They
have, therefore, become embroiled in the most difficult and contentious areas of
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China's conception of its sovereignty. So, it is not a clear-cut or uncomplicated
rule of law situation in Hong Kong, and it is certainly not something we should
idealize.
Just as the NGO community is one of the best indicators that the rule of law is
thriving in Hong Kong, so logically is the continued ability of that conununity to
exercise its freedom of association and the closely related right of assembly. For
that reason, the continued enjoyment of these rights is one of the threshold issues,
one of the tripwires if you like, to measure whether our more apocalyptic fears are
coming to pass. The fact is, I think, that our fears may be borne out in quite subtle
ways, which we may need a little practice and some new skills to identify and to
respond to.
I offer these remarks in the context of a growing awareness among govern-
ments, and certainly in the NGO world, that the issue of freedom of association,
the right which is basically expressed in Article 22 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political rights and in many of the regional instruments, is the most
neglected of rights. In some respects, it is the most important of rights, in that it
serves as a guarantor of other rights. It is the monitoring and lobbying and the ca-
pacity of independent monitors that allows other rights to be observed and en-
joyed. We are belatedly waking up to the importance of freedom of association as
a key international right.
China's role in this emerging discussion about freedom of association bears
thinking about for a moment In the UN, there has been underway for some ten
years or more now, a draft declaration that would codify the rights of human
rights defenders. China has not only been one of the primary obstacles to devel-
oping that declaration in terms that are genuinely permissive of NGO activity. I
think it is fair to say that China has also learned a great deal from the experience
of watching other governments develop regulatory and legislative frameworks to
contain the threat that NGOs can present to their laws and to their practices.
While governments have grown increasingly sophisticated in developing
mechanisms of control of NGOs, I think the human rights movement has been
late in devising, as it were, countermeasures to the kinds of things that govern-
ments characteristically do. I'll try to describe some of these in a moment, and
they may suggest some of the areas that we will need to keep an eye on as Hong
Kong moves through reversion.
I think we have begun to develop a focus-and by we, I mean not only human
rights groups, but the UN, the US State Department, and other national govern-
ments. We have learned to look at the predicament of human rights defenders, but
the tendency is still very much to approach the problem in a very traditional way.
This is very evident, for example, in the human rights country reports of the De-
partment of State. Let me explain. The country reports now have established cate-
gories for monitoring the climate in which human rights advocacy takes place.
Section 2B of the Country Reports deals with freedom of peaceful assembly and
association. Section 4 calls itself "governmental attitude regarding international
and non-governmental investigation of alleged violations of human rights." The
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sections on Hong Kong this year I thought weren't bad, and were an improvement
in that they began to look, albeit rather glancingly, at the question of the legisla-
tive and regulatory framework governing NGOs. This year's report looks, in
somewhat general terms, at the Societies Ordinance in particular, but the general
tendency is still to start by asking the classic, traditional human rights questions.
Did any human rights activists have their heads cracked in a demonstration? How
many people received death threats? Clearly, of course, dramatic events such as
these should be noted and described, but they are, if you will, just the tip of the
iceberg and we only get very progressively and slowly to the larger question of
how the activity of these groups is impeded in the first place.
As I suggested before, Hong Kong may be an interesting laboratory, a place
where the threat begins at the other end of the spectrum where it starts with the
regulatory and legislative end of the spectrum, and may or may not over time pro-
gress to the head-bloodying end of the spectrum.
I tend to agree with Dinah that is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future,
even though it's a scenario that we all sometimes lie awake at night thinking
about, but I don't think Christine Loh, or Martin Lee, or Margaret Ng, God will-
ing, is going to end up in jail Wei Jingsheng style, that is in a way the scenario
that many people in this country are predisposed to see and respond to. Let me be
clear: when I say that won't happen or is unlikely to happen, I am not for a mo-
ment saying that I feel optimistic, but my pessimism is rather of a different vari-
ety.
My fear is not that there will be blood in the streets. It's more that we will not
know how to devise the means of responding effectively to the kind of subtle en-
croachment on rights which I think will happen, and indeed is already happening.
This will require a conceptual framework, a set of antennae, that we haven't
really had to devise, or learn how to devise, until now. It will require a very pre-
cise set of legal and monitoring skills to come up with appropriate policy re-
sponses to what is likely to happen in Hong Kong.
We are likely to get some hints tonight at our video tele-conference panel. It
will be instructive to look at the field of press freedom and fredom of expression,
which was alluded to earlier today. One thinks immediately of course of the cele-
brated cases such as X Yang, a Hong Kong journalist operating in China, who
got 12 years for "revealing state secrets." Notwithstanding cases of this sort, the
laboratory of press freedom has created a niche for a very innovative partnership
between a local NGO and an international NGO and a new style of human rights
work tailored to the reality it is confronting. I am talking about the collaboration
between the Hong Kong Journalists Association and Article 19. What they have
been able to do jointly is to illustrate, very effectively and persuasively, the creep-
ing encroachment on the right of freedom of expression.
One journalist described the Hong Kong press as the canary in the coal mine.
It's the first thing to drop, and it has certainly been the first thing to be affected in
Hong Kong. It's worth running through briefly the spectrum of threats, short of
the X Yang scenario where an individual journalist is thrown in jail, to under-
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stand the very palpable change in the climate of freedom of expression in Hong
Kong.
One which has been mentioned is the chilling statement, the veiled threat, the
implication that the law is something other than what is actually written on paper.
It is a matter of the interpretation that Chinese officials or SAR officials will give
to a particular event. Lu Ping, the PRC spokesman on Hong Kong, has spoken of
the boundary between objective reporting and advocacy, but there is absolutely no
statutory basis for defining what that distinction is.
We've seen a very prevalent, and very widely publicized climate of self censor-
ship, which I don't need to dwell on at length, especially in the Chinese-language
press. We've seen particular pieces of legislation that were reviewed in the early
1990s by the Hong Kong Government for their conformity with the Bill of Rights
Ordinance, which we've heard a great deal about this morning. These include the
Television Ordinance, the Telecommunications Ordinance, the Broadcasting
Authority Ordinance, and the provisions for censorship in the Emergency Regu-
lations Ordinance. There are some early signposts here, I think, to the way in
which the statutes themselves, and retrogressive interpretations of what the law
says, will become the battleground in other areas beyond that of press freedom.
Then we've seen the way in which the economic climate, the advertising cli-
mate, the ownership issues associated with the press, have all been used in a way
that came up this morning in response to a question about private property rights.
The most recent case in point involved a very aggressive entrepreneur called
Jimmy Lai, who also runs a very contentious newspaper called the Apple Daily.
He floated a public stock offering for his media company, only to find that the un-
derwriter of the offering mysteriously pulled out at the eleventh hour, and when
this fellow was asked why this had happened, he made a dark allusion to-well,
everyone knows why these things are happening.
That climate, of what you might characterize as "indirect burdens," is some-
thing that is likely to apply in the NGO world, too, and I'll come to that in a min-
ute. It's something that we must be exceedingly watchful of.
In thinking about some of the danger signs that one should watch for, I wanted
to be less Hong Kong-specific for a moment and reflect a little on the behavior of
other governments-the kind of thing that China has probably been observing
with interest during its very obstructive involvement, together with Mexico and
Cuba and a handful of other governments, in the UN Working Group on the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Human Rights Defenders.
I think China, at a minimum, has been very carefully studying the experiences
of other Asian governments in the regulatory arena as it effects freedom of asso-
ciation. I think it's also very plausible that it may have been studying the laws and
practices that have been applied by other governments trying to clamp down on
NGOs.
The danger in Hong Kong may not be that it will replicate, or import whole-
sale, legislation from the PRC. It may well be that it will pick and choose from
other attractive models. It frequently cites Singapore. All sorts of Chinese officials
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cite Singapore and in all sorts of contexts, as their model.
A number of Asian governments-Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and oth-
ers-have devised various forms of threats against the ability of NGOs and other
human rights monitors to operate freely. The Lax'ers Committee has begun to
study these laws and practices at a global, comparative level, and we will soon
publish a report on this. In the process, we have come to recognize what you
might call a typology of abuses. The range of restrictions that NGOs characteristi-
cally encounter in the legal and regulatory spheres. These abuses are not neces-
sarily headline-grabbing. They are not sexy, they are not classic human rights
abuses as we have learned to recognize them, but they really are the areas in
which Hong Kong has to be watched very, very carefully.
There are questions of registration, for example. Is the registration of an NGO
mandatory? Are the conditions for registration, where they exist, reasonable ones?
How is a "reasonable" condition defined? If registration exists and an NGO is de-
nied, what access to redress and review exists?
The funding of NGOs is, I think, likely to be an extremely contentious area,
and it's also been alluded to by other speakers. There are very few NGOs who do
not depend, directly or indirectly, on some kind of support from abroad, often in
the form of financial support from foreign foundations, governmental organiza-
tions, intergovernmental organizations, or private donors. Will NGOs in Hong
Kong be obliged to disclose the sources of their funding or to give details of their
own disbursements?
In thinking about foreign funding, governmental or non-governmental, the ex-
ample of Indonesia has been something that everyone monitoring these matters
has taken very deeply to heart since the Dill massacre in East Timor in 1991. In
response to the criticism that was leveled by both the Dutch Government, the for-
mer colonial power, and by local NGOs who were receiving Dutch government
support, the Indonesian government barred all financial support from the Nether-
lands.
Next, the tax regime. This doesn't sound like a human rights issue, but it really
is in a context such as Hong Kong, and increasingly in a number of other coun-
tries. Part of Mexico's restrictions on NGOs, for example, has been the denial of
not-for-profit status to NGOs. Will NGOs in Hong Kong enjoy non-profit status?
If they have to disclose financial information, to whom should that information be
made available? Some governments will argue that it should be made available to
all interested government departments. In this country, it's made available to the
IRS. So, if there is a disclosure requirement, will China, will the SAR require dis-
closure only to the relevant taxation authority, or more broadly?
There are a whole slew of questions concerned with interference in the internal
governance of NGOs, in which governments around the world are becoming very
practiced. Does the government have the power to dissolve an NGO? Can the
government replace the board of an NGO and substitute its own designated mem-
bers? Can a government force an NGO to disclose the details and biographies of
its members?
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I mentioned indirect burdens earlier. One form of indirect burden that NGOs
in many countries have experienced, and I would suspect we are quite likely to see
in Hong Kong, is the use of both the legal process and the media to intimidate,
sometimes perhaps even directly prosecute, but at least intimidate NGOs or dis-
credit them in the eyes of public opinion.
Will the government stimulate or acquiesce in assaults on NGOs by third par-
ties? There are many examples. Kenya, for one, springs to mind. For example,
there is one case in which the government of Amp Moi has not directly been in-
volved, but a pro-Moi deputy has brought a private lawsuit against the Bar Asso-
ciation of Kenya for involving itself in exactly the kind of charge that George was
talking about earlier in relation to Hong Kong-becoming involved in political
activities and therefore, acting against its charter.
Now I don't think for a moment that the Chinese lie awake at night studying
Kenyan jurisprudence, but I wouldn't be surprised if they're aware, and have their
own ideas, of how NGOs can be intimidated in this fashion.
Finally, we talked a little about the question of international ties and obviously
the areas covered by Article 23 of the Basic Law, which probably gave rise to the
gravest immediate concern for interference with NGOs. I would be quite worried
if I were the New York City Bar Association or the Hong Kong Bar Association. I
was just looking a moment ago at the text of the final appendix to the New York
Bar report, which is in your briefing book at page 104, the proposal for an
on-going relationship between the New York City Bar Association and the Hong
Kong Bar Association.
I remember when the delegation came back to New York, there was great ex-
citement and enthusiasm on both sides, but how that kind of relationship will now
be interpreted, I'm a little apprehensive to think. There are governments else-
where who have already acted quite aggressively, and have laid down some mark-
ers, if you like. The Turkish Government, for example, has actually prosecuted
people, citing in their criminal indictment the fact of their transmitting informa-
tion about human rights conditions to Amnesty International. Turkey has gone
even further, in fact, and has actually brought prosecutions citing a lawyer's use
of the right of individual petition to the European Commission on Human Rights
under Article 25 of the European Convention.
Again, Turkey is a long way from China, but I think it is clear that the Chinese
Government, whether through the Working Group on Human Rights Defenders or
through other mechanisms, is aware of these trends and has become much more
sophisticated about its own practices. The examples are out there, and they, or
something like them, are quite likely to be applied in Hong Kong. As I said be-
fore, they will not demand the traditional responses that we are used to giving as
human rights advocates.
PROFESSOR JAYAWICKRAMA: Thank you. The last speaker said that after
hearing George and Dinah he had little to say. You will be quite relieved to know
that after George, Dinah, and George, I have even less, if anything at all to add.
Perhaps that's not a bad thing because we ought to begin a discussion after this
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length of time. However, there are just one or two words that I would like to men-
tion on the subject
There is no doubt that the international monitoring of human rights is vital as
far as Hong Kong is concerned. It is a fact that international monitoring has
brought about considerable changes in Hong Kong life. Notably, the attention that
has been paid by the U.N. Human Rights Committee has led to significant legal
changes in Hong Kong.
In fact, the Hong Kong that was the subject of the Joint Declaration in 1984
was transformed into what Hong Kong is today is, I believe, largely due to the
scrutiny that the Human Rights Committee subjected Hong Kong to since 1988.
In that respect, the non-governmental organizations in Hong Kong, perhaps more
than any other, were responsible for activating the U.N. Humans Rights Commit-
tee.
Dinah referred to the tremendous blossoming of NGOs and human rights ac-
tivity in Hong Kong. That's perfectly correct But all that happened post Joint
Declaration, post-1984. I'm happy to see Dimon Liu here. She will remember the
formation of the Ad Hoc Study Group on Human Rights in China which sprang
up in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre and which was able to provide per-
haps the most comprehensive and accurate report of the events in China in the
months of April, May, and June of 1989, and which led to the first ever resolution
in any U.N. human rights monitoring body against China; the first time that the
searchlight was focused on a Security Counsel member. That was due to NGO ac-
tivity which commenced in Hong Kong. The first report on Hong Kong that was
submitted by the British Government to the Human Rights Committee under the
ICCPR in 1979, is now being cited by the Chinese Government
That document and the statements made on behalf of the Hong Kong Govern-
ment were cited by Chinese jurists and Chinese officials in making out a case for
the abolition of the Bill of Rights.
They say, here is a British Government representative who goes to the U.N.
and tells the UN that every law in Hong Kong is fully consistent with the interna-
tional obligations under the ICCPR. And how would you know about it? Because
it is the policy of the British Government not to ratify a human rights treaty unless
and until it has ensured that every single law is in conformity with the obligations
it is about to undertake.
That was absolute nonsense. But it was possible for none other than a chief
justice of the Hong Kong Supreme Court who was chosen to be the spokesman for
the Hong Kong Government on that occasion, to say that and get away with it.
But when the second report was submitted in 1988, ten years later, the interest
that was generated by a number of NGOs in Hong Kong led to the British Gov-
ernment hurriedly submitting a supplementary report claiming there were matters
that had been overlooked. That was just a week before the Human Rights Com-
mittee sat
I have been associated with one NGO, Justice, the Hong Kong Section of the
1997]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
International Commission of Jurists which, together with the Bar Association, the
Law Society, and the Hong Kong Journalists Association, has regularly attended
meetings of the U.N. Human Rights Committee and briefed its members as best as
it could.
That has, no doubt, resulted in the attention the Committee has paid to Hong
Kong and the changes that have resulted in consequence of that attention. So, it is
important, it is vital, that NGOs should remain active.
The response to that of the Chinese Government is that Hong Kong is the in-
ternal affair of China; that it is no business of anyone else to criticize what is be-
ing done. In fact, before the last session of the Human Rights Committee, the
Chinese Government issued a statement and warned the world that criticism of
Hong Kong after 1997 will not be welcome.
Mr. Tung Chee-hwa, the Chief Executive-designate said only a few weeks ago
that people in Hong Kong should not go abroad and say unkind things about the
territory. He called it "badmouthing" Hong Kong. One can therefore see the sort
of creeping paralysis that is being induced on the NGO.
What are the threats that exist to NGOs? The old Societies Ordinance, to
which reference has been made, is obviously the principal threat to the function-
ing of NGOs. It is ironic that the Society's Ordinance was originally introduced in
1949, to prevent the Communist Party of China establishing branches in Hong
Kong.
I have seen the letter which was sent by the British Governor to the Colonial
Secretary in London in April, 1949 where he said:
The Chinese Communist Party is about to take control of China, which means
that within the next few months the Communist Party of China will be trying to
establish branches in Hong Kong; we have to stop that; we've got to take imme-
diate action to stop that; we've had enough problems with the KMT forming
branches. We do not want Hong Kong to become the battle ground between the
Chinese Communist Party and the KMT.
The Society's Ordinance resulted from that. It prohibited outside political or-
ganizations from forming branches in Hong Kong and Hong Kong's political or-ganizations from establishing links with political organizations abroad.
That law was repealed to give effect to the Bill of Rights. The Chinese authori-
ties now want to bring it back and it will probably be brought back because the
NPC has taken a decision to repeal the amending ordinance.
In that connection, perhaps nothing could be more chilling than the judgment
of the English Court of Appeal-to which George referred to a moment ago-
concerning Amnesty International, where it was held that to campaign for the
observance of fundamental human rights, by seeking to influence or agitate for a
change of law or policy, is "political activity" and that any organization that is
engaged in that kind of a work is a political organization. In terms of that judg-




With judicial authority of that kind, it is not going to need much effort to pro-
hibit at least the three organizations in Hong Kong with foreign links, the Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Hong Kong section of the Interna-
tional Commission on Jurists, from conducting the kind of activity they have been
engaged in.
That is a major obstacle. Then, of course, the other proposal to revive the old
Public Order Ordinance, will result in prohibiting any kind of demonstration or
public meeting except with the leave and license of the Commissioner of Police.
The Official Secrets Act is a law that one can live with, because it is a some-
what modernized version of an old English law that is rarely fully implemented.
But when the law is modernized, as the government intends to do very shortly, I
think Margaret is the chairman of the committee that's looking into it.
MR. JAYAWICKRAMA: Not the chairman, I see. Well, a member of the
committee that's looking into it The intention is to localize that old law, without
making any substantive change, merely substituting PRC for the United Kingdom,
which means that any information which is considered to be "prejudicial to the
interests" of the People's Republic of China will be an official secret, and people
will be prohibited from dealing with that kind of information.
To have in one's possession, a document which might be prejudicial to the in-
terests of the PRC, would be an offense. If that kind of substitution takes place
without drafting a new law to meet the new requirements, it would be a major
threat to the functioning of the NGOs.
Reference has already been made to Article 23 of the Basic law. I don't wnt to
go into that again. But the Government has now presented to the Legislative
Council a bill to preempt the future Legislative Council and to create the new of-
fenses of treason, subversion, sedition, and secession. They are seeking to do that
by repackaging existing offenses under new names. I personally think that's a
very dangerous exercise.
For instance, sedition is virtually dead under the common law. The most recent
prosecution I believe was in Canada, about 40 or 50 years ago. And there, too, the
judges interpreted the law of sedition to require some violent activity.
But if the Hong Kong Legislative Council were to reenact these old offenses-
some which are dying and some which are dead-they would, then, become new
offenses. And accused persons who are brought before the courts will probably be
denied the benefit of judicial interpretation which has narrowed the scope of the
offenses considerably during the past two centuries.
These are some of the problems which NGOs in Hong Kong will have to face.
But, the real problem is that which the Chinese government will be called upon to
face. And one has to understand the Chinese position as well.
It's well and good for us to be talking about the fears that Hong Kong has. But
if one looks at it from China's point of view-which I think one must also do
from time to time-it's really a problem of people who have been trained and
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brought up and schooled in what Justice Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court
called the "suffocating orthodoxy" and "standardized thought" to having to come
to terms with a free, open, liberal, relatively democratic society."
How do you accept such a society, take it into your bosom, and deal with it?
The Hong Kong of today is not the Hong Kong of 1984.
But if and if Hong Kong changed, it was not because the British government
changed it, but because one single event in China, the Beijing spring of 1989,
completely transformed Hong Kong. The reality is that Hong Kong has changed
dramatically.
But, then, is it conceivable that the Chinese government would permit a small
region in the South China Sea to enjoy individual and collective rights that are
denied to the rest of the country, including other neighboring southern provinces?
What explanation can the Chinese leadership offer-if each of you happened to
be a state leader of China, what explanation can you give to other regions in the
country, including the relatively prosperous Shanghai or the rapidly developing
Guangzhou, for not allowing them the rights and freedoms enjoyed in the newly
regained Hong Kong? How long will it be before the Hong Kong phenomenon be-
comes infectious?
It may be possible to have two economic systems in one country. But I must
confess I am no longer a starry-eyed idealist to believe-naive enough to be-
lieve-that it is possible to preserve and nourish an oasis of freedom circun-
scribed by an enormous authoritarian desert.
Ostensibly, Hong Kong may enjoy autonomy. But that autonomy will be exer-
cised under controlled conditions by officials, legislators, and judges, who are
themselves chosen and ordained under controlled conditions. That is why we are
seeing today, a "Provisional Legislature," and an attempt to handpick judges to
man the highest courts.
We have a Secretary for Justice who has been chosen, who, in her first state-
ment to the press, said that "[i]t is unlawful today to say 'Down with the Queen,'
therefore it shall be unlawful after the 1st of July to say 'Down with Li Peng."'
Of course, she didn't explain how the attributes of a monarchy can be trans-
ferred into a republic and how Li Peng could possibly be equated to the British
monarch, who is really the symbol of the state, or symbolizes the state.
These, then, are problems that they have to grapple with. The reality is that the
Chinese authorities do have a problem themselves in dealing with Hong Kong.
That's what, I suppose, should bother us most. Thank you.
PROFESSOR SHALLECK: Thank you all for those thought-provoking pres-
entations. Do we have any questions?
MS. MOORE: Margaret Moore, Legislative Council, Hong Kong.
Madam Chairman, I can hardly wait to respond. As a lawyer, I am warned to
win on my good points-at least to try to win on my good point and not to win on
my bad point, because I will lose on the appeal. And for the first time, it looks as
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if, this afternoon, this panel, we may win on our good point instead of winning on
our bad point
I want to heartily thank this panel for drawing the conference's attention to a
very real thing, which is that we are not going to be so much afraid of having
blood on the head of Margaret-and which is very, very unlikely-and having a
reversion of the trend that we have been enjoying in the last decade and more.
I have to say that Hong Kong enjoys very high standards, and we always aspire
to international standards. And the development in the last 10 or 15 years is very
much made possible because of the activity of NGOs and also because of the be-ginning of a more democratic legislature.
I thank Diane for describing in such concrete detail how these things actually
happen. For example, if you have a bill on legal aid-I happen to be on the Vote
Committee-you will see the Vote Committee of this elected legislature asking for
representations from anybody who is interested. And, then, an NGO can come to
the Legislative Council, speak to the Vote Committee, and put forward views,
which will then be considered.
Nihal has just cited an example on the laws of subversion and secession. The
very first things that the Vote Committee did was to ask for representation. Nihal
came as a representative of Justice. We heard from a human rights monitor. We
heard from a number of human rights groups. We heard from the Bar Associa-
tion, the Law Society. And their views were very, very clear, that they didn't think
it would be a good thing.
The Legislative Council, with the assistance of NGOs, is able to put forward
amendments, or it is able to come to a position in which the laws which will be
passed will conform to the high standard of human rights, instead of allowing
governments to slip through legislation which would do that damage.
For example, the Independent Council on Police Complaint-again, that hap-
pens to be a Vote Committee that I am sitting on-again, you see here a coopera-
tion between the NGOs and the more democratic element of the elected Legisla-
tive Council.
Now, I have to say that George Black is perfectly right, that we are dealing
with a latent threat And that is much, much more difficult to deal with. Because
if you already have a few bloodied heads in the streets in Hong Kong, your case
will be a lot easier to run. But if you are talking about latent fears, then it is much
more difficult
I think it is George Black who put forward the example of the press. George
said the most chilling thing is that is what is said by people like the Chinese offi-
cials about the law would not really be the only control. But I do not think that
that is the most chilling thing. The even more chilling thing is how little response
there was to threats of this kind in the Hong Kong press.
And you will find, more and more, that although in the beginning the response
to replacing a democratically elected Legislature with a handpicked one-al-
though in the beginning it was very strong-now the press has come to a stage
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when they become more accepting of these things. It takes you years and years of
very hard work to achieve a high standard-to expect high standards. But it is
very easy for you to give up those standards. All you have to do is to lose heart,
and you will very quickly go back to the old days and nobody would be able to
raise a single sigh of complaint. And I think that these are the very real dangers
we're facing.
Now, much more than that, I think the danger we face is much, much more
real. Article 23 is a very strong weapon because it will have a lot of popular sup-
port. It is easy to say, why should we allow a bunch of foreigners to come and tell
us what to do? We should be allowed to make our own positions. So, these NGOs,
with their connections abroad, should not be allowed to influence Hong Kong.
And Nihal has pointed out to you the kind of real problems that the Chinese
government is facing. But I think that this is exactly where Hong Kong needs
most input from abroad, because even economically we have not become what we
are by staying provincial, by staying completely closed to outside influence. We
have become what we are in Hong Kong because we have kept on listening to the
voice outside, imbibing standards which are accepted not by the country which is
the least concerned about human rights, but from the countries which are most
concerned about human rights. We would only take the highest standards, and I
think this is what we have to keep in the future.
I think this is a very good start, because we have to find those mechanisms to
fight something which, at the first blush, will be very acceptable both abroad and
at home in Hong Kong as shutting out foreign influence because Hong Kong peo-
ple should decide on their own.
I hope very much that you would succeed. I think you've highlighted the prob-
lems. I think we're in the right direction. But it is a lot of hard work. And with
the elected Legislature being disbanded very soon, in a few months' time, being
replaced by an undemocratically elected one, I think the work is even harder.
I started looking at the Legislative Council very closely in the middle 1970s.
And I tell you, it is nothing like what it is today. Because when you have an ap-
pointed Council, it is very easy to arrange for an agreement between the Council
and the executive. It is only when you have open elections, when you have elected
members, that you find that this cooperation between the more open-minded ele-
ment of the Council and the NGOs in the world-that you find it working.
So, you're in the right direction. I hope you will succeed, because your success
would mean very much to me personally. Thank you very much.
MR- HUGHES: Edward Hughes, from the National Democratic Institute.
I'd first like to thank the panel for your thoughts on this topic of NGOs. My
question is whether you have any sense that NGOs in Hong Kong are committed
to the test. I guess, what are the boundaries of what political activities would be-
as Professor Edwards spoke to-and whether they're committed to really force the




MR. EDWARDS: I'm not sure I understood the question. But did you ask how
far will the Hong Kong NGOs go in trying to test the hand of the-- Well, it's
easy for me to sit here in Washington, D.C.--or in Indianapolis, Indiana where I
live-and say that I would be willing, personally, to push very hard, because my
livelihood is not at stake. Even when I lived in Hong Kong, which I did do for
almost six years, my livelihood-my freedom was not really at stake.
And ifI were to go back, I would not have the same problems that some of my
colleagues at the Monitor-or my colleagues and comrades at some of the other
organizations have. And some of their constraints are that they don't have a way
out if things get really hot and heavy. And I can't really speak for those people.
Those are the ones who I think would be in a far better position to answer that
question. We don't have the same-we don't have the same risks.
So, I don't know-I can't speak for all of the NGOs. I can only speak for my-
self, personally. I do know that-and I do believe that some of the people working
at the Monitor who don't have overseas passports would be willing to even have
blood on their head if that's what it takes for fundamental freedoms to be the rule
in Hong Kong in the future.
GOVERNANCE: THE PROVISIONAL LEGISLATURE,
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES,
CORRUPTION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
PROFESSOR WILSON: My name is Rick Wilson. I am on the faculty here at
the law school, and I direct the International Human Rights Law Clinic and teach
in comparative law areas, particularly human rights and criminal procedure.
It's a great pleasure for me this afternoon to moderate this panel. And we'll
run about an hour and a half. I hope we'll have a chance to have some questions
at the end.
And if I may just introduce the panelists. To my immediate right is Howard
Lange, from the State Department To his right is Edwin Fung, from the Alliance
of Hong Kong Chinese in the U.S. And you have seen Christine Loh this morn-
ing, a member of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Mr. Lange has done a great
favor by standing in for JeffBader, who was scheduled to be a panelist this after-
noon and who was taken ill at the last minute. So, Howard has bravely agreed to
step in on his behalf
He is a veteran at the State Department. He has been there for 27 years. He is
currently Director of the Department of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs. And for
some time before that, he was the Coordinator of Taiwanese Affairs.
He spent a good deal of time in China in the '80s, both in China and, then, on
the China desk here at the State Department And he's going to give us an over-
view with regard to U.S. policy regarding Hong Kong.
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MR. LANGE: Thank you, Rick. I am a last-minute addition. I am certainly
much less qualified than Jeff to speak to Hong Kong. I have not served in Hong
Kong during my career. I have lived in Taiwan and in mainland China. I dare say
I'm less qualified than many in the room, also, to speak to the situation in Hong
Kong currently or the history that led us to where we are today.
But I thought I would speak about what I do have some familiarity with, and
that is the U.S. administration's approach to Hong Kong as we near reversion at
mid-year.
Of course, by way of background, the commitments that the Chinese made in
the Joint Declaration are a fairly impressive list of commitments.
Just to tick off the main items in the Joint Declaration: they committed them-
selves to independent courts for Hong Kong; that Hong Kong residents would be
in all the important positions in the government in Hong Kong; that Hong Kong
laws would apply to Hong Kong residents; that Hong Kong's finances would be
independent, there would be no taxes remitted to Beijing. It would have its own
currency; that Hong Kong police would maintain public order, that, to the extent
possible, international agreements would be made with the Hong Kong Special
Administration Region; and that there would be an elected legislature.
As I say, it's a pretty impressive list. And with some of those items, there is
considerable room for optimism, at least in terms of what has happened so far.
Obviously, with a couple of the items, there are some serious concerns, the es-
tablishment of the Provisional Legislature being one concern. Our view is that this
was an unnecessary step, but we have generally refrained from addressing the le-
gal interpretation of this step. What we really want to support are open, account-
able, and democratic institutions as Hong Kong moves into the era after July 1st.
We have expressed the view that the Provisional Legislature should be limited
in duration and in the scope of its action, and that we will be watching for the
emergence of an electoral law for the elected Legislature which is to follow the
Provisional Legislature.
There are some other sources of concern as well: the Preparatory Committee
named by Beijing excluded members of the Democratic Party; there is some doubt
about whether Beijing is going to follow through on reporting on the human
rights covenants as they apply to Hong Kong; there, of course, is the repeal of
certain portions of the 1991 Bill of Rights Ordinance; and there are certain state-
ments from responsible people in Beijing which, as I say, are a source of concern,
statements such as: "There will be respect for freedom of expression in the media,
with the possible exception of such things as rumors and lies." Well, in the U.S.,
if that were excluded from publication, there would be a lot less in the newspa-
pers.
The objectives of the United States in Hong Kong-given that we have very
extensive, immediate interests there in terms of U.S. residents, business invest-
ment, and trade, our objectives are to help preserve the prosperity and the way of
life of Hong Kong.
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In our dialogue with all of the directly interested parties--that is, Beijing,
London, and Hong Kong-we emphasize that we hope to see: maximum auton-
omy for Hong Kong, the continued operation of free market; a legal system which
continues operating independently, protection of freedoms, including press free-
doms; and continued development of democratic institutions.
Bilaterally, directly with Hong Kong, we have tried to set firmly in place a
framework of agreements that will support Hong Kong's autonomy- vie have ne-
gotiated an Extradition Agreement, which we believe will soon be taken up by the
Senate for ratification, and a wide range of other agreements, such as Air Services
Agreement, Judicial Assistance, and so forth; we will do what we can to support
Hong Kong's continued autonomy in economic institutions such as WTO and
APEC; we have independent agreements with Hong Kong with respect to textile
quotas and export controls; we are pursuing privileges and immunities legislation
for Hong Kong's offices in the United States; we pursue education and cultural
exchange. We have had a series of high-level visitors to Hong Kong. And that
continues, and we intend that it will continue. All of this is supported, of course,
by the Hong Kong Policy Act passed by our Congress.
Well, for the future, one encounters differing views on whether the glass is half
full or half empty. One could say, in the perspective of the past seven years or so,
beginning with the period directly after Tiananmen, when the outlook seemed
quite gloomy, that today things look better than expected.
On the other hand, Beijing has taken some steps that may undercut autonomy
and freedoms in Hong Kong. From that perspective, the glass can seem to be half
empty.
The Hong Kong economy seems quite strong. Investors at least sound confi-
dent The stock market also seems strong. Property values are up. People are not
leaving. And, in fact, there are some Hong Kong residents who have second pass-
ports who have been returning to Hong Kong.
Beijing has strong reasons to live up to the Joint Declaration, the agreements it
made there. It has every interest in seeing a prosperous and vibrant Hong Kong.
Of course, we all know that Beijing is going to face some difficult periods. Hong
Kong is much different than any other part of China, and it will take an extraor-
dinary degree of flexibility on the part of the leadership in Beijing to learn how to
deal with this different animal.
The U.S. will continue its policy of supporting Hong Kong's autonomy through
reversion and into the future. And we will do what we can to support that I think
we have a reasonable amount of influence. During Secretary of State Albright's
recent visit to Beijing, she was prepared to discuss our concerns about Hong
Kong. She did not have to raise the subject; it was raised to her. So, I think it's a
promising sign that the leadership in Beijing has come to realize that the world is
watching to see how they carry out Hong Kong reversion. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR WILSON: Our next speaker is Edwin Fung. Edwin n-as born in
Hong Kong in 1955 and emigrated with his family to the United States in 1969.
He is currently an employee of the Goddard Space Center, works with NASA as a
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thermal systems engineer-something I find fairly daunting as a career.
He has been active-since the time that he left Hong Kong-with issues re-
garding Hong Kong. He has been active with the Alliance of Hong Kong Chinese
in the United States, the Federation of Overseas of Hong Kong Chinese in Wash-
ington, and other organizations. He tells me that although he has been away from
Hong Kong more than twice the time he has lived there, he still considers himself
very much from Hong Kong.
He is going to speak this afternoon about the Provisional Legislature and what
we might anticipate from the Chief Executive who has taken power there.
MR- FUNG:* First, I would like to thank the Washington College of Law for
putting together this conference on Hong Kong and for inviting me to be a
speaker.
I would like to correct a little bit of what Rick said about me. I was a thermal
systems engineer for my first three years at NASA, but now I'm a computer ana-
lyst.
Okay. In my presentation, what I'll try to do is to focus on how Hong Kong
will be governed, how the Provisional Legislature and the Chief Executive would
run Hong Kong come July 1st.
In the first part of my talk I will try to give a little background of how the Pro-
visional Legislature comes about, how they are being formed. And, then, I am
going to spend a majority of the time on the kinds of laws that the Provisional
Legislature will change. And, then, at the very end, I will have a preview of what
we expect from the Chief Executive, Executive designate, Mr. Tung Chee-Hwa.
I. BACKGROUND
Why is the Provisional Legislature such a controversial issue? Though he never
intended it, the Provisional Legislature is, in a way, a legacy of the political re-
forms introduced by Governor Chris Patten in 1992. Governor Patten's reforms in
changing the election laws for the 1994 and 1995 elections of the District Boards,
the Municipal Councils and the Legislative Council took advantage of the gray
areas in the Basic Law. The Basic Law stipulates that a certain number of seats of
the Legislative Council are to be directly elected while others are to be indirectly
elected. The indirectly-elected seats are produced by either "functional constituen-
cies" or by an "Election Committee." The Basic Law, however, does not specify
how those seats are to be elected. Governor Patten took advantage of this by en-
larging the functional constituency electorate by a huge margin. For example,
while in the past only the owners and CEO's of major companies have had a vote
in their respective profession or functional constituency, Governor Patten made it
* Mr. Fung learned after the conference that he incorrectly asserted Mr. Allen Lee's
position on the Bill of Rights. Mr. Fung apologized to Mr. Allen Lee for misrepresenting




such that anyone in that profession can have a vote, in effect making these seats
"quasi-directly elected." In the ten seats returned via the Election Committee,
Patten's reforms made it so that the Election Committee itself is composed of
members of the District Boards, who are themselves directly elected. To sum up
Patten's political reform in one sentence: He made it such that the Legislative
Council elected in 1995 is the most representative and most democratic in Hong
Kong's history.
It is, therefore, not surprising that China reacted furiously to Governor Patten's
reforms, calling him anywhere from a "prostitute" to "a criminal for all ages."
The British Government at first tried to find common ground with China and at-
tempted to negotiate with China on a formula acceptable to both sides. After 17
rounds of negotiation from April 1993 to December 1993, when the only conces-
sion that China would agree to is the lowering of the minimum voting age from
21 to 18, Governor Patten decided to implement his political reforms unilaterally,
if for no other reason than that time was running out. China reacted to this by
vowing to scrap all three tiers of the legislature-the Legco, the Municipal Coun-
cils as well as the District Boards-when it took over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997,
and to install in its place the ' Provisional Legislature."
A lot has already been said about how the Provisional Legislature violates both
the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. I will not rehash the arguments on whether the
Provisional Legislature is legal or not, but instead concentrate on how the Provi-
sional Legislature was formed, what laws the Provisional Legislature will change
and how they will affect Hong Kong.
II. FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL LEGISLATURE
The Provisional Legislature was "elected" by a 400-member Select Committee
(SC) on December 21, 1996. Supposedly any legal permanent resident of Hong
Kong can apply to join the Selection Committee. In a letter to the New York
Times on November 26, 1996, Nellie KM. Fong, a Selection Committee member
herselW, claimed that membership of the SC is from "all walks of life" and "open
to the public," and that more than 5,700 I.K. permanent residents applied. Four
hundred of those who got the most votes were selected. What Ms. Fong neglected
to mention was who voted for the SC members. It is the hand-picked Preparatory
Committee (PC), a 150-member body of Hong Kong advisors and Chinese offi-
cials appointed by Beijing to handle transitional details.
If there is any doubt that this voting process for the Selection Committee is
rigged, consider the case of Eric Wong Chung-ki and Grace Au Yuk-har, two
members of the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL), a
"middle-of-the-road" political party. Both submitted applications to join the Se-
lection Committee but both got kicked out by the PC Secretariat simply because
they wrote on their application forms that they opposed the Provisional Legisla-
ture (under the Basic Law, the Selection Committee is supposed to select the
Chief Executive only). So membership in the SC, in effect is limited to only those
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who were willing to toe Beijing's line.
It is also worthy to note that all 86 members of the PC who stood for "election"
to the SC were "elected." Beijing obviously does not think that there is any con-
flict of interest when PC members "elected" themselves. In fact, some of those PC
members who elected themselves into the Selection Committee promptly reprised
this trick by electing themselves into the Provisional Legislature. In fact, if we
follow the history of how Beijing selected those they wanted to install in positions
of power in Hong Kong, we can see the pattern that it is almost always the same
set of people who get appointed. First, they were known as "advisors on Hong
Kong affairs." Then most of these H.K. advisors graduated to the Preliminary
Working Committee (PWC), which is then reincarnated in the Preparatory Com-
mittee (PC). The PC then elected themselves into the SC which in turn elected
themselves into the Provisional Legislature. It is almost the same set of people
over and over again. Therefore, ff we study what the PWC and the PC advocated
in the past, we can get an idea of how the Provisional Legislature will act when
they take over Hong Kong on July 1.
ml1. ELECTION LAWS
The first order of business the Provisional Legislature (PL) will take on is to
undo all the political reforms instituted by Governor Patten. The PL will install
new election laws which will then govern the next election for the three-tiered
legislature, now promised by China to occur some time in 1998. On the two lower
tiers, the District Boards and the Municipal Councils, PC members have indicated
that they will return to appointed seats after the Patten reforms made all District
Board seats to be elected directly by the people.
On the Legislative Council elections, while the number of directly-elected seats
will stay the same-twenty, as this number is agreed to by China in the early
90s--the Provisional Legislature will very likely institute a "single vote, double
seats" scheme or even a "single vote, multiple seats" scheme. In the first-ever di-
rect Legco election in 1991, the system in use was "double votes, double seats"
where two Legco members will be elected in the same geographical constituency
with each voter in the geographical area they were in casting two votes. This was
changed to the 'single vote, single seat" scheme in 1995 where there will only be
one single Legco representative for each geographical area with each voter having
one vote. The "single vote, double seats" arrangement will again limit each voter
to one vote but there will be 2 winners-the two candidates with the highest votes
will be elected. Imagine, for those of you who live in Maryland, that you can vote
for either Barbara Mikulski or Paul Sarbanes, but not both, and for Virginia vot-
ers, you can vote only either Chuck Robb or John Warner, and you can imagine
how fair this "single vote, double seats" or even worse, "single vote, multiple
seats" arrangement will be This will clearly favor the pro-Beijing factions to the
disadvantage of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong. In 1991, both seats on the
Hong Kong Island districts were won by the United Democrats of Hong Kong, the
predecessor of the Democratic Party, on the "double votes, double seats" system.
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Martin Lee won more than 70 percent of the vote, helping the much lesser known
Sai-Cheung Man to win the second Legco seat in that geographical district. If it
were the "single-vote, double seats" scheme then very likely Martin Lee would be
the only democrat elected.
At the heart of the Patten reforms was to transform the previously small elec-
torates of the old "functional constituencies" into much larger ones. It will ba
natural that the Provisional Legislature will turn back the clock on these "func-
tional constituencies." Under the Patten reforms, nine new functional constituen-
cies were created, in addition to the original twenty-one. The Provisional Legis-
lature will likely abolish all nine new functional constituencies and install
completely new ones following the old scheme of giving votes to only a selected
few. The smaller the electorate, the better chance that Beijing can control the
elections. Sir David Akers-Jones, a former chief Secretary of Hong Kong, but in
recent years an "advisor" to Beijing, once said with remarkable insight, that "the
Chinese do not mind having elections. But they do like to know the result before
they are held." Patten's "sin" is simply that it goes against this principle.
IV. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
In January of this year the Preparatory Committee created a furor by proposing
to amend certain sections of the Bill of Rights and the Societies and Pubic Order
Ordinances. Despite the protests of the Hong Kong people as well as the interna-
tional community, the National People's Congress nevertheless endorsed the pro-
posals. Chief Executive-designate Tung Chee-Hwa also expressed support for the
proposals, thereby almost guaranteeing that parts of the Bill of Rights will be re-
pealed after July 1, 1997.
The proposed changes involved changing several articles in Part I of the Bill of
Rights: Article 2(ii), which deals with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights with
regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Arti-
cle 3 which deals with pre-existing laws before the Bill of Rights was enacted;
and Article 4, dealing with the interpretation of subsequent legislation. All of
these articles relate to the idea that the ICCPR should be the standard in judging
existing and future laws. The PC claims that these articles of the Bill of Rights
contravene the Basic Law's Article 8, which states that pre-existing laws should
be maintained, and Article 11 of the Basic Law, which maintains the supremacy
of the Basic Law over any other law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (SAR).
Actually, the reverse can be argued. The Hong Kong Bill of Rights was codi-
fled and incorporated to satisfy provisions of the International covenant on Civil
and Political Rights as applied to Hong Kong-Great Britain being a signatory of
the ICCPR. If the Bill of Rights contradicts the Basic Law, then it would mean
that the ICCPR itself contradicts the Basic Law And yet Article 39 of the Basic
Law states: "The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the International covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
International labor conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force
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and be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region."
It is also interesting to note that some of those Preparatory Commit-
tee/Provisional Legislature members such as Allen Lee and Maria Tam who are
now proposing to repeal or amend parts of the Bill of Rights supported the enact-
ment of the Bill of Rights themselves back in 1991.
The Public Order and the Societies Ordinances have been changed in recent
years to take into account that Hong Kong has evolved into a civil society and that
these original antiquated draconian measures are no longer suitable for Hong
Kong. For example, using a loud-hailer in public without applying for a permit
from the police used to be a criminal offense but is no longer so since 1995. Also,
to conform with the Bill of Rights, it is no longer required to get a police permit
to demonstrate-a simple notification is sufficient. In a similar way, forming a
society or association now no longer requires registration with the government-
simply notifying the government suffices. The Provisional Legislature will reverse
these relaxations of the draconian public securities measures and return to the or-
der of the early and more turbulent colonial days of Hong Kong.
In late 1996, Legco passed a bill on subversion which essentially states that any
acts of non-violence will not be considered subversive. The heavy sentencing of
Wei Jingsheng to his second 15-year prison term in late 1995 and an almost just
as heavy sentence of 11 years meted out to Wang Dan in October 1996 provided
the impetus for this new subversion law. If China were to adopt a similar subver-
sion law then clearly the jailing of Wei and Wang would not be lawful. Of course
China objected to this so this law definitely will not survive the Provisional Leg-
islature, which will enact its own subversion law to satisfy Article 23 of the Basic
Law, which deals with treason, secession, subversion, and sedition.
V. LAWS RELATED TO CULTURAL AFFAIRS
In general, proposals by the PWC or the PC in laws relating to cultural affairs
such as the changing of the flags, emblems, stamps, holidays, etc. are less contro-
versial, with the exception of the attempt to revise existing textbooks for Hong
Kong's schools. The PC takes the position that anything which remotely smacks
of Hong Kong's colonial past needs to be eradicated. They would also like to put
the studying of the Basic Law into the curriculum. The PC has been saying this
for some time, but the matter has sort of been brought to the forefront of the news
last week, when Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen threw his support behind
the idea that Hong Kong's textbooks need to be revised if they "do not conform to
China's principles." One can only guess what he means by "China's principles."
Would events such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the
1989 Tiananmen Massacre be against "China's principles?" To use an American
term, Hong Kong's history textbooks after 1997 will need to be "politically cor-
rect."
Incidentally, as he has done every time since he became Chief Executive-




VI. CHIEF EXECUTIVE-DESIGNATE TUNG CHEE-HWA
This brings us to the question of how the first Chief Executive of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region will govern after July 1, 1997. There is less
material on Tang's views in the public domain than the Provisional Legalsture's,
but nevertheless since he was selected as the Chief Executive by the Selection
Committee on December 11, 1996, Tung Chee-Hwa has spoken on numerous oc-
casions on Hong Kong issues in various speeches and interviews with the press to
give us some idea of how he will govern.
One of the recurring themes that Tung touches on is his emphasis on liveli-
hood issues over the issues of democracy and civil liberties. In a recent interview
with Mike Chinoy of CNN, Tung claimed that the Hong Kong people are not
really concerned with democracy and civil liberties, but rather that they care for
housing, education, and social benefits. Immediately after his selection, Tung said
that he wanted Hong Kong to return to the non-confrontational era. He has com-
plained that Hong Kong has become "too politicized." After the transfer of sover-
eignty, our society will not be as politicized. We can all work together to create a
caring society that has a strong social fabric.
Essentially Tung considers western-style democracy as not suitable for Hong
Kong. No wonder he won praise from Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singa-
pore, who espouses the so-called "Asian values"-hard work, emphasis on educa-
tion, obedience to the authorities, belief in order and stability, a preference for
consultation instead of open confrontation and more emphasis on obligations to
society than the rights of the individual. On the PC's proposal to repeal and
amend the civil liberty laws, Tung justified his support of those proposals by stat-
ing that Hong Kong needs to strike a balance between the need for an orderly and
stable society and the rights and freedom of the individual.
Tung also toes Beijing's line on freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
He has said that "slanderous or derogatory remarks and personal attacks against
Chinese leaders" will not be tolerated in Hong Kong. When asked by Mike Chi-
noy whether he will permit commemoration of June 4 after the handover, while
stating that "any form of peaceful and lawful demonstration will be permitted,"
Tung refused to say outright that he will allow commemorations of June 4. He
simply ducked the issue by stating that he will uphold whatever laws that will be
enacted by the Provisional Legislature.
In the end, a thing of note is that Tung has not deviated in any single instance
from the official line espoused by Beijing. Whether it is the formation of the Pro-
visional Legislature, the repealing and amending of the Bill of Rights or the issue
of revising history textbooks for Hong Kong's schools, Tung so far in all cases has
come to support Beijing's position. It really makes people wonder whether he is
capable of any independent thinking at all.
When asked about the criteria of serving in the three tiered legislature, Tung
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replied that "one should love Hong Kong and love China," and "one should up-
hold the Basic Law," a position that Beijing has stated time and again. However, I
don't know if Tung is aware of the fact that in Article 68 of the Basic Law it is
stated that: "The Legislative council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be constituted by election."
So by his support for the Provisional Legislature, a legislature NOT constituted
by election by any stretch of the imagination, he has flouted the Basic Law him-
self. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR WILSON: Thank you very much, Edwin. Our last speaker is
Christine Loh. You met her this morning. For those of you who weren't here this
morning, a brief introduction. She is an independent member of the Hong Kong
Legislative Council, and she represents Hong Kong Island's Central Constitu-
ency. She had a long career as a commodities trader in Hong Kong before taking
up her political activities. Since that time, she has been a strong advocate of de-
mocracy, human rights, the arts, and environment in Hong Kong. She's going to
be speaking this afternoon about the future of political parties in Hong Kong.
MS. LOH: Thank you. Well, maybe I should start off by addressing whether
there is a future for the business that I'm in, which is, of course, politics. After
listening to Edwin's very fine exposition of the current situation and, indeed,
members of my family, my friends, my overseas friends, I get streams of messages
all the time saying, "do you still want to be doing what you're doing?" Because in
the last year or so I have also decided that I want to spend the next 10 years in
full-time politics. Now, of course, I am about to be unemployed, so being in
full-time politics may very well also mean unpaid work. But nevertheless, I do
believe there is a future in politics.
Just now Edwin reminded us of Mr. Tung's remarks. It's the sort of remarks
we hear quite often from a wide circle of people in Hong Kong, that politics is
bad, we don't want too much politicization.
I believe that kind of thinking stems from a time of the past. Many of the peo-
ple who hold this view, fail to distinguish that politics is really a public deci-
sion-making process. They fail to see that any community has to take collective
actions and therefore take collective decisions. They are used to a system where
only a few people make all the decisions.
In a place like Singapore, the Government doesn't want to consult the people
too often because they believe they already have all the best ideas, so why ask
people whether they should go ahead with those ideas?
Now, traditionally, in Hong Kong, the colonial way of governing is precisely
like that. A few senior government officials draft policy and they implement pol-
icy. They don't really have to ask anybody. Our laws don't mandate that the gov-
ernment has public inquiries in many, many important cases.
So, is that the kind of public decision-making process that is so relevant for the
21st century? I think not, because even in China, what you're seeing is-well, the
top Chinese leaders, increasingly need to build up a bureaucracy, They need to tap
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into the thinking of technocrats in order to advise them of issues like telecommu-
nications, trade liberalization, and so on. Before, you had the Politburo, who basi-
cally took all of the decisions on almost everything. Now even in China, they are
not able to do that.
Now in Hong Kong-I mean, increasingly, the Hong Kong British Govern-
ment has had to tap into, again, a wider pool of information and expertise in order
to make decisions.
So in the future, is Mr. Tung seriously suggesting that his hand picked execu-
tive council and senior civil servants are all that are necessary to arrive at a whole
range of public decisions that could only get more complex? Now he might think
so because he comes from that tradition. But Hong Kong has also arrived at a time
where, well, the society is increasingly better educated. It is fundamentally a dif-
ferent society than was the case in the '50s and '60s.
Hong Kong has had universal education since 1978. So you do have a younger
crowd who are educated, who have experience, who have ideas, and who want to
share them. Part o1 I think, the quality of life is also to be able to participate in
community.
Now in the past, the culture is well, if you want to participate in community,
get into charity work. I think that is not going to be enough any more. And if you
look at the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that we have in Hong Kong
today, well, we have labor groups. We have women's groups. We have groups
representing the rights of the disabled. We have many green groups. I mean, we
have a whole variety of groups in Hong Kong who are quite vocal. We have the
Bar Council. We have the Law Society. We have distinguished members of pro-
fessional bodies who are now speaking out on a whole variety of issues that go to
the heart of policymaking. And the government has not been able to say we don't
want to listen to these people.
So the culture of the colonial government is changing. So, therefore, I suggest
that the business of politics has a bright future. But what the Hong Kong people
must do is stick at it
Now I have to say, that so far being a politician under British rule has been
pretty cushy. It hasn't been so difficult. We can direct all kinds of unpleasant
statements, and nothing happens to us. For example, Governor Chris Patten. He
rather likes it. He is rather combative. He likes to defend his position.
It seems like this sort of culture perhaps is a little less comfortable to Chinese
leaders. But nevertheless, when Hong Kong becomes a part of China, we are not
going to change overnight either. So therefore, there will be this tug where Hong
Kong people should just keep on being themselves.
Now also, I feel very strongly that our generation of politicians-we are the
first generation of politicians in Hong Kong who want to be politicians--we are
prepared to go to the ballot box and seek legitimacy from the people. We prefer
that, in a way, to the old system, which is an appointment system. The appoint-
ment system essentially requires that you get on well with the hand that feeds you.
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If you get on well with the power source, you get appointed to influential commis-
sions and the legislature and the executive council. But ff you have derived your
legitimacy from the people, well, you don't have to do any of those things.
Whatever we say about what the future electoral laws are going to be, it seems
like elections are going to stay. There will be elections where the general mass in
Hong Kong will be involved. This introduces a significantly new arrangement in
the political scene in Hong Kong. And there are actually people, not just me-
there are quite a lot of people in Hong Kong who want to dedicate ourselves to
that process. So I think this is a good beginning for really a kind of political life in
the Chinese community in Hong Kong, which is a significant departure from the
past.
Again, using myself as an example, I am new in politics. In Hong Kong, we all
have to think through what kind of values and principles we stand for. What are
the kind of ideologies that really invigorate us? And frankly, why are we in poli-
tics in any case?
We're in politics because we want to stimulate social progress. So you have to
have a pretty clear idea of what kind of society you want to move towards, and
therefore build a political message and a political campaign based on a broad
picture of the kind of community you want.
And when you look at it that way-well, like any community anywhere, what
are the areas of progress? What are the areas we need to fundamentally reform?
Education, the environment, competitiveness of our economic system-many,
many issues. And these are fundamentally the issues that I think the men and
women anywhere in any country are concerned about.
So when we are looking at social change, and when you look at the political
process, you look at politicians, people like myself who want to be politicians. We
don't just want to be NGOs. We want to get into the process, to stimulate change
from within.
What I found is-why do I want to spend the next ten years of my life doing
this? Because in the last five years, just being an independent member, being one
voice-if you are prepared to work hard, if you are prepared to work with other
people, actually you can make quite a significant impact. You are able to change
the law. When you change the law, when you influence policy, that affects 6.3
million people in Hong Kong. It is an effective route to social change.
So I have learned an awful lot in the last five years. I no longer want to be just
a member of an NGO. I chaired Friends of the Earth in Hong Kong for two suc-
cessive sessions. I am passionate about the environment in Hong Kong. But I
know ifI remain just as an NGO, there will be a role, but it will not be as effective
a role as a member of the legislature. That is why I am going to contest the elec-
tions in 1998, and I hope I will win.
But as I said, it is more than just the environment. It is about thinking through
social progress, and what are the values and the principles you want to be guided
by. These are very challenging thoughts. I don't think I have come to the end of
the road in that process at all. In fact, I think I am only at the beginning.
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If we are looking again at the future of developing representative government
in Hong Kong, if you read the Basic Law, it says the ultimate aim is universal
suffrage. Well, it doesn't tell you any more about how you get there. What I am
going to argue in Hong Kong is that the Basic Law throws down a tremendous
challenge. The challenge is one day you will have universal suffrage.
Universal suffrage just refers to elections. It doesn't say, when you have people
elected, how they are going to hold power or how they are going to exercise
power. And I think that is essentially the challenge for the future, whether we can
delineate and define a new political structure that will make universal suffrage,
that will make elections, meaningful. Are we going to adapt ourselves to a U.S.
Congressional style of government? Are we going to go for a British parliamen-
tary style, a Swiss style of direct democracy, or some other style?
Hong Kong people have grown used to elections. We like elections. But we
know we are not electing a government. We now have to make a quantum leap
sometime in the future to make elections meaningful by making sure that the po-
litical process empowers elected representatives in some way that will make their
task effective.
It will require re-balancing the powers of the executive and the powers of the
legislature. I don't know what that final structure is going to be. And it isn't just
the legislature. We have three tiers of government in Hong Kong. We have Mu-
nicipal Councils, and we have District Bodies. And we are seriously looking at the
future of an authentic system of representative government. We have to look at all
three tiers of government.
At this moment in Hong Kong, the focus on this area is not yet there. Perhaps
we are totally upset and preoccupied with the immediate problems of the transi-
tion. But when we get over the transition in 110 days time, if we are committed to
revising the Basic Law as a living document, something that has to accommodate
to the community as we change, then we have to, as a community, start looking at
these serious issues.
So there is plenty of work to be done-plenty of opportunity for lawyers, politi-
cal scientists, with our friends overseas in think tanks who have done work on
political systems around the world, to actually cooperate-for Hong Kong to think
through a political system for the future that would be appropriate for Hong Kong.
That's a big deal. That's going to take time.
I'm sure some of my democratic friends in Hong Kong will be criticizing me
for even talking about a process that will take time. But having thought about it
now for a couple of years, I think we do need to think of a new political structure.
It isn'tjust about elections to the legislature.
So this period of time, how are we going to spend it? How are we going to
work with each other? How are we going to stimulate and motivate the people of
Hong Kong? Because the people themselves have not focused on this issue.
This is one of the tasks I have set for myself. And I think lastly, I just wish to
say that I don't regard politicians as an endangered species. I think we can grow
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and multiply. What I am going to do on the fourth of May, 1997, with others, is
form yet a new political party.
Now why is that? People say there are already so many political parties. But as
I said, we're at the beginning of thinking through what values we stand for, what
programs we want to promote. So I think the most important thing is for people to
dedicate themselves in that process. There is plenty of time in the future to coa-
lesce and join hands if we feel over time that actually our values and our program
for action are very similar. I think it is more important at this time that people are
willing to dedicate themselves to the political process. So I certainly look forward
to ten years in full time politics, whether I am in the Legislative Council or out-
side the council. Thank you.
PROF. WILSON: I think your remarks bring a question of my own to mind.
And given the concern that I have in the United States with the declining levels of
public participation in the electoral process, I'm curious as to the sense any of you
may have about the extent to which there is a culture of participation, a culture in
the Hong Kong people, at the grassroots level, that is likely to take hold during
the transition and assert itself in aspects that have to do not only with the exercise
of the vote, but in other public participatory activities.
MS. LOH: If I can take that question first, I think there is a big market out
there for all kinds of issues. The reason for this is that people in Hong Kong are
interested in many issues. They are concerned about the future of education for
their children. They are worried about the increasing amount of air pollution in
the air. They are concerned about jobs in the future, whether economic restruc-
turing is going in a direction where many of them will not have jobs. They are
interested in what kind of retraining programs there might be.
So you can get a lot of people interested in these issues. What is missing in
Hong Kong is that many people, even very well educated people, because they
have been brought up in a colony, don't feel empowered.
You must not forget that since 1991 they have only had a legislative councilor,
the equivalent of a senator or a congressman to whom they can write and put their
problems to.
People in Hong Kong don't really as yet connect their vote with voting in a
government. However, people are interested in public issues. So I think our mis-
sion really is how can you capture that interest and that energy, and make them
feel empowered, that there are things that they can do.
For myself, I think the more that I can stimulate members of the public who
are interested in any of these issues, that in taking an interest in that issue, actu-
ally you are building the building blocks, the nuts and bolts, for the democratic
system.
Now whether you are talking about air pollution-essentially, there are certain
ingredients in the approach that you look for to solve the problem. You are inevi-
tably today calling for more information from the government. You are inevitably
questioning government about polices that they have. You are inevitably using
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words like "calling them to account" You are perhaps asking for more public
consultation on government policy.
These are all the nuts and bolts of a democratic system. So even if you are
talking about air pollution, you can very consciously build in a way of dealing
with that issue where, I think, at the end of the day, the people who are concerned
about that issue, will be heard; it is collective action.
MR FUNG: Let me also try to tackle that question. If politics is a dirty word in
America, it is an even dirtier word in the Chinese culture. In fact, we have a say-
ing in Chinese that you will be very lucky if you never enter politics in life. It is
almost like it is better than not going to hell.
So it is-you're right in that there is a culture problem. The Chinese people are
not used to being activists, being masters of their own destiny. But I think what
happened in Hong Kong within the last 20 years or so-I think some people are
beginning to see that they can make a difference, that people are more civic
minded than the Hong Kong that I knew when I was born and raised there.
Every time I go there, I have to remark on the efficiency of the civil service in
Hong Kong. And I think in some ways the colonial British government has, over
the last 20 years, been electing more and more Hong Kong people to participate.
And that is hopefully helping to change the culture for the Chinese people to get
involved in politics.
There is also another thing that will probably help the people to be more con-
cerned with politics in the future. In the U.S., we have witnessed a declining per-
centage of Americans going to the voting polls. I think that if you compare the
situation with Hong Kong, it might be that people may not be very active in poli-
tics. But if they see that their own livelihood, their own environment is being
controlled by people that are not really putting the peoples' interests before their
own, then I think that would help them more; it would motivate them. When there
are injustices in the system, it will motivate the Hong Kong people to be more in-
volved.
In the U.S., the average voter may not think that he or she matters too much.
You don't see a whole lot of great injustices in American society, but with Hong
Kong maybe. With Hong Kong--especially if we have an unelected legislature--
that would be an impetus for people to get more involved.
I believe the Provisional Legislature will definitely change all of the election
laws governing the next legislative council elections. But will there be any par-
ticipation from the people of Hong Kong?
The way China wants to handle it-on the one hand-they want to have con-
trol. But on the other hand, they want it to appear as a democratic process. It is
the Chinese way oft you know, having faith in saying that we can. In fact, when
Tung Shih Wa was elected Chief Executive, Tung Shih turned to the foreign
minister of China to say there is a new day for democracy for Hong Kong.
So in view of this desire to appear that it is a fair process, they will probably
hold these consultation sessions with the general public. But the problem is that
1997]
AM. U. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y
for people that they vehemently oppose, like the Democratic Party of Hong Kong,
they will not allow them to have any say. But for people that are less confronta-
tional in their view, they may actually listen to some of the grassroots opinions
about how those election laws can be changed.
So I think from the Hong Kong peoples' point of view, they need to become
engaged in this process, even though it might be just a facade for giving the ap-
pearance of having consulted the Hong Kong people. My view is that they ought
to engage the political legislature every chance they have.
They do care about public opinion. In fact, I think China miscalculated to some
degree how unpopular the idea of the Provisional Legislature was. They did not
expect that there would be such a furor. And when the dust settled, Chan Chi
Chen again said that "the rice is cooked," meaning there is no turning back.
In Chinese, the phrase "the rice is cooked" is almost always not referring to
something that is good. But it is referring to something that is really bad when
they say "the rice is cooked." So in a subconscious way, I think, Prime Minister
Chen has admitted that maybe the Provisional Legislative is not a good idea after
all.
So the problem is if the Hong Kong people do not even engage the Provisional
Legislature or their representatives, then they can do whatever they want to do.
MS. LOH: Can I just add to that? We don't quite know exactly what kind of
election laws we are going to have in 1998. But unless they pass laws to exclude
specific individuals from standing, whatever system they come up with, it is not
going to be full proof that people they don't like will not get elected.
Now I guess they can dream up whatever laws they like which are intended to
disadvantage certain people. Well, it doesn't stop the people they want to disad-
vantage from also considering what strategy they want to use to maximize those
rules for their own benefit. There is not much point at the moment, for example,
for all of the democrats to band together in one big party, I mean, if the electoral
laws are such that precisely what they want to do is disadvantage big parties. So I
think we can wait and see.
The other thing that I would recommend to you is to look at Annex 11 of the
Basic Law. What you will see is a sort of timetable for a series of elections up to
the year 2007. The general idea is that every time there is another election beyond
1998, they would reduce the number of seats in, for example, the electoral college,
and increase the number of seats in direct elections. So basically, what this is
saying to us is every time we have an election in the next ten years, we will have
to revise the laws somewhat to accommodate the changing environment. I cer-
tainly like to argue that each time that the law needs to be adjusted, we should be
arguing in Hong Kong for some sort of reform that would lead us towards the
more desired political system that we want to reach, which is why I am saying it is
very important at this stage, for Hong Kong to start thinking about an ultimate
political model that we want to adopt.
As I said earlier, this is a big job. There are many models that have been
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looked at by think tanks around the world. So Hong Kong does not need to re-
search into different political models de novo. We can absorb the experience and
the knowledge that has been accumulated around the world. What we need to do
in Hong Kong is somehow have some kind of a project, mb e conducted by the
universities, where they can bring together this sort of international knowledge.
What we need to do in Hong Kong is to take that knowledge and then to think
through what system we want for ourselves. For politicians like myself I also am
interested in plugging into that knowledge so that we can think through what
would be a good model. Without a doubt, there will be several models in the end
that different people would want to support.
So at that stage what kind of political debate can we generate in Hong Kong?
Can we have a genuine debate and in the end seek to amend to the Basic Law, be-
cause that is what is necessary.
There is a process in here for amending the Basic Law. Some people would say
it is pretty hard to hit the jackpot because you have got to get the National Peo-
ple's Congress to agree and so on. But nevertheless, if you took a ten year view,
you might be able to get somewhere. If you want to take a one year view as to
what the elections are going to be like in 1998, things may be a bit rough.
In terms of the public sector, the Hong Kong civil service is required to release
quite a lot of information to the government about their private holdings and in-
terest. In fact, Margaret and I sit on a rather interesting inquiry at the moment
into the case of a former director of immigration. And through that one of the
things we are also looking at is the extent that a civil servant, a senior civil ser-
vant, has to declare his interest.
There might be some room for improvement of that declaration process. But, of
course, right now we don't have much to worry about. So I guess the question
really is about the future, whether the ethics that has been instilled into the cur-
rent civil service, whether that is going to fall away very soon, and whether you
are going to have, of course, a Secretary of Justice, this Chief Executive, you
know, people in the senior ranks of the government who are determined as a
matter of policy to hold the line on running a clean government. I think that will
be very important.
Secondly, about the private sector. I am a bit surprised to hear that the ICAC is
having problems promoting clean business to the private sector because I certainly
have been led to believe by the department and the ICAC, whose task is to go out
and talk to private business, to explain to them about the corruption laws in Hong
Kong, and to help them, in fact, define internal processes for monitoring business
within their own organizations. I thought it was quite popular. I thought they had
quite a long agenda of companies to visit and so on. I am not aure that that is a
problem.
We're talking about representative government, and I think there are many
ways to skin this cat. I believe the chair of this meeting has already said even
America, the sexiest of modem democracies, has many problems. Americans that
I have talked to say that they don't like the political process because it is a lot of
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talk. It is highly politicized in the sense that the Republicans and the Democrats
like to have regular punch-outs, and then, there are no solutions to real problems.
I'm not thinking of transplanting any existing structure for Hong Kong. I think
we need to develop a process of government whereby we have genuine elected
representatives, and those representatives will have sufficient power to affect
change. Frankly, if people lose trust in them, then they don't get reelected.
Of course, we also need to get away from the notion, I think both in the East
and the West-I mean, I agree with Edwin entirely. But in the Eastern tradition,
people don't want to see their friends and children go into politics because politics
is a really bad business for bad people. It is the kind of business where people go
in for their own self interest. I think to a great extent in the West, people are sick
of politics because that is precisely what they see. So, the common men and the
common women of the country get left behind.
What kind of new political system do we need to build for the 21st century, not
just in Asia, but even reform in the West so that they are more solution based.
Perhaps big parties-two big parties is not such a good idea. Perhaps a model
where you have more parties is a better idea. You would be going from, in Amer-
ica, reforming a system that is already here. In a way, in Hong Kong, we are
starting from a process where we have to fit in the building blocks. Maybe we will
have more space to maneuver in the next five or ten years. What is my ultimate
system? I don't know. I suspect that over the course of the next few years my own
thinking will continue to evolve and to see what is an appropriate structure for
Hong Kong.
PROF. WILSON: I appreciate the ongoing interest in discussion. It is 5:30, and
Christine has indicated that she has to leave now. So I think it is appropriate for
us to finish at this point. On behalf of the law school and the other organizers of
this conference, I want to extend my personal thanks to all three of our speakers
and thank them one more time officially.
BUSINESS AND LAW AFTER JULY 1: LEGAL AND
REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE TRANSITION ON
MARKETS, INVESTMENT, AND LABOR ISSUES
PROFESSOR BRADLOW: Welcome back to the second half of the conference
on Hong Kong. The title for this topic, for the session this morning, is Business
and Law after July 1: Legal and Regulatory Impact of the Transition on Markets
and Investments and Labor Issues. We are delighted to have Johanas Chan, who
joined us at the last minute. And we are very grateful for that.
I will introduce all of the speakers on the panel, both from Hong Kong and
here. The order of speakers will be-we'll begin with Johanas, and then come
back to Washington, where Natalie Lichtenstein will speak next. Then we will go
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back to Hong Kong for Apo Leung to speak, and we will come back to Washing-
ton for Claude Fontheim to speak.
Let me introduce the speakers in the order in which they will be speaking. The
first speaker is Johanas Chan, who is a barrister in Hong Kong, and also an asso-
ciate professor of law at Hong Kong University. He has had a distinguished career
as a barrister in Hong Kong, was educated both in Hong Kong and in the United
Kingdom. He practices both-a practice in public law, and includes human rights
issues and administrative law issues.
He has been the counsel in many leading cases involving the Bill of Rights in
Hong Kong. He has published numerous books on the Bill of Rights and human
rights issues in Hong Kong. In 1995, he was selected as one of the ten young out-
standing persons in Hong Kong.
MR. CHAN: Thanks again for the very warm welcome. It is always an embar-
rassing moment for a speaker to be introduced in way that is almost beyond his
own recognition, and I think it is a good morning in your time, and good evening
in our time. Modem technology is wonderful, that I can be so far away and yet so
near.
As you rightly point out, I was chosen only last night, and indeed, I received
my brief only a few hours this morning. Shortly after, I also have a free speech
case in court.
I am asked to address on business and law, which are not usually some of the
topics that I address. Nonetheless, I think comments might be interesting in two
questions. The first question is what will be the regulatory regime, including the
law, the labor system in Hong Kong in 1997. The second question is, if there is a
dispute and if someone needs to go to court, what will be the court system in Hong
Kong after 1997? Will the court system in Hong Kong be able to protect our inter-
ests, our properties, and our rights? I will deal with these two questions in turn.
On the first question, what will be the regime, the regulatory regime, that will
exist in Hong Kong after 1997? I'm sure most of you have heard about Basic Law
in the last day or so. Nonetheless, may I just take you through some of the provi-
sions in the Basic Law?
The starting point, of course, is Article 18 of the Basic Law, which provides
that the laws in force in Hong Kong after 1997 shall be the Basic Law, the laws
previously enforcing Hong Kong, and the laws enacted by the legislature of the
region. It goes on to provide also certain national laws which shall apply to Hong
Kong by the date-in the areas of foreign affairs and defense.
A fair understanding of a reading of Article 18 would suggest that these provi-
sions are exhaustive. Although in the last week or so there were some suggestions
that these provisions are not exhaustive. So, apart from the Basic Law, the law
previously proposed in Hong Kong, and the laws enacted by the future legislature,
it has been suggested, for example, some position of the National Peoples Con-
gress may have binding effect in Hong Kong.
I believe that, aside from those views, for the large part the law will be the laws
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previously enforced in Hong Kong. The law previously enforced in Hong Kong is
defined in the Basic Law to include the common law, the rules, ordinances, sup-
porting legislation, and customary law of Hong Kong. These will be preserved.
Indeed, it is interesting to look at Article 8 to see not what is there, but what is
not there. So what has been taken out? Obviously, the last, the current constitu-
tions of Hong Kong. It has also been left out of the U.K. legislation, U.K. acts,
which applied to Hong Kong for the last 150 years. The U.K. acts are interesting
in the sense that, at present, there are about 300 U.K. acts which apply to Hong
Kong-among them, about 20 are pre-1843 acts. These are fairly old acts. Al-
though they are old, there are still some very important pieces of legislation, for
example, the habeas corpus act. A large part of those 1843 English acts could
largely be divided into the following areas: shipping, aviation, intellectuil prop-
erties--all very important English acts. These are not to be preserved under Arti-
cle 8 of the Basic Law. Since 1985, the Hong Kong government indeed has en-
gaged in a process called the localization process, and it means to localize this
English act into Hong Kong legislation. So far, the progress is only moderately
successful. Part of the reason is that the project is far more complicated than just
to re-enact an English law by legislature. For example, a lot of laws dealing with
aviation involve treaties, and unless there are new bilateral treaties between Hong
Kong as they are in foreign parts, the current treaties, which include those be-
tween U.K. and the foreign countries, will lapse after 1997.
The discussion of these treaties, recognitions of bilateral treaties and multilat-
eral treaties in areas of aviation in particular, shipping register, and intellectual
properties have proved to be far more difficult, far more complicated than ex-
pected.
Nonetheless, we have concluded new treaties, and new laws have been enacted.
The large majority of them are in the shipping areas. We have less progress in
civil aviation. And if no further progress is made within the next few months,
some of the important aviation treaties will just expire. The exciting areas in in-
tellectual property, I think, probably could be localized.
A large part of laws in Hong Kong are the laws previously enforced in Hong
Kong. All of these parts of laws will be preserved after 1997, except for any that
contravene the Basic Law. That is an important qualification. A few weeks ago,
the National People's Congress adopted decisions which set out the laws which
they regard as having contravened the Basic Law and will not be preserved, apart
from the intellectual laws, and also two very controversial pieces of legislation,
namely the society's ordinance and the public order ordinance. The rest of the list
is not that controversial.
In short, most of the regulatory law, particularly the business field, in finance,
in trade will be preserved after 1997. Indeed, the Basic Law goes further than
that. In chapter five of the Basic Law, there are detailed provisions setting out the
policy of Hong Kong SAR on matters like public finance, monetary affairs, trade,
treaties, and commerce.
It starts with Article 105, which may well prove to be one of the most problem-
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atic and litigious provisions. Article 105 protects the rights of acquisition, use,
disposal, and inheritance of property. It also protects the right to compensation for
the lawful deprivation of property, and such compensation shall correspond to the
rate value of the company concerned.
The protection of private properties is important in any capitalist society. The
difficulty, of course, is in many countries where their constitutions introduce a
clause on property rights, that is virtually a fertile field-a fertile legal battlefield.
They are all arranged upon implications, including, for example, implications of
land planning, town planning, compensation, resumption, and so on. This chapter
goes on to deal with things like Hong Kong SAR will be guaranteed with inde-
pendent finance and an independent taxation system. Hong Kong does not have to
pay tax to the central government, and it rnms its own tax system. It's really im-
portant for the investor.
Article 109 further sets down the policy that the government of the Hong Kong
SAR shall provide an appropriate economy and legal environment for the mainte-
nance of the status of Hong Kong as an international financial center. Later on,
Article 118 further provides that the government shall provide an economic and
legal environment for encouraging nationalist technological progress and the de-
velopment of new industries. So the policy is quite clear, although it is not so
clear how these policy oriented provisions could be enforced in court. Nonethe-
less, they provide solid declaration of the policy of the SAR government to pro-
vide an appropriate, economic, and legal environment for trade and investment.
Article 110 provides for an independent monetary and financial system in
Hong Kong. Hong Kong SAR is given the right to formulate its own monetary
and financial policy. The government can safeguard the financial business and
financial markets and regulate and supervise them in accordance with the laws of
Hong Kong SAR.
Article 111 provides that Hong Kong dollars shall continue to circulate, and
112 provides that there will be no foreign exchange control policy. Article 114
further provides that Hong Kong shall remain as a free port. No tariff shall be im-
posed unless otherwise prescribed by law, and Article 115 goes on to provide, to
elaborate, this policy of free trade by requiring the safeguard for free movement of
goods and tangible assets and capital.
Article 116 is important. It is that Hong Kong shall remain a separate customs
territory. All international trade agreements shall continue, while Hong Kong
may continue anticipating the relevant international organizations. The most im-
portant one is, of course, the GATT, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.
And Hong Kong has already resolved its status in GATT after 1997. This article
further provides that export quotas and other similar arrangements, which are ex-
tremely important for investment if they are obtained or made by Hong Kong
SAR, they shall remain valid and shall be enjoyed exclusively for Hong Kong. So,
export quotas from Hong Kong could not be shared by the mainland or by the
provinces of China. They can only be enjoyed exclusively by Hong Kong SARL
The Hong Kong SAR can also issue its own certificates of origin of products in
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accordance with prevailing rules of origin. Then it goes on to deal with the visas,
and there is also one section on shipping and one section on civil aviation.
On the whole, you will find that the provisions in these chapters are fairly
elaborate as possible. In short, what it basically says is there will be an encourag-
ing financial, economic, and legal environment. The position before 1997 will
remain basically unchanged in this respect.
There are a few moments, areas. The first problematic area is some contracts
which straggle over 1997, particularly long term franchise contracts and licensing
agreements. In 1992/1993, China at one stage pointed out that since these con-
tracts for license would straddle 1997, they would not be recognized unless they
had the approval of China.
I'll say that this kind is clearly contradictory to Article 160 of the Basic Law.
Article 160 clearly provides that documents, certificates, contracts, and license
obligations valid under the laws previously enforced in Hong Kong shall continue
to be valid and shall continue to be recognized and protected by Hong Kong SAP,
The second problematic area, which probably is not something which could be
guaranteed as such by constitutional provisions, is the problem of corruption. The
only thing one can see in Basic Law is that Article 57 provides that a commission
against corruption shall be established, and it shall function independently and be
accountable to the Chief Executive. No doubt, this article refers to the current in-
dependent commission against corruption, no less ICHD Hong Kong, and ICHD
has been doing a great job. Indeed, in the last few days, they had a major opera-
tion. Certainly, ICHD would have a continued important role to play, and it would
not be an easy job. Indeed, to some critics, ICHD has too much power. Nonethe-
less, there are a few court cases in the past trying to challenge the powers of ICHD
without success, and the court seems to be very supportive, on the basis that cor-
ruption is an insidious evil, a cancerous disease, and ICHD must be given an even
Draconian power to cope with this serious evil.
A third area is the government's policy as outlined in the provision in chapter
five of the major framework of the economic, financial policy that has already
been set down in the Basic Law. It is unlikely that there will be major departure
from current policies. However, it is true that there is no anti-competitionist law
in Hong Kong, for example, and the Consumer Council has recently put out a re-
port recommending that Hong Kong should introduce anti-competitionist laws to
guarantee fair and level playing fields in Hong Kong.
It is too early to tell whether these recommendations will be eventually imple-
mented into law. But no doubt there are strong pressures from the international
community, particularly from the World Trade Organization and from Europe,
that Hong Kong has to enact some kind of anti-competitionist law.
Nonetheless, even in the absence of law, there are certain areas where the gov-
ernment has already subscribed to the policy of free competition, particularly in
telecommunications. Not long ago, six more new licenses were granted, and the
government has already declared that the role of the government is encouraging
competition and to providing a level playing field.
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There is no reason to expect any change on these matters, though in other ar-
eas, other than telecommunications, they may not be as concrete and as clear, but
the general trend, I suspect, is that the government will have to move to some
kind of anti-competitionist, though no doubt there will be opposition from some
quarters, particularly from some service industries.
The second question which I will refer you to is: If there is a dispute, and if one
needs to go to court, what will the court system like in Hong Kong be like after
1997? Will there be independence of the judiciary? Will we have confidence in
the judicial system after 1997?
I won't go into detail, as I know that you had a session on the qualii ing appeal
yesterday. I will just briefly point out one or two points. First, the Basic Law pro-
vides that judges and other members of the judiciary serving in Hong Kong before
1997 shall remain in employment and can retain their seniority. So, most of the
judges who are sitting in the courts today can continue to sit as judges in the court
in 100 days. They will be the judges of the Hong Kong court, and of course, they
will still be handling the day to day civil and criminal trials.
There are two or three problems which I would like to point out. Although the
court, or the Basic Law points out that the current serving judges will continue
their serAce, in the last few years, we have faced the problem of retirement of
some senior judges. And indeed, at various level of judges, there are some experi-
enced judges who have reached their retirement age and unfortunately will have
to leave us. They, in the last few months, all have been coming up. So, there may
be a personnel problem, although I am glad to say that we have had some also
very good new appointments.
The second point I would make is that the powers of the court after 1997 will
be greatly increased. This is mainly because of the Basic Law-as it touches on a
whole range of matters. No doubt, some of these matters will come to court even-
tually. Apart from human rights issues, there are difficult issues dealing with the
relationship between the executive and the judiciary and the executive and the
legislature.
Some legislative council members will try to do the job, and under Article 74,
the Basic Law, the bills would be confined to those bills which are not related to
public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the government. So,
what is the meaning of political structure and operation of the government, so that
a member could not make a private member bill?
The final point I want to make are the problems of enforcement of judgments.
Again, this relates to what an earlier speaker referred to as mutual enforcement of
judgments as tying to the question of treaties. Some of these treaties will lapse af-
ter 1997, and very few countries have entered these kind of treaties with China.
I think on the whole, as far as economic affairs are concerned, there is no rea-
son to doubt the sincerity of China. The whole tenor of the Basic Law is to try to
provide as much freedom to Hong Kong as possible to guarantee this enforcement
of an environment for investment and trade. There are a few problematic areas.
On the whole, as far as business is concerned, I think the prospect is reasonably
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optimistic, and no doubt, I think they probably disagree with me, so they cut away
my last few words. That brings me to the end.
PROFESSOR BRADLOW: Thank you very much. The next speaker is Natalie
Lichtenstein, who is the chief counsel at the World Bank, the World Bank legal
department for East Asia and the Pacific. Prior to that position, she worked for
many years as a lawyer on the China desk at the World Bank. She is an expert on
Chinese law, and has taught Chinese law at Georgetown University. She was edu-
cated at Harvard University, and has a law degree from Harvard.
MS. LICHTENSTEIN: What I'd like to do is offer a slightly different perspec-
tive on the question of business and law in Hong Kong after July 1. There are two
reasons for this. One is because it is obvious that-both physically and in terms of
experience-there are people who are far closer to the actual situation and far
more familiar with Hong Kong and Hong Kong law and the situation on the
ground. The other is because I think it is quite useful in dealing with anything
related to China to take a historical perspective, and the perspective I would like
to bring is, stepping back, how likely is this to work?
I read for the first time in about ten years the Sino-British declaration. I think
that looking back at the arrangements that were agreed to in 1984, as I think back
to what people thought at the time, it was quite amazing that China had agreed to
preserve Hong Kong for 50 years, roughly, as it was in 1984. And I have seen a
line in the press today that, of course, Hong Kong in 1997 is very different from
Hong Kong in 1984, and what effect does that have on China's willingness to pre-
serve it?
But I think it is an equally important, and maybe a more important aspect that
China today, in 1997, is vastly different from China in 1984, and that will have
several ramifications, I think, for the success of business and law in Hong Kong
after July 1. It is my perception that in 1984 many people were afraid that the
Chinese decision makers would simply not appreciate what it meant to preserve
Hong Kong as the market economy it was and still is today. That they would not
appreciate that the role of the government in a market economy is completely
different from what it was in a socialist market economy, a communist economy,
a planned economy, and certainly the way China was in 1984.
If you look back at where China was when that arrangement was agreed, you
will recall that China was partly on the road to reform. Agricultural reforms had
been started. The legal and market reforms were at a very early stage. Contract
law had been passed, but not yet civil code company law, bankruptcy law, et cet-
era. Foreign and direct investment in China at that point was extremely limited in
scope. At one point in the early '80s, I remember reading a fascinating article in
China Business Review that revealed something like 80 percent of the foreign in-
vestment could be toured in a day. Things have changed considerably.
I think at that time there was also limited or almost no experience at any level
in China with the sensitivity of financial markets. Shanghai and Shenzhen had
not begun market activity. Even as late as 1990, I recall visiting Shanghai when
there were 11 joint stock companies, as they were called. Of course, no legislation
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provided for the joint stock companies at the time. But there were 11 joint stock
companies, of which eight were trading.
When the Shanghai exchange opened, there were those eight firms and one
from another province. I think that a the time 95 percent of the volume in the
market was in fact government securities.
All of that I raise by way of explaining how different China was then, from
how it is today. At that point, one could consider a fairly real concern that the gap
could have become too big. A concern about a lack of understanding the impor-
tance of government acting as a regulator and being sensitive to the need, for ex-
ample, in the financial sector, to having openness in the system, to having public
accounts, and to having a market that can really rely on knowledge and not back
door transactions.
None of that would have been familiar in any way to most decision makers in
China. The notion that rather than controlling business decisions, we should pro-
vide a regulation or a legal system to challenge them is very hard.
China today is still far from the mature system in Hong Kong, which is recog-
nized around the world as a bastion of market economy. But the gap has closed
not just in the parts of Guangdong that are close to Hong Kong, but even among
the decision making life in Beijing.
While there are certainly people who do not have an appreciation of what
makes Hong Kong work, there are far more people who have seen how it works,
and who have seen how the rest of the world operates, than there were in 1984.
That has important ramifications for how seriously and how vigorously the pres-
ervation of completely different systems can work. And of course, it points out
that China is no longer as different from Hong Kong as it was.
The other interesting aspect of this is that China is still changing, and market
forms throughout China are deepening. There is an increasing likelihood that the
preservation will work. This is where it becomes very interesting, in an interactive
fashion, because one of the great benefits of integration for China will be Hong
Kong's influence on its future course. Hong Kong is not only an example--al-
though it is a sterling example-for China's reforms, but also a source of expari-
ence, a source of experimentation, and a linguistically compatible source. So, as
China's reforms deepen and take further root, they will not have experience and
examples just from outside of China. They will have examples from inside of
China.
This will mean that China's economy, economic behavior, and governmental
systems will be more likely to reflect the kinds of things that are going on in Hong
Kong and signify an interactive, symbiotic relationship.
There is at least one area I would like to highlight in terms of how China has
changed. For example, as was mentioned, the Basic Law is rather explicit about
preserving the legal profession and right of counsel. I cannot imagine that anyone
could really appreciate that in 1984 in China. If you looked at the legal profession
in China, they were still at the stage where lawyers were state functionaries in
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many instances and offices were government-owned or run. Lawyers played a
minimal role, and in terms of what the legal system required of them and what
there was on the economic side, there wasn't that much in terms of law.
That has changed dramatically in the number of legal issues facing lawyers in
China today. There is a multiplicity of non-state law firm partnerships. The last
figure I saw numbered them around 7,200. There are all kinds of legal organiza-
tions that are active in transactions. Even ff there is a high proportion of foreign
investment, there still needs to be company law, bankruptcy law, and securities
practice.
With the changing lawyers' role in China, you'll have a much greater likeli-
hood that they will come to appreciate that the role of the legal profession should
be preserved in Hong Kong, and wherever China might go in the future. Also, if
you look at legislative drafting law, there are specific examples. I recall comments
by a senior Hong Kong official describing quiet interactions between Hong Kong
drafters and Chinese drafters, looking at ready sources of actual experience. As he
summed it up, there were Hong Kong fingerprints on a number of key pieces of
legislation.
If you look, for example, at the course of reforms in China, the closeness of ex-
amples of other ways of doing things is very small. I am reminded of being con-
fronted in one of our transactions quite some time ago with essentially a domestic
venture among state enterprises. They had some well drafted legal documents,
which was unusual at the time. When I asked what law had been applied, they
said, well, we didn't have a law that applied, but we had a foreign investment
joint venture model, so we took it. And actually, it worked pretty well.
What I would like to say in conclusion is that I can't really address what law
and business will be like in Hong Kong after July 1. You have already heard some
interesting views and a lot of detail about it. As you look at the details, it is also
important to think about the context. And I think that the context is certainly a
more supportive one than I could have imagined when the declaration was signed,
and I hope will continue along that way.
PROFESSOR BRADLOW: Thank you very much, Ms. Lichtenstein. Our next
speaker back in Hong Kong is Apo Leung, who has had a distinguished career as
a trade unionist and a journalist in Hong Kong. He presently works with the Asia
Monitor Resource Center and the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions. He
also is a journalist for a number of newspapers where he comments on labor af-
fairs and social and political issues, and he is active in numerous NGOs.
MR. LEUNG: We have heard a lot about business and law in Hong Kong.
Well, everything is quite rosy for the business people. But I'm afraid it won't be
that positive for the general public, especially for NGOs, labor organizations, and
the working class people. They are very worried.
I will share with you my thoughts about two major areas of concern. Firstly, we
talk about the present situation, unemployment, and an aging population. In terms
of where the factories were located in the last 15 years we have the working class
people in the blue collar sector, reduced from nearly 1 million to 300,000 today.
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Furthermore, we see a lot of the old people and single parents left destitute in this
society. We need to do something drastically before and after 1997.
On the labor union front, as you may be aware, Hong Kong labor movement is
divided into four major centers: the Federation of Trade Unions (FU)--the pro
Beijing camp, the Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU), and the pro-Taiwan
camp (TUC). Under this Basic Law, a lot has been said, though, about providing
basic rights to the workers in chapter three and other articles, upon which I am
not going to elaborate.
However, we are very worried about Article 23, and a lot of discussion has fo-
cused on the links between local and international organizations. We are afraid
that they have scattered a lot of land mines. It could be more than in Cambodia or
Vietnam after the Vietnam war. In the future, we may be easily labeled and perse-
cuted by the new laws and subversive acts, internal security acts, or in violation of
Article 23.
Furthermore, the other coercive laws, the Public Order Ordinance and the So-
cieties Ordinance, are also affecting the ongoing organizing efforts of the Hong
Kong NGO people and the labor front. Some unions are registered under the
Trade Union Ordinance, and some are registered as companies or under the So-
cieties Ordinance. How will the future government deal with these NGOs? This
remains to be seen. Some of us prefer to wait and see, depending on what we can
do. Ifpossible, some will try to emigrate. For the progressive ones, we'll stay here
and try to get organized, and continue to do what we have been doing for the last
twenty years.
Secondly, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the future relation-
ship of Hong Kong with the international instruments. We are very concerned
about the future implementation and ratification of the international laws applica-
ble to Hong Kong. So we would like to see most of it fully implemented to protect
the Hong Kong workers by complying with the international standards. Of course,
we would like to see China also adopt broad, international instruments to provide
better protection to the Chinese workers. As the lady just now mentioned about
the progress that has been made in the business and legal aspects of China, I'm
afraid to tell you that with China's working class, they are suffering. They are
suffering a lot, especially the migrant workers inside China who are working for
multi-nationals.
For the CTU and many active trade unionists, we are determined to stay on top
and continue our organizing work. We need the solidarity. And w"e will continue
to do whatever we can with the international camps and with the international
working class.
PROFESSOR BRADLOW: Thank you very much, Mr. Leung. Our fourth
speaker is Claude Fontheim, back here in Washington. Mr. Fontheim is the senior
principal of Fontheim & Hammonds, a Washington, D.C. law firm. And he is the
chief executive officer of a consulting firm of international and strategic advisors,
which has offices both here in D.C. and in Hong Kong.
He is a trade law expert, having served as the executive director of the Ameri-
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can Bar Association's study of international trade laws. He lectures widely, has
written articles on foreign investment issues and trade-related issues.
He was educated at the University of Michigan, from which he also has a law
degree.
MR. FONTHEIM: It would probably be most useful if I focus on the perspec-
tive of American companies doing business in Hong Kong, and how the change in
legal system will likely affect markets and labor conditions and the overall busi-
ness environment in Hong Kong after July 1.
The overall picture for the U.S. business community in Hong Kong is positive.
A set of expectations has been created which is very high. And I think, on the
whole, that the effects of that are positive.
However, the business community has a set of expectations that may be unre-
alistic. And if, for example, some of the worst case scenarios described by the pre-
vious speaker were to come about, which is very overt and Draconian political op-
pression in Hong Kong, there could be an even more negative reaction here
because of the fact that the business community has certain expectations about
what is going to happen. But this is not likely to occur, certainly not in the short
term.
Let me talk a bit about the more immediate concerns of some American com-
panies and how they might play out after July 1. First of all, there are concerns
that the rule of law may erode in Hong Kong, that the judiciary, to the extent that
it loses its independence or that its independence is eroded, will not be a good
means of recourse for the business community for enforcement of contracts, et
cetera. And while there is not extreme concern on this point, there is concern.
Second is the issue of corruption and integrity of the government. There is
concern that the integrity of the Hong Kong government institutions may be
eroded over time.
Third, on labor issues, I haven't heard any new concerns, but there are ongoing
concerns. Including the fact that-I have heard concerns that there isn't enough
of a blue collar work force in Hong Kong. For some industries, in some instances,
that is an issue, although that is not likely to get worse or better after July 1. It is
just the circumstance of companies that are already in Hong Kong.
And related to this is the fact that costs in Hong Kong are already extremely
high. There are concerns about costs continuing to increase after July 1 with the
influx of new Chinese companies and institutions plus ongoing increasing de-
mand for real estate and facilities in Hong Kong.
In addition to the issues that are part of the common wisdom and that I think
we are all fairly familiar with, there are other issues that are worth thinking
about: in order for markets to operate effectively, you want to make sure that not
only the judiciary and the executive are independent; you also need a certain
amount of independence on the part of certain critical business institutions in or-
der for markets to operate effectively.
If you think about it, this hasn't gotten a lot of attention yet. You need securi-
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ties analysts to be fairly independent in how they do their analysis. You need the
news reporting services that report on business issues to be fairly independent. If
they are overly influenced by how they are perceived by local authorities or the
Chinese government, they are not going to operate objectively, and that is going
to skew the markets and create a problem.
We have seen isolated reports that are a cause for concern. One such case in-
volves the Next media group. The company had intended to go public in Hong
Kong. It was widely reported that the owner of the company had fallen out of fa-
vor with the Chinese government because of his public comments. Investment
banks then immediately pulled back and refused to take the company public.
Whether or not the cause and effect are as reported, if it becomes widely perceived
that government authorities are directly intervening in the capital markets for
such political reasons, and on a large scale, this could eventually undermine the
Hong Kong markets. Some are also predicting disruption of trade through Hong
Kong after July 1 due to civil unrest, but I don't see this as a particularly big risk.
There is an increasing interest among certain American companies in further
developing their own internal policies and practices as they relate to local laws
and treatment of workers, given local labor conditions around the world. This is
still a minority of U.S. companies. But it is a growing minority of U.S. companies
that understands that their reputation in the marketplace here, and the value of
their brands, is affected if it turns out that their operations abroad are not in com-
pliance with local laws, if companies that they purchase from locally are not in
compliance with local laws, or if their local operations or companies they pur-
chase from otherwise mistreat their workers.
For instance, Nike is under intense criticism for treatment of workers in certain
foreign operations. The Gap came under intense criticism for treatment of work-
ers in factories in Central America. And so certain companies are instituting in-
ternal policies and practices in order to avoid this. Until now, there hasn't been a
great deal of concern about compliance issues in Hong Kong.
There has been great scrutiny of labor and environmental conditions in China,
but not Hong Kong. To the extent that conditions change, the level of scrutiny
may increase even more. And that will be an issue for a growing number of
American companies that are committed to such policies and practices.
Finally, and this will overlap a bit with the following panel, you can't divorce
the local markets, investment environment, labor environment, et cetera from the
larger political environment and the way that it affects business. There is no
question that if there are serious problems after the transition that look bad in the
context of U.S. public policy and politics, that is going to have a profound effect
on the business environment, the investment environment, and the trade envi-
ronment because U.S. companies will come under intense pressure and criticism
in the United States.
The reaction to any problems could be severe in terms of business confidence,
but I don't think that such a severe deterioration of conditions in Hong Kong is
likely-at least in the short term, which is as far as we can predict.
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PROFESSOR BRADLOW: Thank you very much, Mr. Fontheim. Would any-
one else on the panel like to comment on the presentations of anybody else? We
have had a very rich and diverse presentation of views. Let me open it up if any-
one would like to comment.
MR. CHAN: Let me just say a few words. I think most of the people in Hong
Kong also share that kind of concern.
On the other hand, to put it in a more positive way, these are the challenges
that we have to face. And one worrying feature is you change this sort of concern
into a self-fulfilling prophecy fueling matters. That is a worry which we have seen
in the past already. In the last few years when we engage in the wider political
debate with China, we have seen how this self-fulfilling prophecy works.
Some sectors, both locally and internationally, believe that China will. And
they work in a way which will feed into what China expects. And the result is
probably a disaster. And to just sum up either way is-in some quarters, there are
people who are more pious than the pope.
No doubt corruption and inequity-that could be a major concern. The diffi-
culty is what could be done. On the one hand, one can stack up, and the other
thing is the culture, how to enforce and reinforce the current culture. And fortu-
nately, in the last 20 years or so, generally businessmen here have some sense that
corruption and inequity eventually will hurt themselves. But of course, with more
influx of PRC institutions, they have a completely different way of working.
So whether we would be able to pass on the information-and related to this, I
am not that optimistic-I am not that pessimistic, thinking that-of work stop-
page in Hong Kong. But rather, more difficult issues would probably be how to
regulate PRC related operations in Hong Kong, on the one hand, a subject for
Hong Kong law. On the other hand, there are a number of PRC companies which
is also a company or institution in China and subject to Chinese law at the same
time. And that will be a difficult legal issue, when there are two sets of law in
conflict relating to exactly the same company running in two different regimes.
And I think that will pose problems.
MR- LEUNG: You have heard from the various speakers on the cultural con-
tent or some practices initiated by the American multi-nationalists. We have been
monitoring this very closely in China and other parts of southeast Asia, especially
the shoe industry, the garment industry, and the toy industries. So we are strongly
demanding that there should be an independent monitoring mechanism. Though
these are not legally binding practices, the NGOs or the labor groups are able to
play a crucial role to make sure the labor rights are upheld in the whole process
because a lot of the Hong Kong business are acting as intermediaries of vendors
for US companies.
MR. FONTHEIM: First, in passing on some of the issues and concerns that I
have heard, I don't want to imply that I think that this is a list of horribles that
will come to pass. In fact, they are unlikely, but I think it is worth keeping in
mind what the concerns are, particularly given our positive expectations. The ex-
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pectations of in the business community, particularly in the next few years, for
Hong Kong, are very bullish, and I think on the whole justifiably so.
On this last point, I didn't mean to paint too rosy a picture on the issue of in-
ternal policies and practices. This is an area that is still developing in the U.S.
business community. Lots of companies that don't have such policies and prac-
tices are just starting the process of thinking about it.
The good thing is that you now leave tangible actions by some, and a lively de-
bate occurring in a number of other companies. Some executives say, look it just
isn't our responsibility. We contract with some supplier in Hong Kong who then
farms out the manufacturing to a plant in China or Indonesia. What happens there
is not our concern, that's their concern.
Then other executives in the same company will say, well, yes, perhaps techni-
cally it is not our concern, but practically it is. We own the problem. If there is a
problem in the plant, it is going to be in the major news outlets in the United
States. So, whether or not it is legally our problem, as a practical matter it is our
problem.
This new direction within the American business community is very positive
and should be encouraged. Premature criticism and insisting on "independent"
monitors, particularly as a cure all, is not helpful.
So, I see the practices of most American companies as positive, but we're at the
very beginning of a very long road, I think, in seeing this play out.
PROFESSOR BRADLOW: Thank you. I want to thank all of our panelists,
both here in D.C. and in Hong Kong, very much for coming in at unusual times to
make this panel as interesting and diverse as it has been. I hope the next 100 days
until July 1 go much more smoothly than the technology did today.
UNITED STATES POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF HONG
KONG'S REVERSION
PROFESSOR ORENTLICHER: Virtually every panel at this conference has
raised issues that are of deep interest to U.S. policy, and the subject of this panel
is in fact U.S. Policy Concerns Relating to the Transition in Hong Kong. Needless
to say, United States interests in the transition are enormous. Hong Kong is the
13th largest trading partner of the United States. The United States has 36,000
American citizens living in China-I'm sorry, Hong Kong-full time. About all
of the transition and reversion process will be centrally important to the larger
transition process underway in China, in which the United States has an enor-
mous interest.
In this setting, the overriding concern of U.S. policy is that the reversion proc-
ess does not entail a regression process of the very unique nature of Hong Kong's
legal and human rights culture and system, and it is that concern that our very
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distinguished panelists will be addressing. Unfortunately, these issues have to be
addressed at a time of very daunting challenges overall in U.S./China policy, and
given the complexity and enormously challenging nature of those policy issues, I
think we are very fortunate that we have such a sophisticated and distinguished
set of panelists to help us work through them.
I will introduce each panelist separately when they speak. Let me just briefly
give you an indication of the order in which they will speak. First, Rick Kessler
will speak about the initiatives underway in Congress. He will be speaking on be-
half of Representative Howard Berman, who can't be with us this morning be-
cause he is now the new banking member of the Ethics Committee, and I under-
stand they have a full agenda these days. Rick will be talking about the U.S.
initiatives in Congress to address the transition.
John Kamm then will give his perspective on the relationship between business
and human rights in Hong Kong based on his very unique experience as both a
business person with longstanding ties to Hong Kong and a hunman rights activist.
Then finally, Mike Jendrzejczyk will discuss the broader issues of U.S., Hong
Kong, and China foreign policy and make some recommendations on steps that
the United States can take to promote a constructive transition process.
Let me come back to introducing Rick properly. Rick is the Democratic profes-
sional staff member of the Asian-Pacific Subcommittee of the International Rela-
tions Committee of the House of Representatives. In that position, he is responsi-
ble for all foreign policy and trade issues for representative Howard Berman, who
is the leading co-sponsor of the Hong Kong Reversion Act of 1997. Rick served in
a similar capacity previously for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and any
of you familiar with Asia policy, U.S.-Asia policy, will know that Rick is a long-
standing expert in this area, and has been deeply involved in U.S.-Asia policy for
many, many years. We are delighted to have Rick here.
MR. KESSLER: Thank you, Diane. Again, my apologies that I am here and
not Congressman Berman. Then he would have had to get up early, and I could
have slept late.
I am representing his views here, and so I should start as a caveat, wherever I
get them right, they are his views, and wherever I get them wrong, they are my
views. If there is any problem in discerning which are which, we can discuss that
later.
I'd like to make some general comments first in terms of what is going on in
the Congress and Hong Kong this year. It is very clear that 1997-actually, I
think, probably starting the latter part of 1996, Congress became even more
deeply immersed in Hong Kong than it had been in previous years.
One of the figures-I'm not quite sure on what basis it is derived, I think it is
Richard Boucher, the Consul General in Hong Kong, that mentions that 20 per-
cent of the American Congress has passed through Hong Kong in the last few
months. And I wouldn't be surprised if that figure doesn't underestimate the
numbers, particularly, as many of you know, Speaker Gingrich is about to take a
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delegation-I think it is going to be a fairly large delegation--to the region in the
Easter recess.
In addition to the visits, our committee has already held one hearing on the
subject, and I imagine it will be holding more hearings before the end of the year.
Legislation has already been enacted, at least in the House of Representatives,
initiated by Congressman Bereuter, the chairman of the Asia-Pacific subcommit-
tee, and co-sponsored by Howard Berman- The House of Representatives just
voted out and sent to the Senate HR. 750, the Hong Kong Reversion Act.
In addition to legislation-and I'll get into more details about the legislation in
the next few minutes-I think there are numerous policy statements that are
starting to emanate from Congress right now. For example, there is a letter circu-
lating inviting Martin Lee to address the Joint Session of Congress when he is
here in April, a letter to Speaker Gingrich.
I think all of this attention, however, doesn't necessarily mean that 1997 is
going to be a critical year for U.S./Hong Kong relations. I think it is going to ba a
year of education, a year of increasing visibility, but not necessarily a year of in-
creasing confrontation and conflict.
But 1998, 1 think, will probably be a more critical year, both because there are
likely to be elections in Hong Kong for the legislative council, and there will b-
areport due to the Congress from the administration on Hong Kong status, which
will be fairly detailed and probably have greater currency because it will occur
after reversion
In many ways, Hong Kong, I think, has become a-has the potential of be-
ing-a Trojan Horse in the bilateral relationship between China and the U.S. The
Congress, I think, has taken deeply to heart, Chinese commitments to preserve the
concept of one country, two systems, and it is doing its best to ensure that that is
enshrined as much as possible in the U.S. relationship with Hong Kong.
American concerns, at least congressional concerns, focus in three major areas.
First is the stability of the system of government in Hong Kong. Secondly, it is the
continued free flow of information, i.e., the press and media in Hong Kong. And
third is the viability of the legal system and the dependable rule of law, particu-
larly including commercial law.
As many of you know, the initial status of relations between Hong Kong and
the United States were first enshrined in '92 with the Hong Kong Policy Act,
which since then has been legislated. I was on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee at the time in which Senator McConnell initiated that act, and I think
in retrospect, he was very farsighted in his concerns and involvement.
It required-and I think it is part of your package of information-fairly de-
tailed reports from the President on bilateral relations. I won't get into all of the
specifics because you can read them, but I think it is important that one of the key
factors he focused on was continued cooperation in commercial relations, par-
ticularly in export controls, and in the development of democratic institutions and
how that was going. It, in particular, allowed the President to suspend laws if he
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determines that Hong Kong is not "sufficiently autonomous." "Sufficiently
autonomous" is one of those phrases that is always open for discussion, and I'll
talk about that again a little bit later.
Right now, we are in the process of trying to enshrine Hong Kong's unique
status in its relations to the U.S. A number of agreements have been negotiated or
are being negotiated in terms of investment and aviation. The previous panel
mentioned those. To some degree, I would single out the issue of legal assistance,
the extradition treaties, which have the potential to be very contentious. The De-
fense Department is negotiating over the issue of ship visits. We are going to con-
tinue Hong Kong's unique status and its ability to import high technology goods
that are now controlled.
What in effect is going on, I think, is creating an incredibly intricate web of
ties, of standards, between the U.S. and Hong Kong, which I think is fairly unique
in our relations with almost any country, and in creating a situation which could
be jeopardized if China or Hong Kong's new leaders fiddle with the integrity of
these relationships.
Growing out of this concern, and growing out of the Hong Kong policy, was an
initiative that Congressman Bereuter started this year, the Hong Kong Reversion
Act, which in effect reiterates support for the autonomy of Hong Kong and the
future well being of the Hong Kong people by ensuring the continuity of U.S. law
with respect to Hong Kong.
Let me say a few specific items on this. It amends the Hong Kong Policy Act of
1992. It requires the President to base his determination of whether Hong Kong is
not sufficiently autonomous to justify treatment under U.S. law on a report that
assesses a number of critical areas.
First is the successful and timely conclusion of agreements and treaties. Second
is continued cooperation with Hong Kong government agencies and their rela-
tions with the U.S. Third is the preservation of good government and the rule of
law, and lastly is the preservation of the autonomy of the customs territory of
Hong Kong.
These sufficient conditions, which in the bill are made much more explicit, in-
clude cooperation, for example, in customs enforcement, drug interdiction, prose-
cution and prevention of money laundering, counterfeiting, credit card fraud, or-
ganized crime. It requires the government to report on increased corruption in the
government, efforts to suppress freedom of the press, acts or threats against
non-violent civil disobedience, and looks at the whole issue of diversion of high
technology exports to China, and of course export controls.
There is a whole series of very specific items that the President is required to
make an assessment on in this report, and I expect, as H.R. 750 progresses
through the Congress and next through the Senate, it will be further improved
upon and amended before being enacted into law, which I think is highly likely. It
passed with only one vote against it in the House of Representatives. This bill and
the underlying legislation that it amends sets up fairly high standards, and it is
very clear that Presidential determination in finding that Hong Kong is not suffi-
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ciently autonomous will have enormous commercial consequences on Chinese in-
-vestment in Hong Kong, and on the political relationships between China and the
United States. It in effect sets up a potential crisis point in relations between
China and the United States, but also as well between the Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch. I think it ensures that Hong Kong will become a much more po-
tent issue in American foreign policy.
As I mentioned earlier, to a certain degree this is a Trojan Horse, I think, for
Beijing. Chinese leaders may in the future come to regret July 1, rather than wel-
come it when they look at the extent that the United States is involving itself in
trying to ensure the increased integrity of Hong Kong. It is a very, I think, unique
situation, and as I mentioned earlier, the emphasis on the President trying to de-
termine whether or not Hong Kong is sufficiently autonomous is going to be a
critical one, a political debate in the Congress and with the Executive Branch.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR ORENTLICHER. Thank you very much. I am going to introduce
our next panelist by quoting from testimony given last month by Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs here.
He said, "Above all, Hong Kong is a place people go to do business. And the
United States government is far from the only important player that can influence
Hong Kong's future stability and prosperity. The decisions and behavior of thou-
sands of private companies and individuals from the United States and elsewhere
will be at least as important in determining the Hong Kong of the future. For this
reason, we encourage them to speak frankly and directly to Beijing about their ex-
pectations as they assess their future involvement in Hong Kong. Their views and
actions, and those of the Hong Kong people themselves, will be important in af-
fecting Beijing."
I immediately thought of John Kamm when I read that. John Kamm is almost
as unique. He is an independent businessman and human rights monitor. I can't
think of many people that would apply to, that they say both of those things about.
As I indicated earlier, John has lived in Hong Kong. He lived there with his
family from 1972 to 1995 as a businessman, and traveled frequently to China
during that period and throughout Southeast Asia. Mr. Kamm vas the Hong
Kong representative of the National Council for U.S./China Trade from 1975 to
1979, and was president of the American Chamber of Congress in Hong Kong in
1990. You will immediately understand where that put him, at a central point in
the debate about U.S. policy toward China in the wake of the Tiananmen massa-
cre of 1989. And I think that was a very significant point in prompting John to
become deeply involved in promoting human rights in China. From 1991 to 1996,
he made 30 trips to Beijing in a private effort to engage the Chinese government
in a dialogue on human rights, and has written and spoken extensively on the role
of business in promoting human rights in China.
MR. KAMM: Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here. This is an un-
usual setting in that you have so much space between ourselves, you out there, us
back here. The microphone is so far away that we have to lean forward. It's kind
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of a funny posture to be addressing you, but appropriate, I think, for a business
person who is also involved in human rights. One finds oneself in funny positions
acting out this particular role.
I have prepared remarks. I am going to move through them quicdy because I
think that the value of a session like this comes largely in the question and answer
period.
What I would like to say briefly is that we know quite a bit about what Hong
Kong will look like after July 1. We know the names of the Chief Executive-
designate, his principle policy secretaries, and his Executive Council. We know
the names of the members of the Beijing appointed Provisional Legislature. We
have assurances that I think most people are comfortable with respect to the con-
vertibility of the currency and taxation. We know what the flag will look like. We
haven't quite sorted out what the street names will be, but these are the kinds of
things we know quite a bit about.
What we don't know about concerns respect for human rights and the rule of
law. We've been addressing these questions at this seminar, but just to tick off a
few of them, we don't know what activities, for instance, the law against subver-
sion will outlaw. Article 23 of the Basic Law, as you well know, calls for the leg-
islature of the SAR to pass a law against sedition, treason, theft of state secrets,
and subversion.
The concept of subversion is alien to the people of Hong Kong. It is not in the
common law. As I often point out to my interlocutors on the Chinese side, if we
had a law against subversion in this country, at any given time, the members of
the opposition party not in power would be in jail. In the first draft of the Basic
Law, there was no Article 23. It was only after the Tiananmen Square massacre
that Article 23 was inserted into the Basic Law.
We don't know what this law is going to read like. We don't know what the
laws written to replace the now scrapped or soon to be scrapped Societies Ordi-
nance and Public Order Ordinance will say. Will, in fact, demonstrations marking
June 4th be allowed after July 1, 1997? Or will they be considered contraventions
of the law against subversion?
Will newspapers be permitted to criticize China's human rights record in, say,
Tibet? Again, we don't know. We are told that newspapers can't advocate inde-
pendence for Tibet of Taiwan, but what about simple criticism of the situation in
Tibet, a situation that Rick Kessler is especially knowledgeable about. It is a very
important question.
How will the provisions of the United Nations covenants continue to apply in
light of the fact that China is not a state party to the covenants? The most impor-
tant provision of the covenants is the reporting requirement. How can a report on
the human rights situation in Hong Kong be filed if the sovereign power is not a
state party? Maybe it is possible, but it is a big question. Again, the Basic Law
says the provisions of the covenants will continue to apply.
Will the death penalty be reintroduced? I'm not sure this has been touched
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upon here. The last execution in Hong Kong was in 1967. It has been 30 years
since there has been an execution in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, across the border,
as you are no doubt aware, executions have been proceeding at a record rate. The
number of executions carried out in China is not known. It is a state secret Once,
I raised this question with an official in Beijing and I was told that it is a secret of
the same order as the number of China's nuclear weapons. That's a pretty serious
secret.
When I asked the official why the number of executions is a secret, he said that
it is because the number is very, very large. We have some idea because we know
from reports that something like 1,400 executions were reported on, I believe, in
1995, but that is a small fraction of the actual number of executions.
It may sound funny for an American to be sitting up here talking about capital
punishment since our own record in this respect is hardly laudable. Even China
does not execute people for crimes committed before the age of 18. We bear that
distinction, I think, among major industrial countries. Nevertheless, the sheer
number of executions, the absence of due process, the lack of protection of the
rights of the individual, certainly indicate that a great many people who are inno-
cent are being executed.
So again, will the death penalty be reintroduced? And what kind of effect will
that have on society in Hong Kong? These are questions we don't know the an-
swers to yet.
Will international human rights groups with offices in Hong Kong like Am-
nesty International and Human Rights Watch, be allowed to continue operating in
Hong Kong? Will American congressmen interested in examining the rule of law
and human rights issues be allowed to freely travel to Hong Kong? Or will they
have to be approved by Beijing? Again, these are very important questions. But
we don't know the answers.
And of course, as I am sure Margaret Ng and Christine Loh have talked about,
when will the first elections take place? What will be the rules governing those
elections? Will people like Martin Lee and Emily Lao, or for that matter, Marga-
ret and Christine-people who were democratically elected in 1995--vill they be
allowed to stand? Depending on who you talk to, it's a self-assured "yes" or it's a
"well, we are not too sure." It certainly is a question to me.
These are vitally important questions. The fact that the markets in Hong Kong
are so buoyant despite all of these questions is an indication that we-and I speak
really about all of us-we still don't have a very good understanding about the
relationship between a good human rights environment and business.
I think perhaps too many of us have swallowed the bromides of the business
community in this respect, that it is a thriving economy that leads inevitably to
respecting human rights. In fact, I have increasingly come to the conclusion that
it is the other way around, that a good human rights environment and respect for
rule of law lead to economic prosperity.
Here we have all of these questions about rule of law and the human rights en-
1997]
AM. U. JINTL L. & POL'Y
vironment in Hong Kong, and we have these thriving markets at the same time.
What is going on here?
Again, I think there is a lack of understanding about the relationship between
business and human rights, and I think there is confusion about the concept of
rule of law as opposed to rule by law. I think we are hearing more and more lead-
ers-the appointed leaders, not the elected leaders refer to the success of the Sin-
gapore model, that this is something that Hong Kong should follow. In Singapore,
we see a system where you have rule by law as opposed to rule of law. I don't
think enough people have really thought the distinction through.
This session is about what the United States, in terms of policy, can do, and I
think Rick Kessler has covered that ground quite well. In November, 1990, I gave
a speech in New York which I believe was the first speech to advocate a Hong
Kong Relations Act. I called it a Hong Kong Relations Act, but later, I was ad-
vised that too many people would see the parallel with the Taiwan Relations Act,
so the name was changed to the Hong Kong Policy Act. That was a good bill, and
I think the new Bereuter bill is a very good bill. Both bills were co-sponsored by
Congressman Berman. Hopefully, that bill will move rapidly through the Senate.
It was passed by the House about ten days ago, and eventually I hope it will have
the President's signature.
Aside from legislation, what are some of the things that can be done? First of
all, Hong Kong has to be on the American human rights agenda with China.
Hong Kong should be raised during the so-called human rights dialogue, such as
it is. Certainly, it should be raised, and I'm sure will be raised, during Vice Presi-
dent Gore's trip and Speaker Gingrich's trip. I think that when we look at the
kind of things that should be a priority for that agenda, the human rights agenda
with China, signing the international covenants, should be very close to the top,
and that has, of course, a very direct relevance for Hong Kong, as I have just been
speaking about.
If in fact China signs the covenant, then it would be possible, I think, to file
reports on Hong Kong with the Human Rights Commission. It may still be possi-
ble without China's signature. I'm not sure. Certainly, if China signs the cove-
nants, even without ratifying, then of course, without ratification, China itself
would not have to report, but I think it would be possible to report on Hong Kong
nevertheless.
I believe and I appreciate that my activities in this regard are considered, espe-
cially by the business community, to be controversial-that Hong Kong prisoners
in China should be on the lists of prisoners that we regularly submit to the Chi-
nese government-and that includes both political prisoners and business people
who are detained in violation of due process. We don't know how many Hong
Kong prisoners there are in Chinese jails. I understand that the number has gone
up very significantly over the last year. You know, these are business people who
very often are involved in U.S./China trade, and they're being held for two or
three years without being formally charged.
I'm aware of one case where the fellow has been tried and convicted six
[12:3
HONG KONG CONFERENCE
months ago, but no sentence has been announced. So these people should be, I
think, the focus of our attention. They're business people.
Now, you know, intervention on behalf of prisoners sometimes works. We
know that now. Six or seven years ago, the conventional wisdom was that the
Chinese government would not release prisoners in response to international pres-
sure. We know that that is not the case. The Hong Kong journalist Xi Yang, who
was released after serving three years of a 12 year sentence just about a month
ago, was the beneficiary of this pressure.
I would hope that very close to the top of our list of prisoners on whose behalf
we are intervening is the journalist Gao Yu. This woman is serving a six year
sentence in Beijing for writing articles for a Hong Kong magazine. So again,
there is a direct relevance to Hong Kong. Her medical condition is very bad. From
a simple humanitarian perspective, I would hope that she would figure in the lists
that we submit to the Chinese government
Another very important case, that NGOs are paying attention to, concerns two
labor activists in Shenzhen. Their names are Li Wenming and Guo Baosheng.
These men were tried and convicted in November 1996 of the crime of subver-
sion, which carries a minimum ten year sentence. They were convicted for their
activities organizing migrant workers employed in Hong Kong owned factories
immediately north of the border. They have not been sentenced. They were con-
victed in November, and they have not been sentenced. That tells me that there
are some people in China who are very uncomfortable with putting these guys
away for a long time. We need to cast a spotlight on this specific case in our hu-
man rights talks with China.
The private sector can do a lot. It certainly can influence what happens in
Hong Kong. Many of the people who will be running Hong Kong, at least for
some period of time after July 1, are business people, and so it certainly stands to
reason that the business community, the international business community, can in
fact play a positive role.
In this respect, I'm very disappointed that among members of the international
business community, including the American Chamber of Commerce, which I
once headed, no voices have been raised about issues pertaining to human rights
and the rule of law. That is tragic because, as I tried to point out, the success of
business in Hong Kong after July 1, 1997, is directly related to the satisfactory
resolution of the questions we have been considering.
In 1903, the social activist Jane Adams was asked to give a speech on the occa-
sion of George Washington's birthday. I think her words bear a special relevance
to those in public and private life who concern themselves with the conduct of
American foreign policy. She said, "We will not count the opening of markets the
one great field which our nation is concerned in, but that when our flag flies any-
where, it shall fly for righteousness as well."
Ladies and gentlemen, that flag flies today over our consulate and our busi-
nesses in Hong Kong. I think you and I owe it to those that follow us--to our
children and to those who came before us to make sure that that flag represents
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respect for human rights and the rule of law, at least as much as it symbolizes the
pursuit of lucrative contracts and commercial advantage.
Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR ORENTLICHER: Our next speaker, Mike Jendrzejczyk, is a
household name. It is a testament to Mike's singular activeness as an advocate for
human rights in China generally that, perhaps, has mastered the spelling of his
name frequently. Mike in recent years is an advocate for human rights concerns in
U.S. policy in China. He has his capacity as director of the Washington office of
Human Rights Watch Asia, formerly Asia Watch. He served in that capacity since
April 1990.
MR. JENDRZEJCZYK: What is the appropriate role for the U.S. regarding
Hong Kong? Ultimately this is a political issue as well as a question of law. What
possible steps could the U.S. take, both bilateral and multilateral, to support those
in Hong Kong who are working to preserve human rights and the rule of law-
including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the legal community, and
elected legislators-to ensure that China upholds its international obligations to-
wards Hong Kong? I'd like to make some comments and suggestions in response
to these questions.
Secondly, what will be the impact of Hong Kong's reversion on U.S.-Sino re-
lations, especially this year, in the sensitive post-Deng Xiaoping period and prior
to the Chinese Communist Party Congress in October as the emerging leadership
is trying to consolidate its position?
As Howard Lange from the State Department spelled out yesterday, the U.S.
has a strong interest in seeing a smooth transition and in Hong Kong maintaining
a "a high degree of autonomy." The U.S. also has a larger agenda with China, and
a wide range of economic, security, and other interests with Beijing and in the re-
gion.
Given the importance of the U.S. relationship to Beijing-as evidenced by Al-
bright's recent visit, literally the day before Deng's funeral-there is a potential
leverage that could be used, in a constructive way, to press Beijing to live up to its
commitments on Hong Kong.
1) Vice President Gore, on his upcoming visit, will be meeting with Premier Li
Peng and President Jiang Zemin. We hope he'll express concerns about the deci-
sion by the National Peoples Congress to repeal and amend Hong Kong's laws,
convey the unanimous opposition of the U.S. Senate to the abolition of the elected
legislature (as expressed in a resolution adopted by the Senate last June), and urge
early elections to put the Provisional Legislature out of its misery, as Christine
Loh suggested yesterday, and Gore should make his comments about Hong Kong
publicly, as well as privately.
Gore will be discussing plans for a presidential summit meeting between
Clinton and Jiang. I was in Manila last November when the summit was agreed
to, in principle, at a meeting around the edges of the APEC meeting (Asian-
Pacific Economic Cooperation form), but the administration carefully, and cor-
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rectly, avoided setting the date of a summit, due to the Hong Kong handover.
Gore should reinforce the message that a summit in Washington in November is
not possible without a smooth transition, and that future high-level exchanges-
next year, when Clinton hopes to go to China, as well as this year--can only take
place in the context of significant progress on human rights in China and full re-
spect of Beijing's obligations towards Hong Kong. I should add that we were
deeply disappointed by Gore's decision not to visit Hong Kong, as we and other
human rights groups had urged. It was a missed opportunity, that could have sent
a clear, positive message about U.S. concern and interest in Hong Kong's future.
2) The U.S. hosts the G-7 industrial leaders summit meeting this year in Den-
ver on June 22, just days before the handover. It would be useful for the G-7 lead-
ers, representing virtually all of China's major aid and trading partners, to include
in their joint communiqu6 a strong, carefully worded call on China to respect its
promises to maintain an elected legislature, independent judiciary, fre press, and
other basic freedoms in Hong Kong. The G-7 should also agree to assess, at their
1998 summit, China's compliance with these promises. I think that the United
Kingdom, Japan, and other G-7 countries would go along with such an initiativ,
laying out joint, multilateral benchmarks for Hong Kong in very specific terms.
3) CIL Tung, the first chief executive for the Special Administrative Region
(SAR), is expected to visit the U.S. either this spring or sometime after July 1. His
office says he wants to come here, and also visit Europe, to "dispel misconcep-
tions" about Hong Kong. That presents an opportunity for the administration and
for members of Congress to raise questions with him on many of the critical is-
sues discussed at this conference.
I would also hope that concerns about Hong Kong would be on the agenda of
CR-. Tung's colleagues in the U.S. business community when they spak to him.
In our discussions with U.S. and other business people, here and in Hong Kong,
it's apparent that there is definitely concern about Hong Kong and a feeling that
Beijing "just doesn't get it," though publicly business projects great confidence.
Some business people are communicating their concerns directly to Beijing,
warning that if the authorities begin to restrict freedom of the press, or if the rule
of law is undermined and corruption creeps into Hong Kong, this will have nega-
tive consequences. The role of the business community will become even more
crucial after July 1, and it would be very helpful if they went beyond issues of
immediate interest, and also emphasized to Beijing the essential role played by
NGOs, civil society, and an elected legislature in making Hong Kong a thriving
international financial center.
The World Bank/International Monetary Fund annual meeting in Hong Kong
in late September, just a few months after the transition, will provide another op-
portunity for business people, finance and foreign ministers, and officials of the
Bank and RVIF, to make this point
In terms of the impact of the reversion on U.S.-Sino relations, key members of
Congress, such as Rep. Phil Crane of the House Ways and Means Committee
(chairman of the trade subcommittee) and a recent delegation to China and Hong
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Kong headed by Rep. Jim Kolbe, have stressed the linkage between the transition
in Hong Kong and any prospect of permanent MFN (Most Favored Nation) trad-
ing status for China. Permanent MFN, doing away with the annual renewal proc-
ess, has basically been ruled out as "politically unfeasible" at least for this year,
because of the Hong Kong handover. As Kolbe's delegations stated upon its return
in January:
If transfer goes smoothly and in conformity with the Basic Law, this will have
encouraging implications for bilateral relations (between the U.S. and China). If,
on the other hand, the transfer is marred by repression or reversal of previous
agreements, political support in the U.S. for a comprehensive relationship with
China will seriously erode. The U.S. should be watchful to ensure there is not
erosion of economic, political or human freedoms in Hong Kong [in the months
and years after the transition].
What is even more significant, is that Kolbe's delegation, in meetings with
senior Chinese leaders, noted the relationship between the treatment of Hong
Kong and China's pending application to join the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The reversion of Hong Kong, they said, sends signals to the international
community about China's ability and willingness to abide by other international
agreements and obligations, including the rules governing the WTO. Hong Kong
could also become an issue in China's WTO accession and the debate in the U.S.,
especially if Rep. Dick Gephardt's bill, giving Congress a vote on the President's
decision to admit China into the WTO, is passed in both houses.
I would hope that Congress would take the lead in maintaining a high level of
interest and support for human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong and con-
tinue to do so long after the cameras have been packed up on July 2, 1997 and the
international media's attention begins to drift elsewhere. Congress should react
strongly, for example, to any new election laws passed by the Provisional Legis-
lature that don't allow open and free elections, including the participation of some
of Beijing's strongest critics in the current Legco. I would hope that members of
Congress will continue to travel to Hong Kong, stay in touch with NGOs there,
and actively monitor what goes on in Hong Kong beyond the annual report re-
quired of the administration under the U.S.-Hong Kong policy Act.
It would be a mistake to assume that the Clinton administration, given its dis-
mal track record on human rights in China generally, and its crisis-driven ap-
proach to policy making, will give Hong Kong all the attention it deserves and
needs. The administration is engaged in a constant balancing act, trading off vari-
ous domestic interests and constituencies, rather than acting on the basis of a co-
herent, comprehensive strategy towards China in the crucial post-Deng transition
period.
There is no question that Hong Kong's future could become the future of China
more generally, and that should be a central factor in the Clinton administration's
policy. If the rule of law and basic human freedoms can survive and even thrive in
Hong Kong, that would be a hopeful indicator of the prospects for a more open,
accountable, and transparent China in the future.
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